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ABSTRACT
THE OUTSOURCING OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
By
Christopher Weimar

Advisor: Professor Peter Liberman

The outsourcing of military activities and services has grown dramatically in recent
decades. My objective is to understand and explain this phenomenon at work in the
United States Department of Defense (DoD) using theoretical frameworks of strategic
efficiency, political ideology and organizational theory factors. This study seeks to
answer the question, why has the DOD outsourced support activities and functions that
contribute to larger national security objectives and were traditionally performed by DoD
personnel? I’ll use a case-study methodology to examine outsourcing in the DoD between
1970 and 2005, to include an in-depth look at the information technology (IT) networks
area of the military services.
I’ve chosen these cases because they combine to represent a broad perspective of
outsourcing behavior across each service over time as well as a specific core area relevant
to the war-fighting mission of each service. Since the phenomenon is under explored in
political science, my study will be valuable in expanding our understanding of the factors
influencing the increasing role of market actors in national defense activities. I’ll also
address issues regarding the distribution of power, authority and public accountability
while identifying relevant bureaucratic, ideological and organizational factors affecting
the development and implementation of national security.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
My dissertation focuses on the DoD outsourcing of services, a form of privatization,
from 1970-2005. This study seeks to understand the factors driving the DoD outsourcing
phenomenon for support services since they have become vital in the process of
providing defense and security to the American public. These support services contribute
to core activities integral to several DoD operational missions having a direct
consequence on national defense. Procurement of support services increased from $63.9
billion to $130.1 billion (constant 2005 dollars) between 1970 and 2005.
While scholars have studied the U.S. military-industrial complex focusing on
DoD/government relationships with market actors aimed primarily at weapons
manufacturing, research and development, studies addressing the growing onset of
outsourcing for many DoD support functions and missions have lagged behind. When
running defense operations has become dependent on support contractors that going to
war without them, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, becomes impossible, questions arise as to
why the DoD has put so much investment into private actors and its affect on core
military and democratic principles. No one has made a case for why the U.S. has
increased its dependence on the private sector for these activities nor addressed the issue
of winners and losers as a result of this phenomenon. This paper will study DoD
outsourcing in a variety of support functions through the frameworks of strategic
efficiency, political ideology and organization factors in a case-study methodology to
gain valuable insights into the variables affecting outsourcing activity in the DoD.
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Defense outsourcing has become an essential part of the U.S. war fighting effort
and national interest.1 When the national interest can be viewed as an object of political
contestation, some groups may benefit at the expense of others with the advancement of
the outsourcing phenomenon. Defense outsourcing is an element of U.S. national interest
and has implications for a variety of groups. After examining the usefulness of each
theoretical framework in explaining the DoD outsourcing phenomenon, I’ll address in the
conclusion how outsourcing activity has been reflective of the interests of government
and military leaders at the expense of organizational effectiveness, the federal civil
service, and the American public, measured through the safeguarding of democratic
principles in pursuit of national defense.
Since the end of the Cold War, the national-security realm of government has seen
a strong emphasis on privatization unparalleled in the modern state. Privatization is
defined as a relationship between the government and a private firm or organization to
provide a service for the government (Savas 1982; O’Looney 1998). Privatization
actions can take the form of administrative solutions, short-term political benefits or the
rearrangement of the institutional assignment of responsibilities, shifting decision
processes from the public to private realm (Feigenbaum, Henig, Hamnett 1998).
Outsourcing is a form of privatization in which a government organization is tasked
with providing appropriate oversight while the vendor is typically granted extensive
flexibility and responsibility regarding the performance of their mission (Defense Science
Board 1996). It is a form of privatization that is defined as shifting an activity, either in
whole or in part, from the public sector to the private sector in order to achieve a purpose
1

The national interest can be defined as a state acting in the interest of the entire nation, independent of
societal pressures and not representing particular factions within it. The state aggregates preferences as
best as possible to maximize its overall utility (Narizny 2007, 1).
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more effectively, efficiently and accurately (Butler 1991). It involves the increased
reliance on private actors and market forces to take over activities or responsibilities that
have come to be regarded as properly within the government sphere (Feigenbaum ed.
1998). It is grounded in the belief that market competition is a more efficient way to
provide quality service allowing for greater choice, increased efficiency and reduced
costs for service delivery (Savas 1987).
The use of private actors to augment and assume responsibilities for military forces
throughout the DoD has grown dramatically in the past few decades. The U.S. Armed
Forces have experienced a significant increase in its operations tempo over the past 15–
20 years while operating with about one-third fewer forces. Growth in technology has
increased exponentially throughout this period and affected how the DoD conducts daily
business and fights wars. According to Peter Singer, between 1994 and 2002 the U.S.
Department of Defense entered into more than 3,000 contracts with U.S. based private
military firms estimated at a contract value of $300 billion (Singer 2003, 15).
Contractors are involved in areas critical to the U.S. military’s core missions. Some of
these functions include providing security and logistics support for base operations,
conducting army aviation training, and performing maintenance and administration duties
for the F-117 stealth fighter, the B-2 stealth bomber, the U-2 reconnaissance plane, and
various naval surface warfare ships (Singer 2003, 15).
Military support services also became targeted as a business opportunity by the
private sector tailoring its their expertise and service support towards military activities.
The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review suggested that contracting-out battlefield services
would become as common as hiring private firms to build tactical aircraft thereby
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suggesting that only activities that must be performed by the DOD be kept by the DOD
(Cahlink 2003). The reliance on private actors to accomplish tasks that directly affect the
states national security capability has never been greater. It has blurred the distinction
between soldier and civilian (Newbold 1998).
The basic partnership trend between the U.S. government and the private sector was
set in motion in the 1920s when the decision was made to build military aircraft and
advanced technology armaments in the private sector (Hamre 2004, 21). Thirty years
later, President Eisenhower’s administration began an effort to shift federal “commercial”
activities to private enterprise. In 1955, the Eisenhower administration promulgated a
formal policy stating that “ the Federal government will not start or carry on any
commercial activity to provide a service or product for its own use if such product or
service can be procured from private enterprise through ordinary business channels”
(Bureau of Budget 1955). The policy followed the basic competition prescription,
before it had been formulated, that market competition would keep goods and services
cheap and of high quality (Kettl 1993, 41). Eisenhower’s policy evolved into the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76. These early efforts took place
primarily in the context of increased national governmental growth versus a broad scale
and deliberate effort to reduce the size and scope of governmental activity (Henig 1990).
In this study, I evaluate DoD outsourcing conducted through two primary methods —
annual procurement of new or existing private services, and competitive sourcing through
the Federal A-76 process.2

2

The Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 establishes federal policy for the competition of
commercial activities. It provides the process by which government employees and private sector entities
compete for the opportunity to provide a service on an installation (Keating 1997, 43).
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Focus of the Study
My research addresses an important gap in the privatization and defense literature
by examining the outsourcing of DoD support activities that ultimately have considerable
impact on the national interest and national defense capabilities and objectives. It is
significant and makes an important contribution to the literature for several reasons:
1. The nature of outsourcing traditional military activities, their explanatory factors and
impact on societal groups has not been adequately studied in political science literature.
2. Bridging the gap between political science and defense policy literatures.
3. Private firms have become a fundamental part of U.S. defense plans and operations.
4. Since defense outsourcing has important implications for national security and
ultimately weights into the assessment of the state’s military capabilities, it affects the
study of international security. The findings can be significant, as the vast majority of
research in international security assumes the state is a unitary, autonomous actor with an
objective national interest.
5. The study examines the relationship between defense organizations, policymakers and
market actors in the conduct of national security. It looks at issues addressing the balance
between the public and private provisions of security and responsibilities for national
defense, the realm of security as an avenue for political actors to reduce the size of the
state and the degree to which rational value-maximizing behavior, political ideology and
organizations explain the rise of private actors in the business of national defense. The
findings, while examined through case studies of DOD outsourcing activity between
1970–2005, can be further generalized to enhance our overall understanding of the
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relationship between market forces, societal groups, national leaders, and the states
responsibility for national defense and security throughout the international community.

Objective of the Study
The objective of this research is to understand and explain the political phenomenon
of the outsourcing of national security activities in the pre- and post-Cold War era. Why
outsourcing and why now? Though relationships between the military and private actors
are not uncommon and have existed throughout the history of the state, the outsourcing of
activities that are central to the success or failure of national security objectives is a
phenomenon moving beyond traditional government-private actor relationships as
contractors find themselves at the forefront of conflicts in activities that were previously
performed by the state. The study is framed into four parts: Part I — chapters 1-3
(introduction, literature review, research design and data collection, theoretical
frameworks overview and defense outsourcing between 1970 and 2005); Part II —
chapters 4-8 (main body of study, five case studies—1970–1980, 1981–1988, 1989–
1995, 1996–2000, 2001–2005); Part III —chapters 9-10 (Information Technology (IT)
case-study); Part IV — chapter 11 (overall findings and conclusion).
The case studies in Part II were selected to examine and test each of the three
theoretical frameworks in the study. The timeframes for the cases are based on natural
variances in procurement and competitive sourcing activity and are each characterized by
a relative change in one of the dependent variables. They provide a large variation on the
dependent variable across time, offering a good laboratory for testing each of the three
theoretical frameworks. The variance in annual procurement activity is measured using
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the percent of Operations and Maintenance (O&M)3 budget spent on procurement in
Figure 1. O&M expenditures highlight the priorities and interests of the DoD.
Competitive sourcing variance is measured through the following indicators of activity
— annual amount of competitions, amount of positions studied for competition, and
amount of competitive sourcing initiatives announced by DoD organizations in Figure
5,6,7,8 and Tables 5,7.
The first case-study is primarily focused on procurement activity, as the federal
government until 1978 did not systematically capture competitive sourcing data. It
highlights an inconsistent pattern for the annual percent of O&M committed to
procurement. The second case-study is marked by a significant increase in the percent of
O&M funds for procurement as compared to the first case. Additionally, the case is
marked by significant competitive sourcing activity. The third case-study marks a
reduction in the percent of O&M funds for procurement and a more significant reduction
in competitive sourcing activity. In the fourth case-study, the average percent of O&M
budget for procurement activity increased for the period despite a slight decrease in the
procurement dollars spent, while competitive sourcing activity grew significantly. The
fifth case-study points to a slight decline in the average percent of O&M funds spent on
procurement but also the largest increase in the amount of procurement dollars spent
when compared to all cases as the O&M budget increased. Competitive sourcing activity
began to decline during this period.

3

Operation and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations traditionally finance those things whose benefits are
derived for a limited period of time, i.e., expenses not related to military personnel or RDT&E , rather than
investments. Types of expenses funded by O&M appropriations include: DoD civilian salaries, supplies
and materials, maintenance of equipment, certain equipment items, real property maintenance, rental of
equipment and facilities, food, clothing, and fuel (DAU, 2009).
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In Part III, the Information Technology (IT) case-study examines the approach of
each military service in the operations and management of their IT network capability
from the mid 1990s through 2005. It’s a useful case for examining and testing each of
the theoretical frameworks because it evaluates the extent to which outsourcing has
affected the development of computer network management in each military service, a
core support activity penetrating virtually every defense activity in the DoD.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Most of the literature and studies of privatization and outsourcing in the U.S.
government have centered on local and state government. Studies of privatization and
outsourcing within the DoD have been narrowly focused on DoD organizations to
determine efficiency/cost savings at particular locations. Studies addressing a wider
range of potential factors shaping the outsourcing behavior of the DoD with politically
relevant incentives and ramifications have been missing. No one has made a case for
explaining the DoD outsourcing behavior of its support services nor addressed the issue
of winners and losers as result of this phenomenon.
The literature on government privatization and outsourcing offers a variety of
insights and contributions that can be useful in this study. The literature has addressed
the phenomenon through general overviews, as a pragmatic development to provide
expertise and capacity not inherent in government, through ideological descriptions
rooted in politics and based on the designs of leading politicians and as a means to
provide efficiency by reducing costs and improving public management. The literature
has also suggested that outsourcing is ineffective in the government due to the differences

9
in how public and private organizations operate and due to the lack of transparency and
accountability in public services.
In general, theorists studying privatization have referred to it as a social movement
(Tarrow 1989), a form of new populism (Boggs 1986) and a form of postmodernism that
is anti-bureaucratization (Handler 1992). Handler suggests two separate meanings for
privatization: reducing the collective domain, or providing the same level of public
services but more efficiently through the private sector (Handler 1996, 6). Emanuel S.
Savas notes that privatization was first proposed in 1969 as a deliberate public policy to
improve government (Savas 1987, 291). He defines privatization conservatively as “the
act of reducing the role of the government or increasing the role of the private sector, in
an activity or in the ownership of assets.”
As a pragmatic development, Donald Kettl notes how the American government
has steadily been increasing its reliance on private contractors. “It is a practice which
developed in advance of the rhetoric” mainly for pragmatic reasons (Kettl 1993, 199).
Kettl points out that “for more than a century before the privatization movement of the
1980s, state and local governments had contracted with companies to provide a range of
services” (Kettl 1993, 156). The private sector provided the capacity that government did
not possess and could not or did not want to build (Kettl 1993, 199).
Lester Salamon supports Kettl’s view and notes how key features of privatization
and decentralization were entrenched in American government as a result of U.S.
participation in World War II (Salamon and Lund 1989, 3). As the war effort depended
on the private sector to produce materials and weapons for war, state and federal agencies
maintained a contract relationship with private actors for goods and services in the
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postwar period. Salamon views this as part of a transformation in federal governance he
calls “third-party government” characterized by
The pervasive sharing of responsibility for the delivery of publicly financed
services and the exercise of governmental authority with a host of ‘third parties’ –
states, cities, counties, commercial banks, industrial corporations, savings and
loan associations, and many others (Salamon 1995, 5)
Under “third-party governance”, public agencies had the ability to work in
partnership with the private sector to ensure public services were delivered and used.
The private sector became entwined with the daily affairs of public business (Salamon
1995, 5). Salamon points to the need for competition between the public and private
sphere otherwise contracting-out and other forms of privatization would be ineffective
(Salamon and Lund 1989, 258).
Smith and Lipsky (1993) also point to this partnership between the public and
private sector. The postwar period provided an expansion of government agencies
delivering good and services, furthering the interdependence of the public and private
sectors. As noted by Kettl, every major policy initiative since World War II has been a
public-private partnership. These include Medicare and Medicaid, environmental
cleanup and restoration, antipoverty programs, job training, interstate highways, and
many more (Kettl 1993, 4).
Daniel Guttman argues that the growth of contracting in government was the
product of government reform initiatives and relationships established among leading
citizens in the government, non-profit, and corporate network in the first decades of the
20th century, allowing the government to grow to serve the public interest without
growing into a centralized big government (Guttman 2000, 89–90,98). The private sector
would provide both technical expertise and political support for an increased federal
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commitment to national defense and public welfare tasks. Through tacit bipartisan
consent imposed through personnel ceilings, contracting to third parties became the norm
as agencies or programs were created (Guttman 2000, 103–104).
William T. Gormley also notes that privatization is not a new phenomenon and treats
it as a legitimate tool of government. Though it is often justified as an effort to reduce the
cost of government or to reduce the size and scope of government, he argues that it must be
selectively used (Gormley 1994, 215,231).
The ideological support for privatization/outsourcing was prompted by a drift to
widespread disapproval of government operations and its lack of effectiveness in
providing public services in the 1960s and 1970s. The environment surrounding public
services welcomed alternative methods to improve performance. Savas notes how antigovernment sentiment grew more rapidly than anti-business sentiment during these
decades (Savas 1987, 8). Anti-government sentiment spurred on by tax uprisings in the
1970s, growing budget deficits at the state and federal level, and inflation sparked
demands for privatization (Kettl 1993). Recession in the 1980s, growing concern about
the federal government’s budget deficit, and the long-term fiscal crisis in large cities led
to a weakening fiscal position of the public sector and efforts to restrain the growth of
government expenditures and make government operations more cost effective
(Seidenstat 1999, 11). The political environment grew more hostile to the expansion of
government budgets and increases in tax rates, but the appetite for public services and
military force remained constant (Donahue 1989, 3-4). “Popular distaste for government,
though never wholly absent from American politics, reached a level in the 1970s and the
1980s that had not been seen for half a century” (Donahue 1989, 3).
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John Donahue addresses the rise of privatization in the federal government as a
British import, given how the American interest in free enterprise has long imposed a bias
for private actors (Donahue 1989, 4). Donahue suggests that conservative intellectuals in
the U.S. set out to shrink the domain of government and promote private alternatives by
emulating the privatization efforts of the British (Donahue 1989, 3–4). Feigenbaum, Henig
and Hamnett (1998) contribute to our understanding of privatization as a political
phenomenon. Their central thesis is that privatization is rooted in the motives and designs
of leading politicians. They argue that the broader concept of privatization was politicized
by the Reagan administration.
Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980 was facilitated by a platform to reduce the size of
government. The cry was to allow private citizens the opportunity to take care of
themselves without the imposition of government restraints and ambitions (Kettl 1993,
3). Joel Handler noted the development of a new optimism in the belief that the public
bureaucracy could be reduced and private citizens could be counted on to improve the
social fabric of their communities (Handler 1996, 3). Paul Starr argues that however
varied the meaning of privatization, it is unambiguously a serious political countermovement against the growth of big government. It should be viewed as a conservative
attempt to reconstitute the major institutional domains of society, to roll back state
activities in the name of efficiency, effectiveness, and freedom of choice (Starr 1988, 54).
Privatization matured as a policy theory representing a deliberate political strategy
to reshape the economic and political interests in the Reagan administration (Henig 1990,
662–663). Early in his first term, Reagan’s administration began to formulate proposals
to sell government assets to include federally owned parks and wilderness lands, and rail
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services such as Conrail and AMTRAK that reflected the kind of privatization underway
in Britain (Henig 1990, 661). Other forms of privatization such as contracting-out
service delivery during this period was exemplified in the movement to privatize the
administration of prisons (Salamon 1995, 194).
Reagan’s 1988 Commission on Privatization concluded its study in favor of
structuring privatization initiatives to create new interest groups with direct stakes in
accelerating the process of shrinking the size and scope of government (Henig 1990,
663). Henig notes that portraying privatization as a necessary adaptation to fiscal
constraints fails to acknowledge the range of alternatives open to government actors, and
the partisan tactics and pressure exerted by mobilized interest groups (Henig 1990, 669).
Savas suggests that privatization can produce long-term improvements because it
involves institutional change rather than spasmodic exhortation, and causes government
agencies to adopt the well-known, good-management techniques because it poses a
competitive threat (Savas 1987, 289). While Savas argues that it reduces costs without
reducing the quality of government services, issues regarding accountability are not
addressed. Savas concedes that privatizing a government function is not an easy task as
attitudes have to be changed and privatization is not the best option in every case.
Paul Seidenstat explains the acceleration of privatization in the mid-1980s as a result
of understanding the forces for changes and their strength compared to the forces operating
to maintain the status quo such that forces for change grew in strength and broke through
the resistance to change (Seidenstat 1999, 10). Changes in the political environment
regarding the size and role of government in society forced elected officials to consider
methods to restrain government spending operations without a matching reduction in
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services. As the government agenda focused on the issue of restructuring or rightsizing,
privatization became a major policy option as part of a restructuring program (Seidenstat
1999, 11).
Stuart Butler suggests that privatization is more than a method of cutting costs in
government. By changing the pattern of demand for services, it may prove to be a potent
political strategy to reverse the momentum toward ever-larger government in the United
States (Butler 1987, 4). He argues that conditions must be created in which the demand
for government spending is diverted into the private sector as compared to adopting
strategies to contain spending thru legislation. Instead of having to disappoint constituents
and risk electoral damage, politicians can adopt a more palatable approach to cutting
spending by fostering private alternatives reducing the demand for federal spending (Butler
1987, 5).
Florencio Lopez de Silanes, Andrei Schleifer and Robert Vishny (1997) look at the
political determinants of privatization. They examine the choice in providing a service
between in-house government and the private sector by testing efficiency, political
patronage and ideology determinants against census data on the most commonly provided
public services. While political factors are important, they argue that trade-offs in political
costs and benefits help shape privatization decisions (Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and
Vishny 1997, 468).
Robert Mandel notes how the global spread of free-market values legitimized by the
growing belief in economic liberalism promoted competitive privatization as optimal in
all spheres of human activity, including security (Mandel 2002, 2). The rationale for the
spread of privatization is maximizing efficiency, output quality and effectiveness in
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services, accentuated by the declining quality and funding of public services (Mandel
2002, 3).
Philip Deavel suggests the roots of privatization/outsourcing in the Defense
Department stem from more than an economic argument. The privatization debate
resonates with the policy initiatives of the McNamara era and his civilian Whiz Kids
(Deavel 1999). Dismissing the unique organizational needs of the DOD mission, civilian
leadership was determined to bring private sector business efficiency to the Armed Forces.
Deavel suggests that the DOD’s orientation towards a rigid command and control
production and compensation system rather than decentralized market models is rooted in
the ideals of President Roosevelt’s New Deal.
The military cultural deficiency that allowed McNamara to dominate the debate over
the proper organization of the DOD continues in today’s DOD environment. Military
leaders who lack executive level, corporate experience are partnered with political
appointees guided by advisors with strong roots in the private sector spearheading the drive
for privatization (Deavel 1999, 40–41).
Steven Schooner suggests that the momentum to outsource in the DOD is focused on
the administration’s effort to have a smaller military. Anything that is not associated with
fighting is deemed to be something the private sector can provide (Schooner 2005). The
current G.W. Bush administration favors outsourcing because, like its Democratic
predecessor, it wants to tout the elimination of government employees (Schooner 2003,
11). This is not a dramatic break from prior administrations where personnel ceilings were
accompanied by bipartisan silence on the changing nature of the federal workforce
(Schooner 2003).
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Osborne and Gaebler addressed privatization through an approach called
reinventing government wherein privatization was one method among a variety of
alternatives to increase efficiency and cost-savings in the public domain. Promoting an
entrepreneurial spirit and giving customers a choice among competing service agents was
the anticipated method to remedy shortfalls in government performance (Osborne and
Gaebler 1992). The reinventing government approach envisioned private actors being
accountable for meeting public goals while public agencies retained ultimate authority.
Timothy Taylor suggests that privatization results from firms making “buy” decisions
for competencies necessary but not core to the organization. If firms can buy a certain
good or service from outside the firm at a lower cost and at the same level of quality, then
it should buy; if not, it should make it (Taylor 2005, 369). The make or buy decision can
evolve over time as firms respond to price, technology and the degree of quality control
they can exercise (Taylor 2005, 369). Taylor supplements this argument with the belief
that firms have only a few “core competencies” in which it has distinctive skills and
abilities. Firms should hire others firms with their own core competencies to perform non
core tasks (Taylor 2005, 369–370).
Elliot Sclar examines the assertion that contractual relationships will give the public
sector all the advantages of the market without undermining the level of public service
(Sclar 2000, 4). While critically examining the economic reasons for why privatization as
a reform strategy in the form of public contracting often bogs down, he notes the problems
of accountability and control throughout his study (Sclar 2000, 5,157). Highlighting how
transaction costs are often ignored and usually come back in the form of higher costs and
fewer alternatives in the original privatization initiative, he suggests that public contracting
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is a cumbersome and expensive instrument for the delivery of public services with an
ongoing trade-off between the inherent risk of moral hazards4 and the cost of effective
oversight (Sclar 2000, 155,160).
Paul Carrick (1988) examines efficiency in 455 competitions in Navy A-76 programs
and suggests that the government can be as efficient as the private sector, especially if
better incentives are established for public managers. The Center for Naval Analysis has
produced several case studies evaluating competitive sourcing from 1996 to 2001 with
studies primarily focusing on assessing the economic and cost-efficiency of outsourcing
initiatives in a variety of areas to include training, housing, maintenance and base-operating
support (Ackerman, Boning, Clark, Clark and Scafidi, Kleinman, Trunkey, Snyder, and
Tighe). The 1998 study (Snyder et al) argues for large cost savings of at least 30 percent.
The 2001 study (Clark et al) reviews 16 competitions and suggests that savings are real and
sustained over time (Clark et al 2001, 51).
RAND’s report on competitive sourcing (Gates, Robbert 2000) examined six A-76
competitions, noting substantial projected cost-savings. Their findings suggest that using
fewer people and downgrading positions achieved annual personnel cost savings. Neither
contractors nor in-house managers had an inherent advantage when reducing personnel
costs (Gates and Robbert 2000, 63). However, they noted that expected savings could be
overly optimistic in regards to the process of conducing competitions and savings
generated from those completed (Gates and Robbert 2000, 6).
The report by Gansler, Lipitz (2003) addresses the government shift towards marketbased management. The report supported the cost saving from competitive sourcing

4

Moral hazards refer to potential problems of reduced incentives on the part of agent to fulfill the goals of
the principal (Sclar 2000, 114).
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activities in the CNA and RAND studies. They find that competition can achieve better
results at lower costs and stress the importance of post-competition management (Gansler
2003a, 48).
Despite the cost-savings findings in many of these studies, the credibility of A-76
competitive sourcing results appear questionable due to missing data. The studies do not
appear to control for the costs of each A-76 study. Documentation of changes to cost,
performance and workload were inconsistent because records were not routinely kept
(Clark et al 2001, 4). Also, the lack of a central data-collection capability in the DoD
federal government that tracks actual costs and performance after the competition is
completed prevented the government from understanding the longer-term impact on cost
and performance (Clark et al 2001, 8).
Peter Drucker recommended the management of government bureaucracy be changed
before initiating efficiency-type actions such as outsourcing. Drucker suggests that
government agencies have outgrown its structure, policies and rules of behavior of which
many date back to the 1929–1933 period (Drucker 1995, 52,54). He argues that
organizations should rethink themselves when seeking to take actions such as outsourcing
to improve performance by reevaluating their mission and whether it needs to be changed
to produce desired results (Drucker 1995, 54). The process of rethinking can identify many
functions in a particular organization than can be eliminated or better provided by a private
firm.
James Wilson argues that outsourcing offers limited usefulness in government
process. Reinvention and efficiency actions suggested by proponents of privatization are
difficult to accomplish in the public sector. Wilson suggests that agencies are likely to
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have general, vague, and inconsistent goals about which clarity and agreement can only
occasionally be obtained (Wilson 1989, 26). Organizations have a poor sense of mission
due to a general lack of consensus about goals and tasks to be performed. Agencies have
limited autonomy to define priorities normally determined by the political environment
(Wilson 1989, 27).
A significant constraint on government agency leaders is the necessity to negotiate
and depend on political leaders for the execution of mission objectives. Unlike private
sector organizations, the DoD, for example, cannot borrow money; it must rely on annual
Congressional appropriations for funding operations and objectives. Private sector
organizations have greater flexibility and autonomy in rewarding good performance and
correcting poor performance.
Wilson suggests that government agencies don’t quite fit the model for successful
forms of privatization. Successful privatization depends on a defined mission, clearly
defined performance standards, and accountability through enforcement of performance
standards. Government agencies have difficulty in agreeing upon a mission, performance
standards are poorly developed and usually influenced by external factors, and many public
employees are not affected by whether their performance is acceptable or not. Finally,
private sector organizations operate within a market-driven system whereas price and
profit-motive disciplines are absent in non-market environments such as the government
sector (Wilson 1989, 369).
Peter Feaver views the increase in security privatization as a result of how the
government has inefficiently structured itself in relation to private actors. Privatization is
the response to the underlying problems of work within the government that creates
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incentives for the contractor (Feaver 2004, 14). Feaver and Cindy Williams both note how
the U.S. personnel management system and policies are designed to the standards of the
1940s and has been unresponsive to changes in the military environment and shifting needs
(Feaver 2004, 17; Williams 2004a, 8-11). Feaver also points to Peter Singer’s argument
that the government has not effectively set up the mechanisms to manage privatization. The
government is bidding against itself while military force structure is being run down due to
extensive foreign interventions. Singer points to several examples in which the
government has outsourced functions to private contractors who hire displaced military
members at two to ten times the rate the government would have paid them on active duty
(Singer 2004, 14).
John Donahue also points out that productive efficiency is not the cardinal virtue of a
civil service organization (Donahue 1989, 216). While public agencies characteristically
are structured to guarantee due process and administrative fairness, the orientation of the
private sector is to deliver a product for an agreed-upon price (Donahue 1989, 216).
Harnessing private energies to public purposes can be difficult to exercise in contractual
architecture (Donahue 1989, 218). Donahue suggests that contractors are the best choice
when governments know what they want and are interested in the results as compared to
the process. Otherwise, if following guidelines and process is the primary interest of
governments with limited flexibility, civil servants are the best choice for this duty.
Critics of privatization have highlighted its lack of transparency that it can make
public management more complex, increase costs, allow quality and capability to decay,
detract from collective savings, and challenge democratic accountability (P Starr
1987,1991;Markusen 2001). Paul Starr rejects the premises and promises offered by the
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privatization framework, such as reducing public spending and the sphere of government
action. He argues that the privatization movement gains its most devoted support from
ideologically minded conservatives hostile to the purposes of public services (Starr 1991,
25). He suggests the privatization literature is misguided in depicting political decision
making as systematically distorted, inefficient and undesirable (Starr 1991, 25–26). Starr
notes the danger in contracting out — that governments may become captive to particular
contractors as they acquire inside knowledge — and further suggests how privatization
conveys a degree of political authority to private firms, where as the separation of politics
from administration is not a clean divide (Starr 1991, 31).
Though advocates of privatization have successfully brought attention to serious
problems of public expenditure and management, Starr suggests that privatization is not a
general solution to resolve the issues. He suggests that advocates of privatization attempt
to brand the government as incompetent and to change the aspirations of society towards
the market and away from the sphere of common responsibility (Starr 1991, 33).
Smith and Lipsky highlight how government contracts with private enterprise had
the effect of masking growth in government activities and spending. Contracting with
private enterprise enabled government agencies to increase spending and services without
hiring large numbers of new workers and expanding facilities (Smith and Lipsky 1993,
203–205).
Peter Singer’s study on the private military industry offers a variety of insights from
the outsourcing of military services addressing the pragmatic and ideological nature of the
phenomenon. In the post-Cold War era, changes in the market of security, the nature of
warfare, and the thinking about how to produce public services led to the growth of private
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military firms (Singer 2003, 2005). IT technology became an increasingly important part of
warfare, with civilian-based off-the-shelf technologies being integrated into military
functions, and with civilian technicians used to maintain and operate these resources.
The developing gap between the supply of military resources in the post-Cold war
and the demand for military support services due to increased regional conflicts and
humanitarian efforts produced increased contractor involvement. Singer highlights the
state’s reliance on private actors as a capability for accomplishing its strategic objectives.
Similar to private corporations that need expertise in particular areas, any client can access
the full range of military skills as long as they have financial resources.
Singer also points to the change over the last 50 years in how we view public versus
private, suggesting a philosophical shift that needs to be factored into restoring public
services (Singer 2004, 14). Reagan’s idea that the best minds have been sucked out into the
private sector…the term public schooling having an inherently bad connotation all allude to
the ineffective nature of government. The growth in privatization changed the focus of how
to provide public services where the military, being the last monopoly of the state, began to
see its activities and functions being performed by private sector entities (Singer 2005, 34).
Private military actors have been labeled as commodities in the global security
market, having significant implications on international institutions, the state and the
distribution of power, argues Deborah Avant. Material and social challenges from
globalization have been factors in the demand for private security (Avant 2004a, 10). As
suggested by Peter Singer, Deborah Avant notes how market pressures, technology and
social change in the globalized world are creating multiple demands that national militaries

23
have difficulty meeting (Avant 2004b, 21). Changes in the nature of conflicts and
advances in technology have given private security companies opportunities within the
military force structure (Avant 2004c, 154). Avant also suggests that an ideological shift
— a growing belief in the superiority of market-based solutions to collective problems has
led to the rise of private actors as service providers for new security demands (Avant
2004a, 11).
Allison Stanger points to five primary factors contributing to the rise of privatized
military activity. First, in a pragmatic sense, the increasing role of high-technology
weaponry in warfare has transformed how the military fights wars; second, the collapse of
the Cold War order and the related phenomenon of failed states has provided opportunities
for private actors in a variety of global security activities; third, the American obsession
with privatization as a means to cut costs and enhance efficiency; fourth, the militarization
of American foreign policy where as, noted by Dana Priest, the mission of the armed forces
has expanded over the past decade to go beyond merely winning wars; fifth, outsourcing as
the path of least political resistance as the tolerance for military casualties remained low
while the administration’s desire to reshape the security environment was high (Stanger
2004, 3).
The privatization/outsourcing literature review provided a wealth of data and
information suggesting its complexity and the challenges that still remain in explaining the
DoD phenomenon. The review offers no definitive answers or solutions to the outsourcing
of DoD support services. The analysis of competitive sourcing studies was useful in
highlighting the cost-savings efforts of DoD organizations. Yet it also exposed weaknesses
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that are problematic to its cost-savings efforts and were void of analysis from other
theoretical frameworks, such as political ideology and organization factors.
The literature review was useful in suggesting potential causes of and concerns from
privatization at different levels of public life. However, the lack of a comprehensive
analysis of DoD outsourcing behavior in both procurement and competitive-sourcing
activities is pronounced and points to a gap in the literature that requires further
investigation.
This study will address that gap and provide a detailed analysis of outsourcing
behavior in the DOD from 1970 through 2005. The study covers a wide time frame to
capture the extent and variance of outsourcing development in the DoD. To provide a
more focused perspective, the study also evaluates outsourcing behavior in the IT network
management-services area, a key function essential to the defense mission.
Using the frameworks of strategic efficiency, political ideology, and organization
factors, the study offers a unique and unparalleled test of theoretical frameworks to identify
the underpinnings of the outsourcing phenomenon. It offers a broader and more enriched
contribution to the nature of DoD outsourcing than most studies to-date, as the comparisons
across the theoretical frameworks offer perspectives rarely discussed in political science
and military studies literature. It provides military leaders, policymakers, government
officials and interested scholars greater insight into the factors driving outsourcing
relationships. It can be useful in an effort to construct and reshape federal and DoD policy
and national defense strategy, and to understand the potential impact of DoD outsourcing
on democratic values that our defense/national security mission seeks to protect.
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA COLLECTION

The study addresses a number of hypotheses about the cause of DoD outsourcing and
its variance within the study period. The hypotheses represent three distinct perspectives
on DoD behavior: strategic efficiency, political ideology and organization factors. They
each have received interest in the study of national security policy but rarely have been
employed in this manner. Each framework summarizes fundamental attributes of their
respective theoretical foundations as compared to their larger body of work. For example,
organization theory provides a larger and more diverse body of thought than I’ve discussed
in this study. I’ve only addressed some of the fundamentals of organization theory
literature. The use of the term “organization theory” may be misleading so, to indicate
clearly the general origins of the hypothesis introduced, I’ll use the label “organization
factors” for the organization perspective on the causes of DoD outsourcing examined in the
study.

The hypotheses introduced in this chapter are empirical statements that can be tested
logically and will be evaluated using case studies. My goal is to take three theoretical
frameworks that have been employed to evaluate state behavior and compare their
explanatory power. The frameworks introduced are among the most likely alternatives to
each other. To the extent that hypotheses deduced from one of the frameworks better
explain the character of DoD outsourcing and are confirmed by the cases examined later in
the study, the theories from which they are deduced gain more credibility.
In the study, a successful outsourcing action will be characterized as any DoD
mission-related activity that a private contractor has assumed responsibility. The areas of

26
study include the DoD environment between 1970 and 2005 and IT network management
within the military services. These areas can be studied in each of the military services,
they are diverse, important to national defense and the state’s war-fighting capability, and
have the ability to be compared and evaluated over time. I’ve chosen this approach because
it represents both a broad perspective of outsourcing behavior across each service over
time, as well as, a focus on a particular core area of each military service relevant to their
war fighting mission. The cases also allow for multiple observations of the values for each
variable across time, within a common background, offering data to prove or disprove each
hypothesis. In evaluating the hypotheses, I’ll use paired observations and process tracing
for each case within the studies time frame.
In H1, outsourcing is a viable DOD strategy due to its cost-effectiveness. I’ll assess
the cost-effectiveness of the activities in each case-study using military pay and pay-growth
rates, DoD civilian and private-sector employee pay rates and conditional variables
including medical spending and non-cash benefits (health care, retirement, etc.). I’ll rate
cost-effectiveness as either High, Medium, or Low based upon the pay and pay-growth
comparison between comparative DoD and private-sector personnel where outsourcing is
likely when cost-effectiveness is High.
In H2, DOD outsourcing is a consequence of a politically conservative Congress and
President. Actions to reduce the size of the state and increase the role of the private sector
in performing public functions will be considered politically conservative. Political
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conservatism will be rated on a scale of Low, Medium and High based upon the political
party controlling the Presidency, House and Senate.5
I’ll examine and measure the extent to which Congress and the President support
initiatives to outsource public activities and reduce the size of government throughout the
time frame. I’ll compare the findings on the scale of conservatism for the Congress and
the President with the nature of outsourcing activity in each of the case studies. A
positive test of the hypothesis will demonstrate a relationship between the scale of
conservatism and the extent of outsourcing in the case studies.
In H3, New activities and those outside the scope of an organization’s standard or
doctrine-specific activities are likely to be outsourced in periods of budgetary decline. I’ll
examine the organization mission tasks and the extent to which outsourced activities are
new to the organizational mission or replace preexisting activities. I’ll examine the nature
of the outsourced activity and the extent to which it is a primary or support activity, and its
priority in the organization. The priority of an activity is determined by its relationship to
the organization’s core mission, the size of its funding and amount of personnel assigned to
the activity. Priority increases when the activity is an element of the core mission, with a
large budget stream and personnel. A positive test of the hypothesis will be demonstrated
by a direct relationship between a declining budget and outsourced activities being either a
new or support activity outside the core of the organization mission.
The research study is primarily qualitative in nature, focusing on archival and
historical analysis, as well as, personal interviews with government and DOD officials and
private business executives. I had access to public information related to this study through
5

Based on the increased polarization in Congress after 1970 as suggested by Poole and Rosenthal, my
assumption is that political conservatism will likely be greater when the Executive and Congress have a
Republican majority.
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various DOD, military, and outsourcing related Web sites, universities, online journals,
newspapers, magazines, periodicals and interviews. The analysis was exploratory and
focused on collecting information from a variety of sources incorporating data
triangulation. I focused on congressional reports, General Accounting Office reports,
Inspector General audits, White House reports and documents, budget studies and reports,
legislation, DOD documents, specialty journals and periodicals, Freedom of Information
requests, and other public documents that assisted with charting and examining the
outsourcing issues discussed in the study. The analysis also involved searching texts,
reports, periodicals, briefing documents, handbooks, manuals, magazines, pamphlets,
transcripts, newspapers and Internet Web sources for primary and secondary data
contributing to the study.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

Part I
1. Introduction and Literature Review. This chapter summarizes the dissertation project
and overview of the argument. It discusses pertinent literature on privatization and
outsourcing in both the private and military sector. Finally, it reviews the research design
and data collection methods and provides an outline of the study.
2. Theoretical Frameworks Overview. This chapter provides an overview of the strategic
efficiency, political ideology and organization factors and how they will be used to
examine the outsourcing phenomenon in key national defense activities within DOD.
3. Defense Outsourcing and Overview 1970–2005. This chapter discusses the two
primary methods used by the DoD to outsource support activities, procurement of services

29
and competitive sourcing initiatives. It describes variables associated with outsourcing and
concludes with a brief overview of outsourcing activity across the defense sector between
1970 and 2005.
Part II
4. Case Study Defense Outsourcing – 1970–1980. This chapter evaluates the significance
of each of the three theories (strategic efficiency, political ideology and organization
factors) in explaining DoD outsourcing behavior between 1970 and 1980.
5. Case Study Defense Outsourcing – 1981–1988. This chapter evaluates the significance
of each of the three theories in explaining DoD outsourcing behavior between 1981 and
1988.
6. Case Study Defense Outsourcing – 1989–1995. This chapter evaluates the significance
of each of the three theories in explaining DoD outsourcing behavior between 1989 and
1995.
7. Case Study Defense Outsourcing – 1996–2000. This chapter evaluates the significance
of each of the three theories in explaining DoD outsourcing behavior between 1996 and
2000.
8. Case Study Defense Outsourcing – 2001–2005. This chapter evaluates the significance
of each of the three theories in explaining DoD outsourcing behavior between 2001 and
2005.
Part III
9. Case Study – Information Technology (IT) Networks and DoD Outsourcing
Behavior 1995-2005. This chapter examines the development of IT networks in the
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military services from the 1990s through 2005 and the approach of each service towards
outsourcing their network functions and management.
10. Analysis of IT Network Management in the Military Services. This chapter
evaluates the significance of strategic efficiency, political ideology and organization factors
in explaining the use of outsourcing for IT network management in each military service.
Part IV
11. Findings and Conclusion. This chapter will provide a review of the findings from
each case-study explaining the relative success and/or failure of the hypotheses and the
significance of each theoretical framework in explaining outsourcing behavior. It will also
provide an overall assessment of DoD outsourcing and what can be expected for national
security.
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CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS OVERVIEW
National security is a primary objective of the state. The rise of outsourcing within
the defense realm is a phenomenon having impact on the security architecture of the state.
Outsourcing studies have primarily been focused on government services outside the
national security realm with an emphasis on economic efficiency. My study will address
the gap in political science and security studies regarding the outsourcing of national
defense activities by focusing on the phenomenon through the frameworks of strategic
efficiency, political ideology and organization factors.

STRATEGIC EFFICIENCY

The Congress established the Department of Defense in 1947, incorporating and
reorganizing elements of the old War Department and Navy Department (Brown 1983,
215). While one goal was to integrate the military policy of the United States with its
foreign policy through a single, central civilian management of the armed forces and their
activities, the second goal was to address the perceived need for efficiency of operation
(Brown 1983, 215). In the years since 1947, there have been many calls for better, more
efficient and more effective management of the Department of Defense and their its
activities (Brown 1983, 215). Outsourcing has become one of the means to help establish
efficiency and cost saving across the federal government.
DoD and government functions at a variety of levels have been criticized for being
inflexible due to their bureaucratic nature. They should steer rather than row, set policy
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and fund private sector delivery but not produce services directly (Osborne and Gaebler,
1992). William Niskanen (1973) suggests that the superior performance of market
institutions as compared to the federal government is based on differences in structure
and the incentives of their managers (Niskanen 1973, 54). He suggests that private
source of supply can significantly reduce the monopoly power of the bureaucracy,
inefficiency and costs with its improved structure and incentive systems (Niskanen 1973,
57). Outsourcing is a means for public organizations to meet responsibilities more
efficiently because private managers can deliver at lower costs services similar or
superior to those of public managers (Bailey 1985). When it works well, outsourcing can
boost efficiency through accelerated innovation, spare public workers from peripheral
activities, improve spending decisions and provide for a more sensible scale of operation.
Strategic efficiency is based on the premise that states are rational. They seek to
reduce their costs and effectively use resources to accomplish objectives and goals. They
will attempt to get the greatest possible return or benefit for the least amount of cost.
Efficiency in the government, like the commercial sector, can be defined as the ratio of
outputs to inputs (Graves 2001, 49). The case for privatization is built on the assertion
that contractual relationships in which private parties deliver public goods will give the
public sector all the advantages of the market without undermining the level of public
service (Sclar 2000, 4). Economically, competitive contracting sets incentives in place
that ensure production of the best possible product for the lowest possible price (Sclar
2000, 12). Within the DoD, efficiency is defined through an economic lens where the
amount or level of military compensation should be no higher or lower than necessary to
fulfill the basic objective of attracting, retaining, and motivating the kinds and numbers
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of service personnel needed for the active and reserve forces of the United States military
(DoD 2005, 8).
In this framework we would expect to see organizations utilizing procedures to
quantify manpower costs for specific objectives and mechanisms to measure whether
objectives are met or not. In general, as noted by Graham Allison, if the cost of
accomplishing a given objective through alternative means is greater than the primary
means then there is less likelihood of the alternative being chosen. A decrease in the cost
of an alternative in comparison to the primary increases the likelihood of the alternative
being chosen (Allison 1971, 34). This is the essence of a strategic efficiency approach to
outsourcing. It predicts differential privatization/outsourcing based on expected costs or
savings of having particular services performed by the private sector.
The DOD has been in the process to reduce cost and improve the performance of its
activities in a formal manner since the 1950s. It outsourced functions primarily through
two methods — competitive sourcing of internal (in-house) activities and procurement of
new services. Implicit in the strategic efficiency framework is that private actors can
perform public activities equally good or better than public actors, true and sustained
competition is operable, DOD behaves as a private business by providing specific
requirements as articulated in proposals (RFPs) and contracts, and the DoD has adequate
oversight talent to ensure private contractors deliver the promised goods and services
(Markusen 2003). Key variables associated with the DoD’s outsourcing actions include
infrastructure size, manpower costs, personnel qualifications, technology and new
missions.6

6

DOD defines infrastructure as activities that generally operate from fixed locations to support missions to
include those carried out by combat forces. Infrastructure includes installation support, central training,
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In relation to outsourcing activity, strategic efficiency expects the DOD to seek out
the best value through a cost-savings competition between DoD and private sector
producers in order to get the best possible product for its activities and services at the
most competitive cost. Competition among producers strengthens the bargaining power
of the purchaser (Prager 1994, 177). As suggested by Allison, we can expect to see
government agencies seeking alternative means to accomplish public functions when the
compensation costs of DoD personnel are greater than private sector employees
performing similar functions. The theory predicts that government will outsource
activities when they can save money and continue to meet mission objectives. The
framework implies the DoD will be selective and differentiate the activities that get
outsourced based on a cost analysis and getting the most value for its budget.
Outsourcing offers the DOD a mechanism to address cost savings in DOD’s
mission areas, affecting its operations and support services and potentially saving and
redirecting billions of dollars into its top priorities including modernization efforts and
new weapon systems. The ability of private actors to provide public goals more
efficiently and effectively is especially cogent for public officials in an environment
marked by expanding demands and fiscal constraints.7 E.S Savas suggests that
privatization can be a strategic approach to improving productivity and public
management of government agencies, and provide the public with more value for its tax
investment (Savas 1987). It can be portrayed as an apolitical, nonpartisan vehicle for

central medical, central logistics, force management, acquisition, central personnel, and central command,
control, communications (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-110).
7
Efficiency refers to the economically appropriate allocation of resources. The most efficient arrangement
produces the greatest output per unit of input (Savas, p.122). Effective refers to an output most nearly
satisfying the need (Savas, p.122).
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helping government balance their budget, or improve the overall performance of their
economy (Feigenbaum and Henig 1999).
Coase’s theory of the firm, published in 1937, highlights the importance of reduced
transaction costs in the functioning of an organization. The desire of the state to provide
the public with maximum security value using its inherent assets points to a relationship
between the state and Coase’s description of the firm.8 The theory of the firm calls our
attention to addressing the factors determining the firm’s boundaries and what economic
factors relate to its decision to contract out some of its activities rather than perform them
(Coase 1988; Fredland 2003). Considering the DoD as a firm, similar questions can be
asked regarding its role and boundaries in providing security and defense services, as
suggested in the post-Cold War era.
Oliver Williamson expands on Coase’s thesis by using a transaction-cost approach to
study economic organization and efficiency. Following on from John R. Commons (1932),
Williamson maintains that transactions are the basic unit of organizational analysis and
include both exchanges and contracts (Alchian and Woodward 1988, 66) . Williamson’s
approach focuses on contracts in which a promise of future performance is exchanged and
investments are made, the value of which becomes dependent on the fulfillment of the
party’s promises (Alchian and Woodward 1988, 66).
Transactions are marked with the attributes of asset specificity, uncertainty and
frequency (Williamson 2005, 6). Williamson notes that the criterion for organizing
commercial transactions is assumed to be cost economizing, which includes economizing
on production expenses and transaction costs (Williamson 1979, 245). The object of a

8

The similarity revolves around the desire to reduce transaction costs where the state is in the business of
governing and providing public services.
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firm, and in this case the DoD, is to economize on the sum of production and transaction
costs (Williamson 1979, 245). Whether a service should be outsourced or performed inhouse to economize and gain efficiency is thus dependent on the type of transaction and its
costs.
Williamson suggests that transaction costs are more than the cost of finding other
people, inspecting goods, seeking agreeable terms, and writing exchange agreements, but
include the costs incurred in making contracts enforceable by law or by self-enforcement,
precautions against potential expropriation of the value of investments relying on
contractual performance, and the costs of informing and administering terms of contractual
relations (Alchian and Woodward 1988, 66). As noted by Kenneth Arrow, they are the
costs of running the economic system, the economic equivalent of friction in physical
systems (Williamson 1985, 18).
As suggested by Herbert Simon (1985), the cognitive and self-interested attributes of
human actors described as bounded rationality (limited in knowledge, foresight, and skill)
and opportunism (self-interest-seeking behavior with a lack of candor or honesty in
transactions) are core to the study of economic organization (Williamson 1999, 311).
Williamson considers them central to transaction cost analysis. They are unavoidable
hazards whose magnitude varies systematically with the attributes of the transaction that
include asset specificity and uncertainty (Williamson 1998, 76).
A critical aspect of foreign affairs transactions, to include many defense
activities/missions, is probity. It implies a high standard of integrity, abiding respect for
mission, reliable responsiveness to senior government leaders, and accurate communication
to counterparties (Williamson 1999, 322–323). Hazards to probity include lack of
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confidence by senior leaders in the information and assessments provided by the
agency/contractor, perceptions of non-compliance, and lack of authority/expertise
(Williamson 1999, 323–324).
In this context, economic organization has the purpose of promoting the continuity of
relationships between parties to a contract by devising specialized governance structures to
manage transactions, rather than permitting relationships to fracture under the hammer of
unassisted market contracting (Williamson 1985, 1,3). Williamson argues that the firm is
not a stand-alone entity but a governance structure with the attributes of incentive intensity,
administrative control and contract law regime in the service of economizing on
transactions costs by infusing order to mitigate conflict and realize mutual gain
(Williamson 2002, 173,180).
Williamson suggests that joining transactions and governance structures provides for
alignment between transactions that differ in their attributes with governance structures that
differ in cost and competencies in an economizing way, yielding specific efficiency
outcomes that will affect make or buy decisions (Williamson 2002, 191). It offers a lens to
apply through the framework of strategic efficiency as to whether transactions being
considered for DoD outsourcing are aligned with market governance structures or better
suited for remaining within the DoD structure. As suggested by Williamson, transactions
that are long-term have a need for loyalty (to the leadership and to the mission) and a high
standard of integrity, and are best provided by public agencies that offer an effective
governance structure for addressing the hazards of probity (Williamson 1999, 324,338).
While it is beyond the scope of this study to examine the make or buy decisions for all
DoD transactions, the transaction-cost approach is a useful complement to pay and pay-
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growth comparisons between DoD and private sector personnel by examining the type of
complexity in DoD transactions and the extent to which the market or DoD, as governance
structures, mitigate potential transaction hazards.
From the strategic efficiency lens, some military missions in the post-Cold War era
appeared amenable to outsourcing as the U.S. military strategy evolved into a global
policing role. During the Cold War, while the military was deployed globally, in
relatively fixed locations, it acted primarily as a deterrent force. The DoD was dependent
primarily on organic support to fulfill deterrence-related mission requirements. In the
post-Cold War environment, military engagements in the deployed area were more
aligned with a global policing role. Missions had a lower level of risk as compared to a
combat environment. Private contractors appeared to offer the DoD the greatest value for
the cost, in this environment, as they were able to provide the capabilities needed to
support military activities. As the military transitioned into conflicts in Afghanistan and
Iraq, with increased activity and levels of risk, contractor support appeared embedded in
the deployed mission, despite increased risk, as overall military personnel strength
remained at its lowest levels in decades.
The nature of the relationship between the DOD and private actors performing
services for the state raises issues regarding monitoring, as noted in Peter Feaver’s study of
Civil-Military Relations (Feaver 1997). Similar to Williamson’s concerns for opportunism
as a transaction-cost hazard, an area of concern in this relationship is whether the expert
(agent) serves the best interest of the principal or shirk their responsibilities to exploit their
position in pursuit of selfish goals (Feaver 1997).
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In my study, I treat private actors as the functional experts (agents) and the
DOD/civilian leaders as the principal. Whether private actors serve the best interest of the
DOD or will shirk responsibilities and pursue selfish goals, or abandon the mission, is an
element of risk and a hazard to transaction efficiency that can be evaluated in part by the
extent of an agency’s administration, monitoring and oversight activities.
The independent variables to consider for examining the explanatory power of
strategic efficiency towards outsourcing behavior are: pay and pay-growth rates for
military (officer and enlisted force), DoD civilian and private sector employees, along
with conditional variables including medical spending, non-cash benefits (health care,
retirement, etc.), monitoring and oversight results. My proposition is that DoD leaders are
motivated to maximize mission effectiveness by getting the greatest cost savings
possible, from military, DoD civilians, or private contractors.

Military and Private Sector Pay
In general, there are different ways in which civilian and private sector
compensation and benefit systems are structured, compared to that of the armed forces.
This makes it difficult to validate any across-the-board generalizations about whether
there is a gap between military and civilian pay (Goldich 2005, 7).9 Comparing military
to private sector pay has been a contentious issue, since it is very hard to establish
comparisons. Determining the true value of non-cash and deferred benefits received by
military members is difficult to assess, by lawmakers and policymakers who decide pay
levels (Maze 2007, M1).

9

Gap refers to pay-gap concerns; whether private sector civilians have experienced greater pay raises over
time in comparison to DoD (military and civilian) personnel.
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The suggestion that non-cash and deferred benefits need to be assessed in military
pay comparisons is countered with the argument that non-cash compensation, such as
housing and childcare, doesn’t necessarily apply to military members who are single or
without children. In 2000, 45 percent of the military’s 1.4 million active duty members
were not married, and 54 percent of active duty members did not have children (Kozaryn
2000). Sixty percent of non-cash compensation is the accrued cost of retirement pensions
and other deferred benefits that service members receive after they leave active duty
(CBO 2004, 1).10 Yet, as noted by the DoD (Figure 21) and supported by CBO’s 2004
military compensation report, few troops actually remain in the military until retirement.
Most people who enter the American armed forces serve for fewer than 10 years (Segal
2004, 16). Only 10–15 percent of the enlisted force serve for a 20 year career while less
than half of the officer corp. serve for 20 years and collect a retirement pension (CBO
2004, 1). Noting the decreased amount of military personnel who serve for 20 or more
years and become vested for retirement benefits (Figure 21), it appears to inflate the
value of military pay when including these non-cash compensation costs, such as
retirement pension and retirement health care, in calculations and comparisons that affect
the pay of the overall military force.
Notwithstanding the complexities inherent in comparing military and civilian pay,
Congress, along with other senior civilian and military leaders, have been attentive to pay
contrasts between the military and the private sector over several decades in part as a
result of recruitment and retention issues (Asch and Hosek 1999, 1–3). Since the end of
the draft in1973, the adequacy of military pay has been an issue for Congress when it

10

DoD retirement payments and other deferred benefits apply only to members who become vested after 20
years of service (CBO 2004, 5).
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appears that either the military is having trouble recruiting enough new personnel or
keeping sufficient career personnel of requisite quality. Congress also intercedes if the
standard of living of career personnel is perceived to be less fair or equitable than
demographically comparable civilians (in terms of age, education, skills and
responsibilities), as in 2000 when it increased military pay to meet cost-of-living
increases (Goldich 2005, 1).
Policymakers have used the Employment Cost Index (ECI), constructed by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, for the purpose of measuring employment-cost growth in
civilian occupations and as a benchmark measure of civilian pay for comparative
purposes since the early 1980s (Gilmore 2007, 9; Hosek et al 1994, 3).11 In 1990, the
Federal Employees Pay Comparability Act specified that the ECI for wages and salaries
of private-industry workers be used to determine pay increases for federal employees.
Since 2004, permanent law has required that basic pay be increased by the annual
percentage rise in the ECI (Gilmore 2007, 9). 12 In addition to the ECI, Congress uses
commercial pay surveys in setting pay for federal civilians (Musell 2002, 5).
As a measure of strategic efficiency, I compare the Basic Pay Index (BPI) and
regular military compensation (RMC) that accounts for over 90 percent of enlisted and
officer pay in the active duty force with data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for
civilians; evaluate pay-growth using the Federal Employment Cost Index (ECI) data for
multiple categories of DoD personnel and pay grades (officer, enlisted, and civilian
11

The ECI is a fixed-base weight index constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the purpose of
measuring employment-cost growth in civilian occupations. The fixed-base weights hold the mix of
workers by industry and occupation constant, and the employment-cost data show how much the cost of a
fixed bundle of labor increases over time (Hosek et al. 1994, 3). Cost includes wage and salary costs and
employer costs for employee benefits.
12
Permanent law (37USC 1009) provides that monthly basic pay is to be increased by the annual
percentage increase in the Employment Cost Index (ECI).
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employees) with comparative private sector personnel based on skill, age group, and
education levels; medical costs are also evaluated. DoD has used the RMC as a
fundamental measure of military pay since 1962 (Gilmore 2007, 1). 13 I use the ECI index
in Figures 11 and 14 to provide a comparison of military and civilian pay without
accounting for demographic information.
A second index used to measure wage growth is the Defense Employment Cost Index
(DECI). It is an alternative index to the ECI developed by RAND to measure pay
comparability for military personnel. It tracks wage growth of private sector workers who
are demographically similar based on age, education and occupation to full-time DoD
personnel. DECI data is captured in Figures 15 and 16.
The objective is to evaluate whether the DOD is efficient and getting the best value
for providing its required services through a cost savings comparison process.14 The
method is not without potential problems. Though data from the BLS and the ECI are
used by the federal government to assist in determining annual pay increases for federal
employees, contractors can offer bonuses, raises and other perks to private sector
personnel for performing DoD activities that are not captured when comparing the cost
savings value of DoD and private sector personnel. Despite the possibility of noncomparable variables, RMC provides the best measure of military compensation, BLS
provides comparable compensation data for civilian personnel, and ECI data is the
government’s best measure of private-sector wage growth. Comparing compensation of
DoD and private sector personnel offers the closest comparison of cost savings value per
person, in a standardized manner across the length of the study period.
13

RMC includes basic pay, allowances for subsistence and housing, and the tax advantage due to the
allowances not being taxable.
14
Compensation costs are included in the pay variable.
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Relative pay-growth comparisons, as measured from a given base point, are also
referred to as pay gap comparisons (Hosek et al 1994, 4). They are useful in measuring
the extent of divergence in military and civilian pay over time from a base point or
particular year and are good indicators of military/civilian pay trends (Hosek et al 1994,
4,6). 15 Military pay is compared with private sector pay in a composite perspective with
several age/education groups.16
The initial assumption is that, among DoD and private sector personnel who are
equally qualified in comparable functional areas, the DoD will select the personnel
offering the lowest cost to perform the activity. For several years, DoD has stated that
its aim was to make Regular Military Compensation comparable with the 70th percentile
of civilian earnings (Murray 2007, 13). 17 The DoD’s objective has been to attract quality
personnel with a competitive compensation package that exceeds the pay of seven of ten
private sector workers.
In assessing cost efficiency, paying employees less than the 70th percentile may not
meet DoD competitive standards for its share of a quality private sector workforce, but it
gains cost efficiencies by being able to perform its mission with a workforce for less than
its targeted cost. The assumption made in assessing cost efficiency is that pay rates
15

The ECI measure has been critiqued (Williams 1995, Asch and Hosek 1999, Kosiak 2005, Murray 2007)
regarding its usefulness as a measure to address pay gap issues with the private sector, since its does not
measure military and civilian pay levels but instead reflects a comparison of rates of wage growth. It also
does not take into account demographics of the military and civilian workforces or does it measure non-pay
and deferred cash benefits that comprise a significant amount of DoD compensation packages. Although
pay gap comparisons do not encompass all elements of compensation, they do cover a major portion of a
member’s salary and are useful in combination with periodic assessments of non-pay and deferred benefit
levels.
16
The data source for private sector pay is the Current Population Survey March Supplement and is
measured in terms of the earnings for persons who averaged at least thirty-five hours per week and worked
at least thirty-five weeks per year.
17
The 70th percentile exceeds the pay of 70 percent of private sector workers and is less than the pay of 30
percent of the workers.
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below the 70th percentile would be considered more cost-effective while those above the
70th percentile less cost-effective for meeting DoD requirements.18 When the pay gap
widens in favor of private sector personnel (private sector pay rising faster than military
pay), military personnel become more cost effective if their pay is equal to or below the
70th percentile in the first independent variable. The reverse is true for private sector
personnel when the pay gap favors DoD personnel and private sector personnel pay is
equal to or below the 70th percentile.

Hypothesis 1 (H1)
Outsourcing is a viable DOD strategy due to its cost-effectiveness.
In (H1), outsourcing of DOD activities in the case studies is the dependent variable and
cost-effectiveness is the independent variable. Civilian and DOD leaders are considered
rational agents with value-maximizing behavior in the pursuit of security. The decision to
outsource is based on the relative cost savings of DOD versus private sector actors in the
performance of similar activities. Cost-effectiveness is measured using the following
variables: military pay and pay-growth rates for military, and DoD civilian and private
sector employee pay rates; conditional variables include medical spending and non-cash
benefits (health care, retirement, etc.), contract monitoring and oversight results.
The Strategic Efficiency Table below highlights the expected outsourcing activity
based on pay differential and pay-growth. Chapters Four through Eight will test the
variables through the strategic efficiency framework to assess their effectiveness in
explaining the DoD outsourcing phenomenon.

18

Assuming personnel are qualified and able to perform required services.
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Strategic Efficiency Table
Pay Differential

Outsourcing Activity

Private > Public (DoD)

Decrease

1970–1980
2

Private > Public (DoD)

Decrease

1981–1988
3

Private > Public (DoD)

Decrease

Public (DoD) pay approaching parity with
private sector pay for junior level civilian,
enlisted and officer grades
Private > Public (DoD) for mid-senior level
civilian, enlisted and officers

Mixed with increase
expected in junior level
positions (< GS-8
federal civilians; < 6
years experience for
enlisted; < 10 years
experience of officers)19

Case/Time
period
1

1989–1995
4

1996–2000

5

pay-growth was mixed;
pay-growth > in military for junior level
enlisted as compared to comparative private
sector personnel ; < in military for middleto-senior level officer and enlisted positions
Public sector (DoD) pay relatively equal to
Private sector pay for junior level civilian,
enlisted and officer grades
Private > Public (DoD) for mid-senior level
civilian, enlisted and officers

Increase in junior level
positions (< GS-8
2001–2005
federal civilians; < 6
years experience for
enlisted and < 10 years
experience for officers);
Parity in pay-growth between public (DoD) decrease in mid-toand private sector
senior positions (GS-9
and above for federal
civilians ; 6+ years for
enlisted; 10 + years of
experience for officers
Assumption – Medical spending is a conditional variable that can impact outsourcing if
both pay and pay-growth variables are relatively equal for the private/public sectors.

19

Based on DOD Instruction 1320.13 where commissioned officers (in any of the services) can expect to
be promoted to the rank of Major in the Field Grade Level officer category (assuming they are selected for
promotion) and the enlisted E-6 promotion eligibility requirements of the services. GS-7 and below are
considered entry-level grades for those with a bachelor degree and below.
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POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

Ideology is defined as a belief system where ideas and attitudes are bound together
by some form of constraint or functional interdependence (Converse, 1964). This study
uses ideology, as applied by Converse, to represent the continuum of positions of
legislators. Many of the key themes and intellectual inspirations for outsourcing were
influenced by the ideas of Ludvig von Mises, Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman
with early roots to Adam Smith (Friedman 1962; Linowes 1988; Henig 1990). They
sought a belief and respect for not only individual liberty, but also for free market
economics with minimal government intervention.
Economists Milton Friedman, and George Stigler, and public-choice theorists
James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock helped to establish the notion that economic
behavior and government behavior were not distinct spheres of human behavior but that
government activities were a subset of economic processes (Henig 1990). They proposed
that behavior of public officials and government agencies could be explained as the result
of rational pursuit of individual self-interest. Their ideas provided the groundwork for delegitimizing the welfare state and highlighted the inefficiencies of interest group politics
in the U.S. government (Linowes 1988; Henig 1990). Friedman also proposed three
themes that would become relevant to the outsourcing debate: an analogy between
government and private monopolies, the characterization of government regulation as
being anti-consumer and the distinction between government responsibility and
government provision (Friedman 1962; Henig 1990).
These ideas helped to serve as a roadmap for statesmen eager to reduce the size of
government and increase the role of the private sector in providing public activities.
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Privatization can be considered much more than a set of specific changes in how an
activity is performed, but part of a fundamental political and economic reassessment of
the roles of government and the private sector in the modern welfare state (Linowes
1988). President Reagan’s Commission on Privatization noted how political and
economic ideas played a growing role in American government since the 1970s. The
greater role in American politics of ideology was an important factor furthering the
contemporary privatization movement (Linowes 1988, 237–239).
Events leading up to privatization activities included the deregulation of major
industries and tax abatements in the 1970s and 1980s (Noll and Owen, 1983). Evidence
that market forces could effectively produce public goods was provided in municipal,
state and federal privatization cases (Savas 1987; Osborne and Gaebler 1992;
Feigenbaum 1999). The deregulation of major industries includes banking,
communications, transportation, oil and gas, and securities was motivated by the idea that
markets represent a superior mechanism for allocating resources (Linowes, 1988). The
tax reduction movement and Tax Reform Act of 1986 were also designed to diminish the
intrusiveness of government in the private sector. Together with the deregulation of
major industries these events represented significant shifts away from governmental
control over the economy and greater reliance on private market forces (Linowes 1988).
Privatization began to become part of public policy debates in the United States in the
1980s (Henig 1990). The Reagan administration attempted to use privatization as a political
strategy to reshape the state’s economic and political landscape where it represented a
deliberate effort to reduce the size and scope of government activity (Henig 1990).
Feigenbaum notes how several elements marked the emergence of privatization in the U.S.
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national government agenda during the Reagan administration. The first was an interest in
selling state assets, such as federally owned park and wilderness lands, and Conrail and
AMTRAK. Second, adopting the unfamiliar term “privatization” and the argument that it
represented an adoption of private means to pursue public goals instead of a rejection of the
welfare state. It offered a framework where contracting out, vouchers, and divestitures,
among other techniques supported the government’s efforts to pursue public goals through
private providers. Finally, by drawing analogies to the British experience, the Reagan
administration could demonstrate that privatization was economically feasible and
politically popular (Henig 1990;Feigenbaum 1999).
Privatization efforts carried over into the George H.W. Bush and Clinton
administrations maintaining support through a domestic agenda rooted in markets and the
entrepreneurial spirit (Feigenbaum 1999). President Bush supported market mechanisms as
a vehicle for school reform and named Jack Kemp, a leading advocate for enterprise zones
and the sale of public housing to tenants, to his Cabinet (Henig 1990). President Clinton
was a proponent of Osborne and Gaebler’s ideas for reinventing government where he
recommended public officials selectively learn lessons from successful businesses
including the benefits of competition, customer satisfaction and leveraging change through
the market (Osborne and Gaebler 1992).

The George H.W. Bush administration has

maintained an interest in outsourcing public activities in his management agenda and the
growth of outsourcing activities throughout the government. The effectiveness of his
National Security Strategy depended on a variety of actors including the private sector that
played a key role in the government’s largest reorganization since the Truman
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administration created the National Security Council and Department of Defense in1947
(National Security Strategy 2002).
As noted by Hill, Hanna and Shafqat in their study of the liberal-conservative
ideologies of U.S. Senators, past research has consistently demonstrated that the
ideological orientations of American national legislators are systematically associated
with their partisanship where, on average, Democrats are more liberal than Republicans
(Hill, Hanna, and Shafqat 1997, 1401). Similarly, in this study I assume that economic
orientations of national legislators are associated with their partisanship where Democrats
are more aligned with a state interventionist approach to managing the economy, while
Republicans favor a market-centric (neoliberal) economic approach.
A brief overview of the role of Congress and the Executive in developing
legislation and their leverage in affecting policy change is useful in understanding the
extent to which political ideology can factor in the DoD outsourcing phenomenon. Then,
I’ll discuss the two competing economic strategies of state intervention and neoliberal
economics that have been the foundations for the competing ideological strategies of each
political party. I’ll address how conflicts over economic objectives have affected
defense policy and describe the extent of political polarization during this period, due in
part to the divide on managing the government. I’ll evaluate the actions of Congress and
the Executive during the time frame of the study, and examine whether ideology has any
explanatory value in understanding the DoD outsourcing actions.

50
Congress
A brief review of the role of Congress and the Executive in outsourcing is useful in
establishing a framework for their actions and the extent to which ideology can become a
factor in the shaping of policy. Congress affected DoD outsourcing through its ability to
pass laws that shape the nature of the outsourcing process and the appropriation of
money.20 Congress enacted the laws that set forth both the competitive sourcing and
acquisition process and provided funding through the annual defense budget to support
procurement activities (C.B. Cochrane and Hagan 2005, 3). This included funding for
daily operations and maintenance, procurement of equipment, weapons systems and
support services, and providing personnel salaries and benefits. The size of the budget
indicates the extent to which the DoD could retain existing service contracts and extend
new contracts for additional services through the procurement process. With an
approved budget, the DoD followed the legal guidelines established by Congress for
acquisitions. Congress had no significant input into the type or amount of support
services procured by defense organizations once the DoD budget was approved.
Congressional involvement in the defense policy process grew over the last several
decades, providing it with the opportunity to impart its interests and beliefs on DoD
outsourcing. Congress had leverage on outsourcing policy through its power to make
legislation and appropriate funds. Congress became more likely to affect defense policy

20

Congress enacted the following legislation affecting the nature of outsourcing within the DoD: Small
Business Act (1963), Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (1983), Competition in Contracting Act
(1984), Department of Defense Procurement Reform Act (1985), Department of Defense Reorganization
Act of 1986 Goldwater-Nichols, Government Performance and Results Act (1993), Federal Acquisition
Streamlining Act of (1994), Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act (1998), and the annual
authorization and appropriations legislation. (This legislation may contain new or amended statutory
requirements, like the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996.)
C.B. Cochrane, and G.J. Hagan. 2005. Introduction to Defense Acquisition Management, edited by D. A.
University: Defense Acquisition University Press.
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by a variety of means including: altering DoD line-item requests, demanding justification
for DoD programs, and mandating the Pentagon to undertake specific actions (Lindsay
1987, 373). In addition, Congress could legislate how activities such as competitive
sourcing were conducted within federal agencies.
Congressional involvement and leverage in defense policy stemmed from a
combination of factors. Initially, during the 1970s, the rise of the subcommittee system
within the armed services committees strengthened their ability to intervene in the
defense policy. For example, by 1979 the House Armed Service subcommittees marked
up the entire defense authorization bill with the right to schedule hearings on virtually
any subject (Lindsay 1987, 381). This contrasted the lump-sum authorizations the armed
services committees approved prior to 1961, which were expansive enough to leave
DoD’s plans unfettered (Lindsay 1987, 375). The subcommittee system was indicative
of the dispersal of power within Congress giving legislators an opportunity to increase
their input in policymaking (Lindsay 1987, 378–379).
The second factor affecting congressional involvement and leverage in defense
policy was the growth of the annual authorization process, discussed above, which
expanded the intervention and influence of legislators and their staffs in defense policy
(Lindsay 1987, 375,383). After 1960, all appropriations for the procurement of major
weapons systems, which eventually extended to the entire defense budget, had to be
preceded by a specific annual line-item authorization (Lindsay 1987, 375). The rise of
the authorization process stimulated the defense appropriations subcommittees to
increase their scrutiny of the defense budget and expand opportunities for congressional
intervention in defense policy (Lindsay 1987, 376,383). With the congressional reforms
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of the 1970s, legislators had more freedom to debate defense issues with less fear of
retribution by congressional and/or committee leaders (Lindsay 1987, 384). The
increased congressional scrutiny and involvement in defense policy provided greater
opportunity for ideology to impact congressional decisions.

Executive
Authority and guidance for outsourcing also comes from the Executive through
executive orders, national security decisions and directives issued by the President in
establishing executive direction and the national budget (C.B. Cochrane and Hagan 2005,
7).21 Legislatures expect the President to provide leadership through ideas and programs
they seek to make the center of their legislative agenda (Keefe and Ogul 1985, 305). For
example, Democratic and Republican presidents have focused on different
macroeconomic policy choices as presidential agenda items. A central component of
every Presidential agenda and strategy is the proposed Budget.
The President has the responsibility for preparing and presenting the budget which
is the most authoritative single measure defining what the executive wants to do while in
office (Keefe and Ogul 1985, 308). It is arguably a blueprint of the administration’s
goals and strategies (Keefe and Ogul 1985, 309). The President’s effect and leverage on
DoD outsourcing stems from his agenda for the nation and national defense, the type of

21

Examples of executive direction include: the Bureau of Budget Circular A-76 (1967) introduced
competition between government operated and private sector commercial activities based on the cost of the
activity. It seeks to rely on the private enterprise system to obtain commercial products and services;
Executive Order 12352 (1982) directed procurement reforms and establishment of the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR); Federal Acquisition Regulation (1984) provided uniform policies and procedures for the
procurement of all goods and services by executive agencies of the Federal Government with guidance for
defense acquisition programs provided in the DoD Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS);
National Security Decision Directive 219 (1986) directed implementation of recommendations of the
President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management.
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budget requested, and the relationship with Congress, which has unlimited legal authority
to alter the budget. For example, a factor in the President’s defense policy is the
projected size of the DoD budget and types of appropriations necessary for the
envisioned defense structure, whether its a commitment to expansion of strategic weapon
systems during the Reagan administration or a reduction in conventional force structure
during the Clinton presidency.
The interrelationship between the President and Congress affects the President’s
agenda and level of success in advancing presidential policy and budget allocations to
support initiatives and executive direction. The President’s ability to develop coalitions
within Congress is a factor in efforts to transform ideas into law. Developing coalitions
is easier when your own party controls Congress. Yet, when the opposition party
controls Congress, in periods of increased polarization, coalition building becomes more
difficult. The study examines this interrelationship and the President’s ability to infuse
ideology into lawmaking through nine administrations during which Congress grew
increasingly polarized over the last few decades.

Two Competing Economic Schools of Thought
A central factor that has divided the two parties and affected the nature of defense
policy is the fundamental economic principles for managing the state. State intervention
based on the general ideas of Keynes and Hayek’s neoliberal economic approach to
managing the nation’s economy and public services have been two competing approaches
used by our national governments. State intervention suggests that government
knowledge is superior to that of the marketplace providing the intellectual foundations for
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managing the economy (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998, 42). It is based on the Keynesian
idea that governments create jobs and increase purchasing power through a process of
replacing missing private investment with public investment financed by deliberate
deficits (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998, 41). Keynes provided a specific rationale for
governments to have a bigger role in the economy with confidence to manage and
intervene in the economy effectively (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998, 42). The Democratic
Party built its economic platform around state intervention with Roosevelt’s New Deal as
the foundation for deficit spending and big government programs.
A competing set of ideas and beliefs promoted by Frederick Hayek and embraced
by the University of Chicago economists (Chicago School), led by Milton Friedman,
suggested it was better for governments to disengage from economic activities, get
smaller and allow private activity to champion the economy (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998,
145–146). This was the foundation of neoliberal economics. It suggested that unfettered
markets produced the best outcomes and prices were the best way to allocate resources
(Yergin and Stanislaw 1998, 146,149). It emphasized laissez-faire and free markets with
a strong belief in the power of the markets and the effectiveness of competition (Yergin
and Stanislaw 1998, 145–146). Hayek and the Chicago School provided a substantial
part of the foundation for the intellectual reformulation and shift in the global attitude
toward markets and neoliberal economic ideology in the United States (Yergin and
Stanislaw 1998, 145,149).
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Competing Economic Objectives and Defense Policy
Mark A. Smith notes how American politics since the mid 20th century have been
marked by the widespread use of an economic lens for examining, discussing and
deciding political questions. The type of military force structure and how military
services are provided are political questions, as much as they are defense issues, and have
been affected by the economic lens. Benjamin Fordham suggests that partisan conflicts
over economic objectives shaped DoD budgets and affected the national defense posture
during the Cold War (Fordham 2002, 63–88). Fordham finds that domestic political
conflict figures prominently in the picture of American Cold War military policy.
As Fordham argues, during the Cold War Democratic presidents were more willing
than Republicans to engage in deficit spending in order to fund both domestic and
international programs as an alliance of state intervention policymakers and advocates of
larger military budgets who played a role in promoting major military buildups under the
Truman and Kennedy administrations (Fordham 2002, 67). The Eisenhower
administration sought to balance the national budget and avoid inflation despite deferring
important defense policies. Eisenhower’s desire to avoid a budget deficit meant a greater
reliance on nuclear weapons and air power instead of a large conventional force that
would be too costly (Fordham 2002, 67).
Fordham suggests that major military procurement decisions of the 1970s and
1980s indicate a pattern of partisan conflict over economics, defense strategy and force
structure (Fordham 2002, 69). In addition, his findings suggest that party ties of national
security policymakers matter, as military strategy can reflect the nature of the party in
power (Fordham 2002, 85). The Republicans and Democrats each sought to establish
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different force structures when they controlled the White House, where Republicans
sought a smaller force with increased spending on weapon systems as opposed to a large
conventional force structure favored by Democrats.
Analogous to Fordham’s findings that partisan politics and conflict over economic
policy can shape military strategy is the thesis that partisan politics may predict changes
in DoD outsourcing over the past 30 years. Each economic approach to managing
national defense translates to either a larger or smaller commitment to the private sector
enterprise. During a Republican regime, an increased interest in using private enterprise
to support mission requirements within a reduced force structure is likely, as opposed to a
Democratic strategy favoring uniformed manpower over outsourcing in a relatively
unchanging force structure with limited weapon systems buildup.
Kevin Narizny argues that the economic interests of domestic societal groups play a
key role in shaping state policy and behavior. Parochial interests and political
contestation are at the root of state behavior (Narizny 2007, 313). As opposed to political
ideology, it doesn’t matter what motivates the behavior of politicians as long as their
positions correspond to the partisan coalitions that selected them to lead (Narizny 2007,
32). He suggests in his study of Britain from 1905–39 that societal debate over Britain’s
international strategy was the product of cleavages in its domestic political economy
(Narizny 2003, 189).
In comparing outsourcing in the federal government, particularly the DoD, Narizny
suggests that Republicans and Democrats espouse different arguments and positions
because they are representing different economic sectoral interests that are affected in
some positive or negative way by the outsourcing phenomenon. It’s likely that political
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ideology and political and economic interests will track closely with each other in the
study of DoD outsourcing. While outside the scope of this study, the study remains
sensitive to the role of political interests of capital or specific economic sectors that gain
power in different administrations or are represented by members of Congress and their
potential impact on DoD outsourcing.
Mark A. Smith argues that the Republican political leadership and its neoliberal
ideas have grown in the government over the past 30 years because Republican
politicians have made the economy and economic issues the central focus of their
platform. With economic insecurity at the forefront of people’s minds in the 1970s and
1980s, Republicans adapted their messages to audiences by reprioritizing issues and
reframing their positions around improving the state of the economy. This included using
a neoliberal economic strategy that supported pro-business policies, support for using the
market in public activities, and smaller government and larger private sector involvement
in government activities through outsourcing opportunities (Smith 2007, 145). The
Republican focus on a neoliberal based economic strategy helped to distinguish
conservative and liberal platforms. This would also indicate that if ideology were a
factor in explaining DoD outsourcing behavior, we would expect an increase in private
enterprise within DoD missions, especially during Republican control of Congress and
the Executive.
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Polarization in Congress
The work of Keith Poole, Nolan McCarty and Howard Rosenthal on modeling
congressional roll call voting in Congress argues that Congress began to polarize around
conservative and liberal platforms beginning in the 1970s and gained strength throughout
the course of the period.22 Poole suggests in his work that members elected to Congress
after 1970 created a polarized environment by maintaining their ideological position
throughout their careers with minimal exception when voting during roll calls (Poole
2003, 3; Poole, Rosenthal, and Poole 2007, 28). Thus, once a liberal, conservative or
moderate, members of Congress remained committed to these beliefs throughout their
tenure (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006, 16; Poole and Rosenthal 1997, 2001).
McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal note that after 1970, the party controlling government
likely developed policy based on its ideology with relatively little change during its
tenure of government control. Winning outcomes in the Congress were highly
responsive to the balance of partisan forces within the Senate and House (Poole and
Rosenthal 1997, 69).
As Poole, McCarty and Rosenthal suggest, most roll call votes can be interpreted as
splits on the basic liberal-conservative dimension. This dispersion has increased over the
course of the period where Congress was more likely to see extreme conservative and
extreme liberal positions as compared to the 1960’s (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal
2006, 23). The dispersion has led to the ideological composition of the two political
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They suggest that polarization in Congress can be defined as a separation of politics into liberal and
conservative camps where conservative and liberal positions are matched with Republican and Democrat
ideals respectively, over the past thirty years. For parties to be polarized, they must be far apart on policy
issues and party members tightly clustered around the party mean (McCarty, Nolan, Poole and Rosenthal
2006; Poole and Rosenthal 2007, 105). Roll call voting is one method of congressional voting where each
member’s vote is recorded and held on record.
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parties becoming more homogeneous. Overlap between the parties has diminished while
the positions of average Democrat and Republican members of Congress have become
more widely separated (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006, 24).
The process of policy development and transforming ideological positions into
policy and business practices is complex. Mark A. Smith argues that rhetoric has been a
key element in the transformation process and integral in supporting the rise of
Republican power and neoliberal ideas into policy throughout this time frame.23 As an
intervening variable, rhetoric is crafted by politicians and political leaders to advocate
and justify their positions to constituents, bureaucrats and political elites (Smith 2007,
28). Smith argues that it provides the connection between preferences and policy choices,
as preferences alone can not be the direct cause of policy (Smith 2007, 28).
Congress was increasingly polarized after 1970, where members were more likely
to maintain policy choices throughout their tenure. I assume political leaders use rhetoric
to advocate, justify and move their ideas and preferences into policymaking. Policy
actions expected during a Democratically controlled government include:
- Increased levels of federal regulation
- Increased spending for government programs and debt creation
- Decreased private enterprise in federal activities
Policy actions expected during a Republican-controlled government include:
- Reduced level of federal regulation
- Reduced spending on government programs and debt creation
- Increased private enterprise in federal activities
23

Rhetoric refers to verbal and nonverbal means of persuasion such a logical arguments, emotional appeals,
personal credibility, presentation of evidence, language, organization and delivery of speeches (Smith
2007, 24-25).
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Hypothesis 2 (H2)
DOD outsourcing is a consequence of a politically conservative Congress and President.
In H2, my argument is based on the proposition that changes in military missions
and force structures have their roots in ideas held by political leaders. In addition, when a
political party controls both Congress and the Executive, policy will favor increased
outsourcing in periods of Republican control and decreased outsourcing in periods of
Democratic control; when Congress is controlled by the competing party to the
Executive, we are likely to see divided positions on outsourcing behavior with
outsourcing activity likely to respond in the direction of the Congress; during periods
when Congress is split, the Executive will have increased influence on the direction of
outsourcing policy and activity.
Congressional legislation in support of activities that facilitate outsourcing is more
likely to succeed if it has the support of the President. Liberal and conservative ideology
is not solely based on party affiliation but can be determined by the overall legislative
record of lawmakers. The dependent variable is the extent of outsourcing in each time
period; the independent variable is the degree of liberal and conservative makeup in the
Congress and Executive in each time period.
The Political Ideology Table below suggests outsourcing motivation based on the
dominant party that controls two out of the three national policymaking and leadership
bodies (Executive, House of Representatives, Senate). The suggested outsourcing
motivation will be evaluated and discussed in chapters four through eight when each of
the variables are evaluated against outsourcing data.
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Political Ideology Table
Case/

Executive

Senate

House

TimePeriod

Dominant

Outsourcing
Activity

Party

1:

Republican/

1970–1980

Democrat

2:

Republican

1981–1988

Democrat

Democrat

Democrat

Decrease

Republican/

Democrat

Republican

Increase

Democrat

Democrat

Decrease

Democrat

3:

Republican/

Democrat/

1989–1995

Democrat

Republican

4:

Democrat

Republican

Republican Republican

Increase

Republican

Democrat/

Republican Republican

Increase

1996–2000
5:
2001–2005

Republican

Dominant Party is when one party controls two of three federal governing bodies
(Executive, House, Senate)
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Table ID1 (below) provides a general proposition of the type of actions expected from
federal lawmakers during the period of the study based upon the makeup of Congress and the
Executive as described in Table 11.24

TABLE ID1 EXPECTED FEDERAL POLICY BEHAVIOR
PERIOD
GOV’T
FEDERAL SPENDING
INVOLVEMENT
AND DEBT CREATION
IN ECONOMY
(NOT INCLUDING
(REGULATION)
CONFLICT/WAR SPENDING)
1970–1980 High
High
1981–1988 Medium-Low
Medium-Low
1989–1995 Medium-High
Medium
1996–2000 Medium-Low
Medium-Low
2001–2005 Low
Low

GROWTH OF
PRIVATE ACTORS
PERFORMING
DOD SERVICES
Low
Medium-High
Medium-Low
Medium-High
High

- 1970–1980 High government involvement in the economy, with high federal
spending and debt creation and low growth of private actors performing DoD services
due to the dominate nature of the states role in policymaking from both sides of the
government. Market-centric actions were less pervasive among government policy
options and not a significant factor in mainstream federal policymaking for Nixon, Ford,
and Carter and the Democratic Congress that maintained a large majority through 1980.
- 1981–1988 Medium-to-low government involvement in the economy and in
federal spending and debt creation with medium-to-high growth of private actors
performing DoD functions; growing interest and impact of neoliberal, market-centric
choices in federal policymaking across the Republican government. The presidency was
dominated by the Republican Party with Ronald Reagan serving in the Oval Office
through 1988 with a split Congress through 1987. President Reagan attempted to reduce
government size, regulation, federal spending and debt creation, and increase private
24

Time frame is based on significant changes in the dependent variable.
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sector actors in the public sector with some success. Though debt creation increased
throughout Reagan’s two terms, it did not appear to affect his commitment to neoliberal
aims. The Congress appeared more appeasing to Reagan’s policy actions in the first term
with increased congressional splits during the second term. President Reagan was able to
enact his legislative platform due to his election mandate and congressional split.
- 1989–1995 President George H.W. Bush attempted to maintain the Reagan
economic and defense policies through 1992. Yet, the fall of the Berlin Wall and Soviet
empire led to a tapering-off of defense spending (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998, 336). By
the end of the Bush-1 administration, the ideas that underpinned the Reagan Revolution
had acquired a much wider resonance in both parties (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998, 336).
President Bill Clinton represented the New Democrats who criticized the traditional
Democratic approach of “tax and spend” economics (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998, 336337). President Clinton attempted to reshape government as a conservative Democrat,
highlighted by his support for reducing the federal budget deficit. Expectations included
minimal increases in federal spending, government growth and the growth of private
actors in DoD services. The Democratic Congress through 1994 minimized efforts to
move policymaking to the right. Congress attempted to be involved in the economy
through increased government spending, economic stimulus programs and higher taxes
on the upper income while minimizing the growth of private actors performing DoD
services (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998, 337).
- 1996–2000 The 104th Congress, controlled by the Republicans, challenged many
areas of traditional government expenditures, proposing a variety of government
spending reductions. President Clinton adopted the principle of the proposed changes
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that included a balanced budget (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998, 338). The Clinton
administration became more conservative based on Republican gains and control of
Congress, with a majority averaging eight seats in the Senate and 20 seats in the House.
Given the Republican nature of Congress and President Clinton’s conservative bent,
expectations were for low-to-medium government involvement in the economy and,
minimum federal spending with medium-to-high level of growth in private actors
performing DoD activities.
- 2001–2005 Neoliberal/market-centric influence was expected across federal
government as President Bush and the Republican-controlled Congress shaped policy.
The President had success enacting neoliberal-based legislation, due in part to
congressional support. Due to the Republican control of Congress and the Executive,
expectations were for low government involvement in the economy with low federal
spending with the high growth of private actors performing DoD services.

ORGANIZATION FACTORS FRAMEWORK

An organization may be defined as a combination of people with a common set of
values who work together by fulfilling different but complementary functions to achieve
some purpose or objective; the participants share a set of beliefs, which relates their
values and purposes to larger organizations within which they operate (Friedrich 1963,
132). Organizations come into existence for the pursuit of specific purposes, tasks or
objectives that demands coordination, planning and supervision (Posen, 1984). As Barry
Posen notes, the national security activities of the state are divided among specialists.
Each of the military services are assigned specific missions with large, expensive
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capabilities (combat forces and their supporting elements) that involve the allocating of
limited DoD resources to accomplish assigned missions (Barrett and Jones 1983, 31).
Morton Halperin (1973) suggests that influence, domain, essential role,
independence, budget and morale are the principle interests of organizations that
participate in the national security policy process. These interests are important variables
in shaping the decisions and actions of an organization and are useful in the study of
outsourcing behavior.
The most pervasive interest is to exert independent influence as it seeks to further
organizational purposes, ensure its well-being and, where necessary, secure capabilities
(Barrett and Jones 1983, 33). The essence of an organization, what it ought to be, how it
ought to proceed and what it ought to seek to achieve derives from the common set of
values and purposes that members of the organization share (Barrett and Jones 1983, 34).
Maintaining or enhancing independence and, as suggested by Halperin and Kanter
(1974), a quest for autonomy are sought by organizations to safeguard their essence and
domain (Barrett and Jones 1983, 36). Manifestations of the interest in independence or
autonomy include resistance to participation by outsiders in their operations (Halperin
and Kanter 1973, 11-12). All military services are interested in the size and composition
of their budget. A budget can be an indicator of the significance of influence within an
area of responsibility while also reflecting national priorities at a given moment for staff
and operational organizations (Barrett and Jones 1983, 37). Maintaining morale is an
important interest of the organization as the values and purposes that members share must
continue to be regarded in a favorable light and objectives must continue to appear to be
worthwhile.
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I suggest these values are pertinent and reflected across the actions of an
organization.

When I talk about organization factors in this study I’m referring to

maintaining core competencies, unconstrained budget, and autonomy. These are derived
from organizational values and used to evaluate the extent of organizational impact on
outsourcing behavior. Organization factors are an appropriate lens to examine
outsourcing in the defense realm since defense organizations are the primary actors and
have a stake in the decision making process. Their missions are directly affected by
outsourcing decisions.
Hypotheses derived from these organization factors are that organization members
develop loyalty to the organization and conformity in performing activities. They
develop routines that value predictability and stability and are averse to change,
especially change from outside the organization. These preferred ways of performing
tasks are known as Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). SOPs in turn become
institutionalized within an organization, where members have very little interest in
change (Posen, 1984). Organizations facing decreased funding will focus on
maintaining core activities— missions essential and fundamental to their survivability.
Barry Posen suggests that organizations abhor uncertainty and changes in
traditional patterns of accomplishing tasks. James Q. Wilson notes that organizations are
successful when they create a sense of mission, decide how to perform critical tasks and
acquire a degree of autonomy with external political support (Wilson, 1989). As
suggested by both Halperin and Wilson, organizations place a high premium on
autonomy. In the relatively decentralized DoD outsourcing environment, organizational
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autonomy will likely contribute to disparate behavior in levels of outsourcing activity and
types of services being considered for outsourcing.
Despite having certainty and predictability in an organization, outsourcing suggests
innovation by offering a new approach to providing capabilities and services for
defense/national security activities. It is argued that innovation is rarely generated from
within the organization due to the uncertainty it brings, unless the organization has a
significant failure.25 In such cases, outsourcing can be explained by organization factors
when civilians with legitimate authority intervene to promote change (Posen 1984;
Allison 1971).
Yet, outsourcing activities add a new dimension to operating procedures and are an
adjustment to traditional patterns of conducting business that organizations seek to avoid.
However, organizations may be likely to accept outsourcing if it has ramifications on
their ability to save core programs or weapon systems that impact their mission, size and
funding, especially in times of a reduced and limited budget. Prolonged budgetary
famine, as noted by Allison, may result in a major retrenchment of an organization
(Allison, 1971). Tasks that are not defined as central to the mission are often performed
poorly or starved for resources (Wilson, 1989). These types of activities may be
outsourced to protect the overall well being of the organization.

25

Stephen Peter Rosen, “New Ways of War”, International Security, Vol. 13 (Summer 1988), pp.134–168,
offers a contrasting proposition that military innovation can be generated during peacetime without
experiencing prior defeat, and the relative impact of civilian intervention can be less than that of indigenous
military innovators.
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Overview of U.S. Military Organizations
The study evaluates the DoD, which is a functioning organization with a mission
and basic structure that includes powerful constituent organizations (Barrett and Jones
1983, 15). The organizational configuration for maintaining the military instrument
consists of the military departments headed by service secretaries and contains four
uniformed services responsible for providing forces for land, sea and air warfare (Barrett
and Jones 1983, 21).26 Each exhibits a strong interest in the maintaining function
especially when they perceive an issue being decided is either potentially advantageous
or threatening to their strength, vitality, and ability to perform its part of the function
(Barrett and Jones 1983, 28).
The military organizations have the ability to translate their interests into influence
due to an abundant freedom of action as a consequence of the structural configuration of
the DoD (Barrett and Jones 1983, 29). Their freedom of action provides ample
opportunities to seek and find powerful external proponents whose interests parallel their
own (Barrett and Jones 1983, 29).
Carl Builder, in The Masks of War argues that the most powerful institutions in the
American national security arena are the military services. These institutions, while
composed of many individuals, have distinct and enduring personalities that govern much
of their behavior (Builder 1989, 3). The essence of the military organization is captured
in distinct mannerisms and a culture27 that is derived from each service and its

26

Maintaining functions are all actions incident to preparing forces for war and sustaining them during
hostilities (Barrett, Jones, NDU, 1983, 22).
27
Organizational culture is defined as a patterned way of thinking focused on the organization’s central
tasks (operations) and relationships (administration), passed on by generations and slow to change
Smith, James M. 1998. Air Force Culture and Cohesion: Building an Air and Space Force for the TwentyFirst Century. Air Power (Fall): 40-53.
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approaches to strategy, national security and its dominant image of the next major war for
which it must prepare to fight (Builder 1989, 127,131).
Organizations have considerable freedom in defining their missions and the
capabilities they need to pursue those missions to include what kinds of people, expertise,
experience and knowledge are necessary in the organization (Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter
2006, 27). The military services are no exception. Each considers their service as the
decisive factor in winning wars. Since each service was not completely confident in
relying absolutely on each other during a crisis, each produced redundant capabilities and
self-reliant war fighting concepts (Johnson 2006, 194).
While DoD organizations have primarily unique missions, they share the following
attributes:
•

Each seeks to maintain their self-interest; they pursue unconstrained budgets
and resources favoring service-defined missions and capabilities

•

Reliance on technological advantage and the desire to integrate technology
into force structure and operations for superior performance

•

Slow to change force structure and missions primarily built to maintain
traditional roles and missions, supporting large conventional and/or nuclear
conflict scenarios

•

Tasks not defined as central to the mission are often performed poorly or
starved for resources
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Air Force
Since its inception in 1947, the Air Force has focused itself primarily around
strategic bombardment and tactical air warfare. It has argued strongly for its size in terms
of the number of bomber and fighter wings, where technologically advanced aircraft have
been a higher priority than the number of aircraft (Builder 1989, 21). The Air Force
measures itself by the kind or quality of its aircraft followed by the quantity (Builder
1989, 21; Smith 1998, 44). Its legitimacy as an independent autonomous institution rests
on the decisive and independent nature of the air war (Builder 1989, 28). The true
business of the Air Force is waging the air war and those activities directly involved in
that mission. The Air Force is confident in regards to the decisiveness of air power as an
instrument of war, irregardless of whether it is waged for strategic or tactical objectives
(Builder 1989, 28).
The Air Force continues to nurture and apply technology, as it depends on
commercial hardware tuned to military needs, to develop its commitment to space
operations and to provide air and space power and superiority for U.S. military actions
around the world. Former Secretary of the Air Force James G. Roche notes the pursuit of
the investments needed to sharpen the teeth of long-range strike, surveillance, mobility,
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and space assets. The Air Force is making critical
investments to improve the capability of current weapon systems while bringing new
capabilities to the fight by, for example, integrating space systems into virtually every
aspect of military operations (Roche 2001-02, 13).
Today’s Air Force is highly technical with a complex mix of specialties to support
air, space and cyber capabilities. In a Pentagon Town Hall Meeting in May 2006,
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Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and General Peter Pace, then Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff confirmed the central position of technology in the Air Force, noting how
the Air Force planned to eliminate 40,000 personnel over five years as a result of
advances in technology requiring less personnel for supporting activities (Mideast Stars
and Stripes 2006, 1). Considering the Air Force dependence on high technology to
support its aviation, space and cyber missions, along with its need to have a robust
logistics infrastructure to support its weapons systems, increased outsourcing with the
private sector is expected. Expertise in technology and logistics has grown throughout
this period and will be necessary to maintain dominance in mission areas. Also,
reductions in military and civilian manpower to pay for new technology and maintaining
DoD personnel ceilings will put more demand on the private sector to support military
activities.

Army
The Army’s essence has been its ground combat capability (Halperin, Clapp, and
Kanter 2006, 32). The Army concerns itself with how well it can adapt and use its
assigned resources to achieve its objective of sustained land dominance across the
spectrum of conflict (Builder 1989, 86; United States Army 2001, 277). In support of
this objective, the Army has begun to move towards a dependence on technology. While
already dependent on weapons such as the Abrams tank and Bradley fighting vehicle as
key components of its war-fighting strategy, the weapons also provide access to a bigger
budget slice in a defense program orientated towards sophisticated weapon systems that
have incorporated greater technology into their development and support (Builder 1989,
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24). Since 1990, we can expect to find an increase in the outsourcing of technology and
logistics expertise to support Army weapons systems, objectives and deployed mission
requirements.

Navy
The Navy’s essence is to maintain combat ships whose primary mission is to
control the sea against potential enemies (Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter 2006, 30). Its
approach to decision making and force structure management is grounded in a tradition
where independent command of ships at sea is a central element (Builder 1989, 18).
This culture of independence has provided many navy units with a wide degree of
latitude in decision making and budget actions in supporting their operational mission
(Porter, 2008).
The Navy’s size and relative success in budget battles is measured in capital ships
(e.g. battleship, carrier, super carrier) and submarines. The size and composition of the
required fleet have been remarkably constant despite changes wrought by wars,
technological advances and new enemies (Builder 1989, 21). These weapon systems
have necessitated a variety of support activities to provide for their operational
requirements. With its continual worldwide mission, the Navy became a high technology
organization open to new ways of doing business with maturing technologies (Mullen
2002, 38). Support activity and technical expertise requirements have provided ample
room for outsourcing opportunities as the private sector developed similar capabilities.
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Common to all Services
Support activities contributed to the unique mission of each service as a critical
enabler for the decisiveness of force projection and military success on the battlefield.
Information technology and logistics are two areas that provide direct support to the
mission of each service. For example, within a conflict environment, providing the daily
tasking order— detailing the nature of the mission for each service organization
supporting a war/contingency environment is possible due to a complex and sophisticated
secure computer and voice network involving a range of communication architectures
stretching across the DoD infrastructure.
The support infrastructure has become fundamental to mission execution.
Information systems became essential components for the success of the DoD mission
transforming the nature of the battle space. Logistics provided the backbone of all air,
land or sea operations and were essential for longer duration campaigns, providing
supplies, spare parts, fuel, deployed base support, ammunition, etc. Military success
during both peacetime and wartime operations would be jeopardized and less likely
without these support capabilities.
Though the U.S. reduced its conventional force structure, its remaining forces were
a shrunken version of their Cold War predecessors (Williams 2001, 2). American strategy
was not decisively changed after the Cold War, as power projection, decisive force,
overseas presence and strategic agility remained core concepts (Metz 2000, 36). Within
its shrunken force size, technological dependency grew, as the DoD was still required to
deliver its core mission requirements while also addressing emerging conflicts. With a
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smaller force, the U.S. engaged in more conflict operations after the Cold War than it did
between 1975 and 1990.

Hypothesis 3 (H3)
The Organization Factors Hypothesis for explaining the DoD outsourcing
phenomenon is (H3): New activities and those outside the scope of an organization’s
standard or doctrine-specific activities are likely to be outsourced in periods of
budgetary decline and decreased organization autonomy.
In H3 the dependent variable is outsourcing. Independent variables to be tested
include type of organization activity, budget, and organization independence/autonomy. I
test whether outsourcing activities are a result of the type of activity, size of the budget or
degree of organization autonomy in the process. The hypothesis suggests that
organizations will be more likely to outsource activities not aligned with traditional/core
activities, or those low on their priority list, while focusing internal resources on primary or
doctrine related activities. Organizations are also affected by budgetary reductions and
external actors, and are more likely to outsource activities when budgets are decreasing and
when facing increased pressure from external political or senior military leaders.
Organizations seek increased independence/autonomy in decision making and it’s argued
that organizations with a high degree of autonomy will be very subjective in their
outsourcing efforts, suggesting decreased activity. Those with limited autonomy are more
apt to respond to demands from higher levels of command and prone to increased
outsourcing.
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The table below highlights the relationship between organization factors—level of
autonomy, budget and the predisposition towards outsourcing core and non-core
activities. In Chapters Four through Eight, and Ten, organization variables will be
evaluated in examining DoD outsourcing behavior.

Budget
Increase

Decrease

Autonomy
High

⇓ Non-core/Core

⇓ Non-core/Core

Low

⇓ Non-core/Core

⇑ Non-core
⇓ Core
⇑ Non-core/Core

⇑ Non-core
⇓ Core
⇑ Increase in outsourcing activity
⇓ Decrease in outsourcing activity
Core/Non-core refer to type of activity
Very Low

Significant
Decrease
⇑ Non-core
⇓ Core
⇑ Non-core/Core
⇑ Non-core/Core
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CHAPTER THREE

DEFENSE OUTSOURCING OVERVIEW 1970–2005
The outsourcing of activities and services within the DoD has grown dramatically
in recent decades. The use of private actors to augment and assume responsibilities for
military forces throughout the DoD has become an increasingly common sight over the
past three decades. In 2005, nearly 66 percent of the O&M budget, or approximately
$130–140 billion, was spent on outsourced services, as compared to 1974 when 52
percent of the O&M budget, or $100 billion, was spent on outsourcing services.28 In
2005, the amount obligated on service contracts exceeded the amount DoD spent on
supplies and equipment to include major weapon systems (GAO 2006c, 4). In addition,
when evaluating discourse analysis on usage of the terms “Outsourcing” and
“Privatization” within newspapers and periodicals between 1970 and 2005, there has
been a steep increase between the mid-1980s and 2005, as noted in Figure 28.
In this chapter, I’ll address the two primary methods used by the DoD to outsource
support activities — 1) the procurement of new or existing services, and 2) competitive
sourcing initiatives for activities currently being performed by DoD organizations.29
These will be the primary indicators of DoD outsourcing activity that will be evaluated
throughout the study. I will then identify and describe each of the dependent and
conditional variables associated with outsourcing activity. Finally, the chapter will

28

Using 2005 dollars to standardize comparisons.
In competitive sourcing initiatives DoD organizations compete with private sector organizations
interested in performing the activity. Both types of outsourcing activities represent the decision of DoD
agencies to use or consider private enterprise to perform activities either directly or indirectly involved with
national defense and security.

29
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conclude with a brief review of outsourcing activity and results from throughout the
study.

DOD OUTSOURCING METHODS

DoD agencies use two primary methods to acquire services from the private sector.
The first is through the acquisition of services that are new, improved or continuing in
nature. DoD agencies directly seek private enterprise to perform select services (new or
ongoing) that are usually peripheral to the core mission, through procurement processes.
A vast array of services considered necessary in the performance and completion of an
organization mission are subjected to competition throughout the service support sector,
including personnel, administrative, engineering, logistics, base and post support
functions in all military services (Harvey 2002, 56). O&M funds are programmed to
support these activities through the DoD’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting and
Execution (PPBE) Process. The percent of O&M funds spent on procuring these services
is measured annually to highlight spending behavior and changes throughout the period
of the study.
This method represents the bulk of outsourcing activity in the DoD. This process
requires the DoD to advertise the service requirement requested and accept bids from
public and private organizations interested in performing the activity. DoD will primarily
select the vendor with the best cost-savings for the required service. DoD will use cost as
a primary determinant for a large majority of its contracts. It’s an important variable to
measure for examining outsourcing behavior, as it indicates the volume and extent of
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private sector activity in DoD organizations as compared to those activities being
performed by in-house military or civilian personnel.
DoD has traditionally approached the acquisition of services differently than the
acquisition of products or weapon systems (GAO 2006c, 6). Acquiring services has been
largely fragmented and uncoordinated within and across service organizations (GAO
2006c, 6). Responsibility for acquiring services is decentralized and spread among
individual military commands and organizations, program offices, or functional units on
military installations. Much of the responsibility for procurement of services is at the
lowest levels of command as contract dollar values for services are usually much smaller
and don’t require senior level or congressional approval or oversight, as compared with
contracts for weapon systems (GAO 2002b, 19).
As noted by DoD and military department officials interviewed by the GAO, the
DoD generally views service acquisition as less risky than the acquisition of weapon
systems (GAO 2006c, 6). They are not tied directly to mission accomplishment and tend
to be composed of far more numerous and lower-dollar-value contracts, which are
overseen by the service or component acquisition executives, as opposed to the Under
Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), who provides oversight
for the acquisition of DoD’s largest programs based upon estimated dollar value; they
include weapon systems and major automated information systems (GAO 2006c, 6).30

30

The traditional view that service acquisitions are less risky and not tied to direct mission accomplishment
has begun to change with the significant amount of outsourcing and procurement of support activities
across nearly all functional areas in all services. Many military members would argue that contractors are
fundamental to their mission accomplishment as they now manage and operate essential functions such as
supply, communications and weapon systems maintenance at U.S. and forward deployed locations in
conflict areas. Key military leaders consider contractors a fundamental component of their Total Force.
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The second method for acquiring services is through OMB’s Circular A76/competitive sourcing process. In this approach, commercial activities being
performed by military or DoD civilian personnel are identified by DoD components for
competition (Andrews 2007). As with the procurement of services, competitive sourcing
has been a decentralized activity for most of the study time frame where local level
organizations select activities to be considered for outsourcing that are integral to the
process. OMB’s Circular A-76 provides the guidelines and procedures for the
competition process where DoD organizations announce activities being competed,
allowing private sector firms to compete against the existing organization providing the
service.31 The most important element of the competitive sourcing process is the expected
cost-savings offered by each competing organization (Andrews 2007). The organization
that wins the lengthy competition usually shows the most significant cost-reduction
ability in performing/providing the required service.
In many cases, DoD looks for an initial 30–40 percent cost reduction through its A76 competitive sourcing process (Andrews 2007). Activities that are won by private
sector firms transition to procurement contracts after the initial contract term is completed
making it very difficult to systematically track and monitor whether the projected cost
savings were produced. If the DoD retains the activity, the private sector firm or DoD
entity can re-compete for the contract at a later time.

31

OMB Circular A-76 was first issued in 1966. Authority for the OMB Circular A-76 originated in the
Budgeting and Accounting Act of 1921 and the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act Amendments of
1979. It provides guidance for agencies to determine whether commercial activities should be provided
through contract with commercial sources, use of in-house governmental personnel, or through interservice
support agreements with other federal agencies. Once an activity is selected for Circular A-76 review, the
industry develops proposals; the agency puts together a more efficient organization for retaining the work
in-house and prepares its own proposal. The best value contract offer is compared with the agency’s
proposal to determine final award. Note: The circular and its Supplement are not applicable to DoD in
times of a declared war or military mobilization (Grasso 2005, 3,14,23).
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As compared to the procurement of services, the A-76 competitive sourcing process
represents a small amount of the total outsourcing activity of the DoD (under two
percent). Yet, it is extremely important, as it is the only method by which the DoD
makes its in-house personnel and services part of a competitive process in which it can
replace existing military or federal civilian personnel with private sector resources. It
provides valuable insight into factors affecting outsourcing behavior and the ultimate size
and shape of the military and civilian (government-owned) manpower force.

DEFINING DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Dependent variables can be observed by two measures — changes in the annual
procurement of services as a percentage of O&M costs, and changes in the annual
amount of competitive sourcing activity.32 Examining the procurement of services in
relation to the O&M budget helps put into perspective the size and extent of changes in
service procurement over time. It provides a barometer of the activity in procuring
services relative to changes across other program areas funded by the O&M budget.
Data for the first dependent variable is provided in Figure 1.33 It displays a yearly
measure of the procurement of services as a percentage of O&M costs and is a useful

32

Procured services are paid from the O&M budget (GAO 2007, 2).
Outsourcing services included in Figure are:
Research and Development; Special Studies and Analysis; Architect and Engineering Services; Automatic
Data Processing and Telecommunication Services (Technology); Purchase of Structures and Facilities;
Natural Resources and Conservation Services; Social Science; Quality Control, Testing and Inspection
Services; Maintenance, Repair, and Rebuilding of Equipment; Modification of Equipment; Technical
Representative Services; Operation of Government-Owned Facilities; Installation of Equipment; Salvage
Services; Medical Services; Professional, Admin and Management Support Services; Utilities and
Housekeeping Services; Photographic, Mapping, Printing and Publication; Education and Training
Services; Transportation, Travel and Relocation Services; Lease and Rental of Equipment and Facilities;
Maintenance, Repair or Alteration of Real Property.
33

Throughout the study I’ve evaluated and compared yearly costs using the 2005 consumer price index (CPI)
that provides a common comparison on outsourcing costs for each year.
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indicator of the volume and change to DoD outsourcing activity throughout the time
frame of the study. The data indicates how outsourcing as a percentage of the O&M
budget has grown over the time frame from an average of 56.9 percent through 1981, to
65.7 percent of O&M costs in 2005. During this period, the annual percent of O&M
spent on procured services has ranged from a low of 52–54 percent in 1974, 1976, 1981,
and 1991 to a high of 67 to 70 percent in 1982, 1985 and 1987. On average during the
study time frame, more than half of DoD’s O&M funds were spent on private sector
actors to provide support services.
Figure 1B provides data on the average percent of O&M funds spent on procured
services for each of the first five cases. This information helps to compare the changes in
procurement activity for support services across the cases being studied.
The second dependent variable, competitive sourcing activity, is measured through
the following four variables: the annual amount of completed cost-comparison studies
performed by DoD organizations, the annual amount of DoD positions or full-time
equivalents (FTE) positions studied, the annual amount of DoD public/private
competitions, and the annual amount of competitive sourcing initiatives announced by
DoD organizations.34 The annual completed cost-comparison data is found in Table 5 for
each DoD service/agency from 1978 through 1996. It provides a useful indicator in
identifying competitive activity and trends across the DoD over time.

34

A cost-comparison study is the process of comparing in-house and private sector organizations against a
Performance Work Statement (PWS) for the performance of required duties, and selecting the organization
that can perform the duties more cost-effectively significantly reducing the current production cost of the
service is a major factor in selecting the service provider (Andrews 2007). One FTE is equivalent to one
position, or a full-time worker.
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The second variable looks at DoD positions filled by either military and/or DoD
civilian personnel. Evaluating the amount of DoD positions also considered FTE
positions studied for competitive sourcing initiatives is an indicator of the extent that
competition has permeated DoD missions and affected the size of the force. Table 7 and
Figures 5 and 6 use data on the annual amount of positions studied to help explain
competitive activity within the DoD. Table 7 lists the number of positions studied in the
DoD on an annual basis from 1988 through1997. Figure 5 lists the number of positions
studied in A-76 competitions between 1979 and 1996. It also lists the DoD’s projection
for positions to be studied from 1997 through 2003. Figure 6 provides data on the
average number of total FTEs or positions competed for each year from 1996 through
2003. This data is important, as it reflects outsourcing effort versus outcome for nearly
the entire period of the study and helps to highlight trends of activity within the DoD.
The third variable identifies the extent of competitive sourcing activity via the
number of DoD public/private competitions held each year. Figure 7 measures this
activity from 1995 through 2003, providing data on the total number of competitions
within DoD each year, and the amount of competitions won by in-house and contractor
bids. The data is useful in providing the level of competitive activity within the DoD and
the patterns of success and failure for both private sector and in-house organizations in
the competitive sourcing process.
Finally, the fourth variable to assess competitive sourcing activity is the annual
number of competitive sourcing initiatives announced by DoD organizations. Each
organization provides a public announcement for an activity it intends to competitively
source, through the A-76 process, seeking both public and private sector bids.
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Announcements are made throughout the year, offering private businesses the
opportunity to compete against in-house organizations for the opportunity to perform
select functions. An increased amount of announced initiatives suggests a greater level of
activity for competition and outsourcing. Figure 8 charts the amount of initiatives
announced by the DoD services and agencies between 1995 and 2004.
In the following section, I’m going to briefly examine the extent of change in
DoD’s outsourcing activity over the course of the study. It provides the foundation for
testing independent variables and evaluating each of the three theoretical frameworks for
their usefulness in explaining outsourcing behavior in Chapters four through eight and
ten. To better understand the causal nature of outsourcing behavior in the DoD, the first
five cases are framed by time periods distinguished by either a significant increase or
decrease in outsourcing activity, as defined by changes in either service procurement or
competitive sourcing activity. These periods are 1970–1980, 1981–1988, 1989–1995,
1996–2000, and 2001–2005. The sixth case evaluates outsourcing in the realm of DoD
IT network management.
Overall, outsourcing activity for procured services increased over the course of the
study at different rates of growth/decline. Competitive sourcing activity across the study
fluctuated, with periods of active competition followed by little competitive activity.
President Reagan’s two administrations were the most active in both the procurement of
support services and competitive sourcing activity, followed by President Clinton’s
second administration. The periods with least activity were 1970–1980 and the
administrations of President G.H.W. Bush and President Clinton, between 1989 and
1995.
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OVERVIEW OF DOD OUTSOURCING ACTIVITY 1970–2005

1970–1980
Between 1970 and 1980 there was an inconsistent pattern of growth in service
procurement. During this period, the primary data (and only data available) to study
outsourcing were the yearly amount of procured services and the percent of O&M dollars
spent on procured services, as described in Figure 1. The amount spent on procured
services ranged from $52 to $64 billion yearly, while the percent of O&M budget spent
on service procurement ranged from 52 to 61 percent yearly. The change in the percent of
O&M dollars spent on procured services from year to year during this period declined by
3.5 percent. The average percent of O&M budget spent on procured services was 57.8
percent. Data for competitive sourcing activity was not available until 1978 and it
increased significantly between 1978 and 1981.

1981–1988
The first significant change in procurement activity for both service procurement
and commercial sourcing activity began in the early 1980s. In comparison to the 1970s,
the procurement of services increased significantly. From 1981 through the end of 1982
the percent of O&M budget spent on service procurement increased from 52.1 to 70.6
percent. This appears to be a result of the Reagan administration’s investment in national
security through a commitment to military buildup, and neoliberal ideological principles
that will be discussed in Chapter five. The 18 percent increase in procurement spending
was three times larger than the six percent increase in the O&M portion of the DoD
budget for the same time period. The average percent of O&M funds spent on procured
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services was 64.2 percent between 1981 and 1988, as compared to 57 percent in the prior
period. The amount spent on DoD procured services averaged between $80–100 billion
annually during this period, as compared to $52–64 billion annually in the 1970s.35
Overall, the change in the percent of O&M dollars spent on procured services from year
to year during this period increased by 9.3 percent.
Competitive sourcing activity, as measured by cost-comparison studies, paralleled
the growth in service procurement. As listed in Table 5, cost-comparison studies peaked
with 379 completed studies in 1983, while there were over 1,900 completed studies
between 1980 and 1988. Data for both procurement of services and competitive sourcing
indicates a significant increase in competition and a large commitment to using the
private sector for performing DoD activities.

1989–1995
Between 1989 and 1995, the average percent of O&M funds spent on procured
services was 61.6 percent, nearly three percent lower than the prior period. At this lower
level of procurement, the percent of O&M spent on procured services increased by 1.2
percent due to increased procurement activity in 1992–1994 as the O&M budget
decreased and procurement spending levels remained relatively consistent. A large
decrease in competitive sourcing activity, as measured by cost-comparison studies in
Table 5 and the total number of positions studied in Table 7, was a significant
development highlighting substantial change in outsourcing activity during this period.
Completed cost-comparison studies declined from 153 in 1988 to 9 in 1995, while the
number of positions studied dropped from 12,000 in 1988 to 2,128 in 1995. While the
35

The amount spent on procured services annually was adjusted to 2005 dollars.
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data on service procurement reflects interest in retaining and hiring new private sector
actors for functions not performed by DoD personnel, the competitive sourcing data
reflected both legislative restrictions and hesitation from within DoD organizations
towards outsourcing of functions being performed by their personnel.

1996–2000
Between 1996 and 2000, the average percent of O&M funds spent on procured
services was 64.8 percent, nearly four percent greater than the previous period and the
highest average across the case studies, as the DoD budget was at its lowest since the
1970s. At this increased level of procurement, the percent of O&M dollars spent on
services decreased by three percent, as the O&M budget increased in 1999 and 2000
while the amount spent for procurement of services remained consistent. The increase in
commercial sourcing as measured through A-76 competitions, positions competed and
announced DoD competitive sourcing initiatives was significant. A-76 competitions, as
tracked in Figure 7, increased from under 20 in 1996 to nearly 210 in 2000. Figure 6
displays how the average number of total positions competed increased from under 100
in 1996 to nearly 8,000 in 2000. The amount of announced DoD competitive sourcing
initiatives represented in Figure 8 increased from 50 in 1995 to nearly 450 in 1999.

2001–2005
Between 2001 and 2005, the percent of O&M dollars spent on procured services
increased by 3.7 percent, from $61.9 to $65.7 billion spent, with an average of 63.3
percent as the O&M budget increased to nearly $200 billion. Competitive sourcing

87
activity began to decline as announced DoD competitive sourcing initiatives declined
from nearly 450 in 1999 to under 50 in 2004. DoD competitions decreased from over
200 in 2000 to 160 in 2003, while average number of total positions competed for
annually declined to under 14,000 in 2003. The data indicates that while the DoD
continued to seek private actors to perform new or existing activities, competitive
sourcing activity began to decline based on the volume of competition for functions
performed by the DoD.
The next five chapters address the outsourcing activities described above by
evaluating each of the three theoretical frameworks against data from each of the five
periods. The objective of these chapters is to identify those variables that are significant
in explaining outsourcing activity throughout the study and the extent to which each
theoretical framework is useful in explaining and understanding the phenomenon.
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CHAPTER FOUR

CASE STUDY—DEFENSE OUTSOURCING 1970–1980
During the 1970–1980 period, outsourcing indicators are based on procurement
activity that ranged from $52 to $64 billion where the percent of O&M funds spent on
service procurement ranged from 52 to 61 percent.36 Outsourcing activity decreased
through 1974, increased between 1975 and 1978 and decreased slightly through 1980.
While the DoD was efficient in outsourcing low-skilled requirements, organization
autonomy was a central characteristic of outsourcing behavior, resulting in selective
outsourcing based on disparate local organizations with little oversight and
accountability.
Outsourcing behavior highlighted inefficiencies in providing the national defense
capability and was insensitive to war fighting commanders and the American public. The
interest of the services in maintaining organization independence undermined the joint
structure and comprehensive national defense mission. The semi-autonomous position
of defense agencies that went relatively unchecked by leadership contributed to a lack of
transparency and violated the theory of governmental checks and balances.

STRATEGIC EFFICIENCY 1970–1980

During this period, strategic efficiency offers a limited lesson in explaining DoD
outsourcing activity. By examining pay rates and pay-growth, it appears that military and
federal civilian personnel were a better cost savings than private sector personnel for

36

O&M costs are in 2005 dollars.
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most military activities. Strategic efficiency would expect outsourcing in low skill areas,
such as housekeeping and utilities, to provide opportunities for DoD personnel in higher
skilled activities where they offered a greater cost savings advantage than private sector
equivalents. Transaction cost economics is aligned with these expectations as low-skilled
activities are mundane and commonly found in the market. The market offers the most
efficient mode for organizing these transactions, as significant competition can be
arranged to provide a safeguard for procurement.
The data on outsourcing through DoD’s service procurement process does not
support strategic efficiency as 65–75 percent of service procurement actions were for
higher skilled activities where DoD personnel offered a cost savings advantage.
Outsourcing through the competitive sourcing process (A-76) does support the strategic
efficiency for a majority of its actions, as approximately 75 percent of the DoD’s
competitive sourcing initiatives were for low-skilled/manual labor type commercial
activities such as utilities and housekeeping services.

Comparing Military with Private Sector Pay
In the 1970s as the DoD transitioned to an all-volunteer force, military and federal
civilian pay trailed behind pay levels for comparable personnel in the private sector. This
was in an era when low-quality recruits, lack of experienced personnel and insufficient
training created what many argue was a hollow military force (Jehn 1999, 2). Military
pay achieved a short-lived parity with private sector pay in 1972–73 when the allvolunteer force was born. In 1973 annual military pay averaged $8,977 as compared to
civilian industry pay which averaged $9,106 while others argued that it did not include
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fringe benefits of up to 25 percent of military compensation (Finney 1975b, 25).37 During
the mid-to-late 1970s, military and federal civilian pay raises were consistently capped
below wage increases in the private sector (Figure 11) and federal civilian salaries trailed
behind those in the military (AUSA 2000, 1; Finney 1975a, 25). Figure 11 highlights the
military-private sector pay gap between 1977 and 1980 (The bars with a negative
percentage measure indicate a slower pay raise). It highlights how military pay grew
slower than private sector pay.38
Personnel cost savings between the DoD and private sector can be evaluated in
Figure 17 by comparing pay-growth by specific functional specialty areas, such as
professional/technical, administrative, service, etc. In the professional and technical
functional areas such as health, law, staff, computer, and satellite military pay-growth
trailed civilian counterparts by four to eight percent from 1977–1980. During these years
every functional area listed in Figure 17 — professional/technical, administrative,
service, craft/production and operator/laborer, military personnel were a better cost value
than their private sector equivalents.

Comparing Federal Civilian With Private Sector Pay
How does federal civilian pay compare with the private sector? For DoD civilians,
I reference the federal government’s process for setting wage rates governed by a table of
salaries referred to as the General Schedule (GS), and the Congressional Budget Office
37

Determining military compensation has always been controversial, as the military and the Commerce
Department focused on base pay plus allowances for clothing, housing and meals.
(Finney, John W. 1975b. "Military Pay Put Above Civilians". New York Times, March 2, 1975, 25).
38
The lack of a military pay gap in 1982 was the result of a large military pay increase amounting to 25
percent of base pay aimed to counter recruitment and retention issues arising from the introduction of the
all-volunteer force in 1973 (Hosek, Peterson, Heilbrunn 1994).
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(CBO) comparison of the annual value of federal and private sector benefits (Masia and
Holen 1997, 1).39 For DoD civilians, changes in federal pay are compared with private
sector pay using the ECI index from 1977 through 1980.
The data, illustrated in Figure 20, shows that both groups started with comparable
salaries in 1977. 40 Yet, the private sector had faster pay-growth and increased wages as
compared to the federal civilian sector between 1970 and 1980. In 1979, Jerome M.
Rosow, chairman of the Advisory Committee on Federal Pay, reported that since 1970
federal white-collar salary scales rose 73 percent while white-collar pay in the private
sector rose by 92 percent (Associated Press 1979, 59). Through 1980, the data suggests
that federal civilian personnel were likely to be a better cost savings and more affordable
to the DoD over time than their private sector counterparts. The pay gap was also
supported by the findings of President Carter’s advisory panel that noted the disparity
between federal white collar and equivalent private sector pay (Associated Press 1979,
59).
The wage data for the 1970s, as discussed above, show that military and DoD
federal civilians competed for wage parity with the private sector. The expectations from
the strategic efficiency framework are not supported by the DoD outsourcing data for
procured services (Figure 29) and some competitive sourcing activities. The cost savings
value for higher skilled activities favored DoD personnel. Nearly 65 to 75 percent of
outsourcing for procured services (Figure 29) and 25 percent of competitive sourcing
actions (Table 4) were for higher skilled labor-type activities. Strategic efficiency is

39

The General Schedule is the government’s largest pay plan, covering 76 percent of all employees (Masia
and Musell 1997, 2).
40
1977 is the last year for which federal employees received a full pay raise necessary to make federal and
private sector salaries comparable as defined by law (Masia and Musell 1997, 10).
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useful in explaining outsourcing through most competitive sourcing practices (Table 4),
as 75 percent of these outsourced activities, were for low-skilled activities such as
housekeeping and utilities.

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 1970–1980

The political ideology framework seeks to identify how a set of shared ideas and
beliefs of government leaders impacts choices, actions and ultimately policymaking. This
section will evaluate whether the neoliberal economic ideas of introducing competition
into the federal workplace, specifically the DoD, and using the private sector to deliver
public goods and services is a causal factor in DoD outsourcing activity during the 1970–
1980 period. I’m going to address the nature of these shared ideas and beliefs held by
government leaders (evaluating each administration and Congress in the Nixon, Ford and
Carter era as they pertain towards the government and economy and what actions were
taken based on these ideas and beliefs to affect outsourcing activity.

Nixon Administration
The predominant method of managing the U.S. economy from Roosevelt’s New
Deal into the 1970s was through state intervention, where the government had a very
active role in overseeing and directing the economy. President Nixon’s 1969 election
raised hopes for neoliberal economists that a counterrevolution against the legacy of the
New Deal and state intervention were at hand (Klein 2007, 132). Nixon met regularly
with Milton Friedman in the Oval Office and named several of Friedman’s acolytes (e.g.
George Schultz and Donald Rumsfeld) to key economic posts (Klein 2007, 132-133).
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Rumsfeld used contractors to gain leverage over a defiant federal civilian workforce as
the director of the Office of Economic Opportunity. Rumsfeld hired Booz Allen
Hamilton and Arthur Andersen to reorganize the agency and eliminate 108 civil positions
(Guttman and Willner 1976; Peckenpaugh 2003e, 4). Though a minor example, it
highlights the existence of neoliberal type actions in the government. Also, Roy Ash
was selected by Nixon to run the OMB and oversee federal contracting in 1972. Ash, a
former chief executive officer of Litton Industries, Inc., a major government contractor,
played a key role in the establishment of a leading contracting-out lobbying group, the
National Council on Technical and Service Industries (Hanrahan 1983, 90).
However, in 1971 with a slumping U.S. economy, high unemployment and
inflation, Nixon embraced state intervention with price caps for basic necessities such as
rent and oil to avoid his own political demise (Klein 2007, 133). Nixon told aides that
decisions on economic matters had to be guided by political considerations, presumably
because of the consequences for his public support (Smith 2007, 144). Nixon introduced
a full employment budget providing for deficit spending to reduce unemployment and
supported the development and passage of an income policy whereby the government
intervened to establish a wage and price control system (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998, 60–
63). In addition to the implementation of economic controls, Nixon carried out a great
expansion of regulation such that more new regulation was imposed on the economy
during the Nixon administration than in any other Presidency since the New Deal (Yergin
and Stanislaw 1998, 64).
The administration did not appear to have an effective competitive sourcing strategy
to increase private sector utilization in the federal system. Though data does not exist on
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the extent of competitive sourcing activities prior to 1978, the Nixon administration did
not take action to focus attention on A-76 and the competitive sourcing process in an
effort to stimulate or increase its activity within the DoD. For example, the GAO, who
administered the A-76 program, did not update the A-76 circular to address common
problems and irregularities found across organizations.
Neoliberal beliefs did not factor into the shaping of policy during the Nixon
administration, despite a few minor examples of market related actions, Nixon’s actions
reflected a strong commitment to government involvement in shaping the economy and
the market. Between 1970 and 1974, the average percent of O&M funds spent on
procured services was 58.6 percent, declining by 8.5 percent since 1970. Spending on
outsourcing activities decreased from $63.9 in 1970 to $51.9 billion in 1974 (see Fig 1).
Nixon’s actions appeared influenced by state intervention in the economy as opposed to
implementing Milton Friedman’s suggested market-centered actions for managing the
government and addressing the country’s economic problems. 41

Ford Administration
Ideology does appear to offer some significance in explaining outsourcing behavior
during the Ford administration. Confidence in state intervention and the supremacy of
government knowledge in running the economy began to be questioned during the mid1970s as the economic system suffered from recession, slow growth, high inflation, high
taxes and increased unemployment. The skepticism generated by the economic
difficulties of the 1970s helped to enlarge the growing influence of ideas for less

41

Figures are standardized using the 2005 Consumer Price Index
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government intervention in markets and economic policy with increased competition
among the private sector, as promoted by Frederick Hayek.
As noted earlier, neoliberal economic ideology was not a popular option for
policymakers during the 1970s and would take some time for it to become a dominant
framework for national economic policy development. The concept of outsourcing and
privatization was still relatively unknown in the United States. The Ford administration
used a combination of neoliberal and state intervention type actions in its 1975 battle with
recession. President Ford used tax cuts, cash rebates and deficit spending as part of his
anti-recession policies, resulting in the federal budget deficit increasing from 0.53 to 4.10
in 1975 (Meeropol 1998, 54). With the Ford campaign in 1976, the Republican party
began to increasingly use neoliberal concepts to address national financial troubles in the
economy (Smith 2007, 144–145). Ford’s proposed Government Reform Act of 1976
attempted to reduce the impact of federal regulations on selected sectors of the economy,
exemplified in the airline industry(Haider 1979, 252). The Ford administration’s support
for deregulation of the airline industry eventually became law during the Carter
administration in 1978 (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998, 342–343,345).
In President Ford’s budget message for fiscal year 1977, he noted his belief and
support for expanding competition and private enterprise in the economy while reducing
the size of government. He noted the gradual and uneven growth trend in the federal
government, arguing that the drift towards bigger and bigger government must be
stopped. He also pointed to the private sector as the driving force in the U.S. economy
over its history. He argued that the U.S. must rely on and nurture the private sector for
the economy to grow, instead of continuing to increase the government share of the
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economy, which would dampen the forces of competition in the economy resulting in
little or no growth (Ford 1976).
During the 1976–77 period, with a Democratically controlled Congress, President
Ford took actions to increase the role of private actors in the federal government while
reducing the federal workforce through management reforms to integrate better budget
and management operations (Haider 1979). In July 1976, President Ford launched a
Presidential Management Initiative (PMI) focusing on five initiatives that included
contracting-out. What became known as “Operation Barnacle Remover,” the President
asked each agency to develop a plan to increase reliance on the private sector and ordered
them to identify five types of activities that were being performed in-house for possible
contracting-out (Haider 1979; Hanrahan 1983, 90).
The Ford administration took actions designed to make it easier to justify agency
decisions to contract-out government services. Based on estimates reviewed by the U.S.
General Accounting Office, OMB revised Circular A-76 by specifying an increase to the
amount used to compute employee retirement costs in cost studies used for outsourcing
competitions from seven to 24.7 percent of a federal employee’s base pay. In addition,
retirement and health and life insurance benefits were increased to four percent rather
than at 1.4 percent (Haider 1979, 253; Hanrahan 1983, 91).
Both percentages were key variables used to determine in-house costs for the
performance of government services. By increasing the percentage of retirement costs
and life insurance benefits, the cost of federal employees increased when compared to the
private sector during cost comparisons in competitive sourcing activities. The change
had a dramatic impact in making a wider range of labor intensive activities available for
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contracting out, with at least 75,000 federal jobs more expensive than if the same jobs
were performed by contract workers (Hanrahan 1983, 91).
The actions of the Ford administration were aimed at giving private sector actors
opportunity to compete successfully during job competitions and ultimately increase
private sector performance of government functions. These actions appear to have been
driven by an interest in reducing the size of government, as the Ford administration
intended to introduce increased contracting-out actions of additional support activities
and services, including aircraft and vehicle maintenance, and computer services at
military bases and other federal installations (Hanrahan 1983, 91). Ford’s PMI actions
appear consistent with his earlier budget message calling for smaller government and
expanding competition and private enterprise in the economy. Ford’s actions contributed
to the development of neoliberal economic policymaking in the federal government.
Between 1974 and 1997 while outsourcing and privatization were still relatively
unknown and rarely discussed, money spent on DoD outsourcing of services through
procurement climbed from $51.9 to $57.4 billion and approached the levels at the end of
the Vietnam war in 1973 (Figure 1). The percent of O&M budget spent on procurement
of services increased by 3.5 percent from 52.2 to 55.7 percent while the overall DoD
payroll was reduced from $158.8 to $148.3 billion (Figure 4).

Carter Administration
The results of DoD outsourcing during the Carter Administration did not appear to
be driven by ideological actions or design. When President Carter took office in 1977 he
began a rollback of conservative policies that supported an increased private role in
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government as shaped by the Ford administration. Initially, his administration included
the review of outsourcing as part of their overall program for government reorganization.
Within five months of taking office, the Carter administration stopped President Ford’s
Presidential Management Initiatives and reduced the amount used to compute employee
retirement costs in A-76 competitions from 24.7 percent of a federal employee’s base pay
to 14.1 percent (Hanrahan 1983, 91). However, it was later raised to 26 percent of an
employee’s base pay during his administration, likely resulting from his support for
maintaining federal personnel ceilings established by OMB and Congress and limiting
the costs of federal employment (Staats 1979, 2; Hanrahan 1983, 91).
The manning ceilings supported by the Carter administration to limit the growth
and expense of the federal workforce actually supported pro-business efforts to increase
outsourcing. Between 1976 and 1980 the military was reduced by nearly 20,000, while
DoD civilians were reduced by nearly 55,000. Many adherents to personnel ceilings saw
it as a tool for controlling the growth of the federal bureaucracy. President Carter
affirmed his faith in personnel ceilings in a fireside chat two weeks after he took office
(Hanrahan 1983, 33). Yet, as observed by Senator Frank E. Moss, D-Utah, reducing the
federal workforce without reducing the workload created a misleading illusion of control,
as it did not control costs nor produce efficiency (Hanrahan 1983, 34). It prevented
federal managers from improving productivity, since they were unable to use the best
possible mix of government and contractor employees (Hanrahan 1983, 34).
In 1979 congressional testimony, Carl Black, a local Washington, D.C. consultant
and former military officer noted how personnel ceilings favored the consulting industry
since DoD requirements did not get reduced but resulted in fewer people, which required
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agencies to hire outside contractors to assist in accomplishing the local mission
(Hanrahan 1983, 33). Admiral Alfred J. Whittle, Jr., Chief of Naval Materials,
acknowledged that the Navy would have to contract out more services because of
personnel ceilings placed upon the DoD. As noted by Admiral Whittle, the Navy
preferred to have ships overhauled in naval shipyards because they get better service
(Hanrahan 1983, 94–95).
While contracting-out solely to meet civilian personnel constraints was prohibited
by law, it was inevitable for it to happen as services did not have enough personnel to
perform in-house activities, according to Admiral Whittle (Hanrahan 1983, 95). The
Carter administration implemented personnel ceilings to hold the line on federal
employment and save money (Hanrahan 1983, 95). However, as noted by former Rep.
Herbert E. Harris II, D-Virginia, personnel ceilings led to increased outsourcing where
savings from cutting federal employees were often not realized (Hanrahan 1983, 95).
Personnel ceilings fell in line with a market-centered conservative economic agenda of
increasing the role of the private sector in DoD.
The Carter administration took a variety of actions to control the growth of
contractors. Initially, it attempted to control the growth of contractors performing
consulting activities for the federal government that had been unchecked throughout the
1970s. President Carter’s 1977 memorandum to federal agencies requested a review of
their consulting service arrangements to ensure they were appropriate and necessary
(McIntyre 1980). Carter’s memorandum was followed by OMB Bulletin No. 78-11 to
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meet a requirement for uniformity of definition, criteria, and management controls among
the agencies (McIntyre 1980).42
Noting the growth and minimal control of consultants in a wide variety of areas, the
Carter administration issued Circular A-120 for consulting services of an advisory nature
to agency administration and program management.43 Seeking to control and reduce the
extent of private actors performing federal services, the circular called for rigorous cost
comparisons between in-house and private-sector performance of a service, using
contractors on an intermittent and temporary basis, prohibiting contracts for inherently
governmental services and severely limiting long-term consulting arrangements
(Hanrahan 1983, 95). The administration believed these services were being used
excessively, unnecessarily and improperly (Hanrahan 1983, 92). Private contractors
performing these consulting services would likely be compared to officers or senior
NCOs who provided a greater cost savings to the DoD.
In the summer of 1977, with support of the Democratic controlled Congress,
President Carter signed legislation imposing a moratorium on new contracting-out
activities in the DoD until March 15, 1978. It restricted base operating support services
from commercial contract, as well as logistical support, intermediate and depot level
maintenance, research, development, and test and evaluation activities (GAO 1979, 2).
The legislation reflected congressional criticism of defense contracting procedures. The
42

OMB Bulletin No. 78-11 defined consulting services as “those services of a purely advisory nature
relating to the governmental functions of agency administration and management and agency program
management. These services are normally provided by persons or organizations who are generally
considered to have knowledge and special abilities that are not generally available within the agency
GAO. 1980. Government Earns Low Marks on Proper Use of Consultants. Washington, D.C.: General
Accounting Office.
43
Areas affected by crackdown on private consulting and services: policymaking, repeated contract
extensions, nonessential studies and analyses, bypassing or undermining personnel ceilings, pay limitations,
competitive employment procedures, revolving door abuses, interagency duplication of efforts and conflicts
of interest between consultant advice and outside financial interests and affiliations.
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Democratic position on outsourcing government activities was expressed by the House
Appropriations Committee and its Democratic Chairman George Mahon arguing that
contracting-out had wasted taxpayers’ money and harmed the civil service system
(Hanrahan 1983, 92). The legislation was limited to new contracting-out actions and did
not address pre-existing contracting arrangements.
Political ideology did not appear useful in explaining DoD outsourcing activity
during the Carter administration. While it was still a relatively minor topic based on
discourse analysis in public newspapers and academic journals (Figure 28), the
expectation of Democrats was for reduced outsourcing activity. Despite the
administration’s efforts to control outsourcing of consultants and support activities, the
data in Figure 1 doesn’t reflect their success in this area, as outsourcing costs increased
from $57.4 to $61.9 billion between 1977 and 1981, with a peak of $63.5 billion in 1978.
Additionally, though the Carter administration had initiated Circular 120 to control
the outsourcing of consulting services in the professional and management support areas
between 1977 and 1980, outsourcing costs for DoD’s professional services and
management support rose from $1.6 to $3.1 billion (Figure 29). Also, although DoD’s
A-76 (competitive sourcing) activity data was not captured on a federal database until
1979, once the data became public it indicated a sharp increase in competitive sourcing
activity between 1979 and 1980, with completed DoD cost comparison studies of inhouse commercial activities rising from 99 to 154. While the expectation in the
Democratic administration was for reduced outsourcing activity, the actions of the Carter
administration were not successful at containing the growth of the private sector. As the
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outsourcing results appear to reflect a market influence, the actions of the President and
the Democratic Congress were not intended to have those results.
As discussed earlier, the President was unsuccessful in controlling the growth of
new procurement and contracting-out of government activities through legislation. The
Democratic Congress expressed frustration with outsourcing practices and passed
legislation to limit new outsourcing activities for 12–18 months, yet it had a difficult time
reaching a consensus on the role of the private sector in performing government
activities. It introduced six bills to improve federal contracting practices but only one
was enacted to Public Law.44 As noted in the next section, the outsourcing findings
appear to demonstrate the initiative of military services to procure and compete activities,
based on local organization interests and mission requirements.

ORGANIZATION FACTORS 1970–1980

Between 1970 and 1980, expenditures on outsourcing (procurement) activities as
noted in Figure 1 remained relatively consistent and steady, averaging around $58 billion
annually. DOD organizations at the lowest levels had a great amount of control and
independence in selecting the activities for outsourcing. While A-76 competitive
sourcing data was not systematically captured by the federal government until 1978, the
literature suggests that service organizations selectively applied Circular-A-76 while
senior civilian leaders did not enforce A-76 requirements (Comptroller General 1973;
GAO 1972; Staats 1979; GAO 1981a; GAO 1979).

44

Public Law (96-304, 307) required agencies to submit consulting services budget justifications
to Appropriation Committee (GAO 1980).
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The period between 1969 and 1974 proved difficult for the Pentagon and its
military services who needed to adjust to a changing environment with new demands on
the DoD that included a decline in the level of defense expenditures as the Vietnam war
efforts declined, increased personnel costs, high costs for weapon systems, reduction in
civilian and military personnel, the phase out of older weapon systems, and reduced base
infrastructures (Korb 1979, 26–45). In 1969, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird inherited a
demoralized force due to in part to the previous leadership of Defense Secretary Robert
McNamara, who excluded the military from the decision making process within the
Pentagon (Korb 1979, 85).
Secretary Laird concluded that McNamara had over centralized the Pentagon and
had given insufficient weight to professional military judgment (Korb 1979, 87). He
instituted a process labeled “participatory management” that dispersed some of his power
and gave military leaders a much larger voice in the decision making process and greater
choices in managing the defense budget (Korb 1979, 87). Secretary Laird looked
primarily to the military services and their Chiefs for the design of the force structure, not
attempting to exercise control of details in the defense budget and allowing the services
wide latitude in structuring the budget categories (Korb 1979, 87, 90).
Support for organization autonomy and independence was revitalized during the
Laird era, affecting policy to include the procurement environment through the end of the
decade and into the 1980s. During the 1970s, the congressional desire to retire older
weapons systems and reducing infrastructure, personnel and budget, offered the
opportunity for outsourcing in non-core mission activities. The increased autonomy of
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service organizations would likely limit the extent of outsourcing in an effort to preserve
the organization and budget capacity.
In this environment, it appeared that the autonomy of military organizations had an
impact on the extent of outsourcing of commercial activities and selection of contractors.
The ability of service organizations to limit the effect of the A-76 process on their
respective personnel and missions and maintain their standard procedures and practices
was evident from the opportunities to outsource DoD commercial functions that were not
extended for consideration to contractors. In 1970, 2,759 of 5,421 in-house activities,
or 51 percent, costing approximately $3.3 billion annually, had not been reviewed but
represented a source of potential savings (GAO 1972). In the early 1970s the DOD spent
approximately $6.3 billion annually to provide installations with commercial and
industrial services and products that included maintenance, food service, transportation,
and ammunition (GAO 1972, 1).
Most of these services were not directly connected to the primary mission of these
organizations as discussed above in the review of each military service. Table 4 provides
a list of the type of activities (functions) and number of competitive sourcing studies
performed in DoD outsourcing efforts between 1978 and 1986. Most of these activities
were local support functions not connected to combat or wartime mission requirements.
Contractors received approximately 18 percent of these DOD’s expenditures (GAO 1972,
1). Depot maintenance involved repair, overhaul, and modification of equipment beyond
the capability of operational units. In 1969–1970, depot maintenance cost $2.6 billion;
$2 billion worth of that maintenance was performed at military installations and $600
million by contractors (GAO 1972).
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In addition to these in-house contracting opportunities, a 1970 Comptroller General
review of DOD outsourcing activities (GAO 1972) at six DOD locations indicated three
significant findings:
1. Installations omitted commercial-type activities from installation inventories45
2. DOD personnel were performing new activities that should have been considered
for public-private competition as they were not considered inherently governmental
activities
3. Justifications for continuing in-house performance of activities were
unsupportable. Twenty-six activities with an annual cost of $65 million were omitted
from inventories due to a lack of definitive guidelines
These findings indicated that DoD organizations put little emphasis on A-76
guidelines and used their own local procedures and interests for managing installation
manpower requirements. Procurement guidance was not followed by base/post leaders
despite A-76 and DOD requirements requesting each Service Secretary to obtain
approval from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) prior to
initiating new in-house activities. At two of six locations studied by the GAO, both
lack of service guidelines and not maintaining standard operating practices were noted
(GAO 1972, p.16–17). Local base justifications for continuing the performance of inhouse functions were not supported by most decision making explanations (GAO 1972,

45

Installation inventories are the total type and amount of activities being performed at an installation. By
omitting them from the inventory, they were precluded from being candidates for commercial sourcing and
potential outsourcing.
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7). 46 Most recommendations were based on the reviewer’s personal knowledge of the
function with no evidence of the factors used for consideration (GAO 1972).
The lack of senior service level policy guidance and organization subjectivity was
noted in the findings at various installations where in-house performance of similar
functions were justified by differing, contradicting and unsupported reasons (GAO 1972,
7). Organization autonomy was reflected in their ability to subjectively determine (based
on local interests) which activities/services would be considered for competition. The
Army reviewed and justified in-house performance of building maintenance and repair at
102 installations, of which 77 were based on officials who believed programs would be
delayed by changing to contract performance and 20 due to non-availability of adequate
sources (GAO 1972, 7). These justifications were made primarily because local officials
suggested there was not enough time to look for commercial sources and perform cost
studies (GAO 1972, 7).
Service organizations reacted slowly to change, defended their organizational
interests and attempted to maintain core procedures. For example, in 1974 the OMB
ordered services to study the feasibility of hiring private contractors to perform support
functions on military bases performed by civilian employees (Finney 1974). Though the
OMB contended that contracting-out these services would save money, the military
services did not share the same view. They opposed a reduction in their civilian forces
with almost the same fervor with which they resisted cutbacks in troop strength (Finney
1974).

46

In-house refers to activities being sourced through government military or civilian personnel as opposed
to contractors.
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Lack of oversight by senior civilian leadership reinforced the climate of
organization autonomy that supported local selectivity with no necessary priority for
outsourcing through the competitive sourcing process. A 1977 report by the Comptroller
General noted that DOD inventories of commercial and industrial activities were
unreliable. Installation personnel did not identify all activities and costs. Inappropriate
justifications and difficulty in matching DOD classification of commercial and industrial
activities with the military service activities allowed organizations to maintain control
over the outsourcing process and continue to use in-house resources (GAO 1979, 10).
Findings in the area of augmenting military services with management support
consultants continued to highlight an organization behavior of independence and selfinterest when it came to procuring these commercial activities by military services. This
was not an area of competitive sourcing where organizations would lose valuable
personnel positions, but of procurement of management services allowing organizations
to augment their size with civilian specialists. Since the 1960s this behavior was noted as
part of military culture (GAO 1981b, 21). This can be exemplified in the 1979 review of
256 management consultant contract awards across the DOD. Organization
independence and self-interest were exemplified in the following:
- The use of consultants to perform work that should be completed by DOD
personnel
- Revolving door abuses where former employees were given preferential treatment
in obtaining contracts
- Excessive use of sole source contracts restricting competition
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- Repeated contract extensions and failure to maintain adequate information on the
number and cost of consulting services (GAO 1981a, 1,4)
Through 1980, organization factors appear significant in explaining outsourcing
behavior within the DOD, as both budgets and personnel were reduced The data in
Table 4 for competitive sourcing indicates that organizations primarily protected their
core mission activities and procured a variety of support services focusing primarily on
activities with low skill requirements secondary to mission requirements. Data from
Figure 29 points to procurement activities in the range of 25–35 percent for support
activities that included utilities and housekeeping activities. The type of services
procured appears to indicate that many organizations were selectively competing
positions not considered essential to the core mission. The inconsistent nature of O&M
expenditures across the DoD throughout this period supports the argument that local
organizations maintained control of the process and used private actors where necessary
to satisfy secondary requirements and augment their organizations as a result of budget
and personnel reductions.
Due to the lack of competitive sourcing data on a DoD-wide scale in the 1970s,
comparisons of yearly activity were unavailable through 1978. As noted in Table 4, once
competitive sourcing data was tracked in 1978, the type of support activities competed
were local in-garrison activities and similar to procurement data indicated in Figure 29
(Ex. facilities, utilities maintenance, custodial, motor pool). Competitive sourcing activity
is indicative of organizations focusing on core missions and utilizing their limited
personnel on higher priority skills and activities. DOD service organizations were able
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take advantage of weak oversight, implementation, monitoring and enforcement practices
in Circular A-76 to subjectively outsource activities that fit their local interests.
While A-76 procedures and competitive sourcing were selective and lacked
political oversight, and procurement remained decentralized with power at the local level,
outsourcing behavior for support services during this period was a microcosm of the
much larger defense environment. It highlighted behavior that was ultimately inefficient
in providing the larger national defense capability and contributed to potential
insensitivities to war fighting commanders and the American public. While service
leaders with support of Secretary Laird sought autonomy and independence in developing
and planning their missions and running their organizations, the increased autonomy was
an undermining factor in the ability of the DoD organization to fulfill its national
requirement for genuine joint military advice and unified military action. The priority of
being able to execute a national defense effort appeared secondary to the requirements of
each military service (Barrett and Jones 1983, 49).
For example, in defense acquisition, central management failed to force adequate
comparisons of the capabilities of proposed and competing systems to accomplish a given
mission at early stages of the process of deciding new weapons and equipment (Barrett
and Jones 1983, 60). The 1977–80 Defense Organization Study found that civilian
leadership in the DoD did not provide clear, definitive policy guidance needed for
military planning (Barrett and Jones 1983, 54). Military staffs formulated their own
policy programs without explicit acceptance or rejection by senior decisions makers
resulting in the policymaking function moving from civilian to military authority (Barrett
and Jones 1983, 54).
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The preeminence of the four services in the DoD organizational structure during the
1970s was out of proportion to their legally assigned and limited formal responsibilities
for the maintaining function. The interest of the services in maintaining organization
independence and ensuring their capability to accomplish service missions provided
continuing incentives to influence as many decisions as possible and co-opting the joint
structure (Barrett and Jones 1983, 79).
A difficulty inherent in the DoD organizational structure, with its increased
autonomy, was the service influence over joint forces. In this environment, services had
a major influence on both the structure and readiness of military forces for which a joint
forces commander was responsible but had very little input (Barrett and Jones 1983, 53).
Rather than being unresponsive, the military made inputs into decision making, where
defense policy was predominantly service-orientated. The tendency was for each service
to favor capabilities enhancing its organization. The objective was to potentially rush
into production a unique capability or weapon system, outsource a service/function or
maintain a traditional outdated mission with inadequate test, evaluation or reappraisal that
was not sufficiently offset by a broader DoD perspective (Barrett and Jones 1983, 80).
While every organizational entity has its own interests, which will advance if
unchecked, and may not further the interests of its larger mission, it requires some over
watching authority(Barrett and Jones 1983, 74). The degree of limited efficiency by the
DoD due to chain of command and management discrepancies caused concern over
wartime effectiveness while undermining its economy due to the relative lack of
competition and over watch by agencies (Barrett and Jones 1983, 76).
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The semi-autonomous position of defense agencies in the environment of
organizational self-interest was relatively unchecked by leadership, as suggested across
the DoD. It had a potentially adverse impact on the public trust by increasing the lack of
transparency in DoD functions and violated the theory of governmental checks and
balances.
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CHAPTER FIVE

CASE STUDY - DEFENSE OUTSOURCING 1981–1988
During the period of 1981 through 1988 yearly outsourcing activity costs for
procurement grew from $62 to $87 billion, while the percent of O&M budget spent on
service procurement ranged from 52 to 70 percent.47 Competitive sourcing activity was
significant as marked by the extensive activity around cost-comparison studies of inhouse commercial activities. Cost comparison studies increased from 99 in 1979 to 379 in
1983 with an annual average of 210 between 1980 and 1988. Outsourcing of services
through competitive sourcing grew by 37 percent over the previous period.
Reagan’s beliefs and subsequent neoliberal economic strategy, though used
discriminately and with congressional support for a majority of the period, was
significant in explaining DOD outsourcing behavior. 48 Funding for DoD outsourced
activities had its greatest peacetime increase, as compared to activity before and after this
time frame, with an increase of nearly 41 percent. The result of interservice competition
for resources, similar to the first case, reduced civilian control of the military. The
natural consequence was a heightening of civil-military disagreement and loss of
information critical to effective decision-making and transparency in military activities.

STRATEGIC EFFICIENCY 1981–1988

As noted in chapter 2, the DoD’s objective was to attract quality personnel with a
competitive compensation package that exceeded the pay of seven of 10 private sector
47
48

O&M costs are in 2005 dollars.
Increasing the deficit was not a reflection of neoliberal economic policymaking.
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workers. In assessing cost efficiency, paying employees less than the 70th percentile did
not effectively meet its competitive standard with the private sector for its share of the
quality workforce but it did gain cost efficiencies for the DoD by being able to perform
its mission with a workforce for less than its targeted cost. The assumption made in
assessing cost efficiency is that pay rates below the 70th percentile would be considered
more cost-effective, while those above the 70th percentile less cost-effective for meeting
DoD requirements.49
In the early 1980s, Congress provided a large military pay increase, addressing the
restraints placed on the growth of military pay in 1979 and 1980 (Slackman 1982, 1).
Congress raised military pay and allowances by roughly 30 percent in 1981–1982 helping
DoD manpower achieve parity with comparable private sector personnel, while
addressing concerns with an insufficient quality of manpower being recruited and trying
to retain a competent, competitive and skilled workforce (Slackman 1982, 1).
Despite the 1982 pay raise, the officer and enlisted force appeared relatively costeffective for the DoD throughout the 1980s, as noted in Table 8, where pay remained
below the 70th percentile for most personnel throughout the period. In Figure 9, military
pay for junior (E-4) and mid-level (E-6) enlisted personnel with varying levels of
education was compared against similar private sector personnel from 1982 through
2000. The data shows that military pay for both junior and mid-level enlisted was a cost
advantage for the DoD in the 1980–1988 period. Their pay ranged from below the 50
percentile for junior and mid-level enlisted with some college, to the 60th percentile for
junior enlisted with high school. Similarly, junior and mid-level officers were a cost
savings, as well (Figure 10). While junior officer pay appeared competitive with private
49

Assuming personnel are qualified and able to perform required services.
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sector equivalents in the early part of the period, junior officer pay decreased from the
75th to the 60th percentile from 1982 through 1988 as mid-level officers decreased from
the 65th to 55th percentile from 1982 through 1988. This also pointed to the fact that as
junior level officers transitioned to more experienced and skilled levels of activity (midlevel) their pay grew less competitive than private sector equivalents.
Comparison of federal and private sector pay in Figure 20 highlights the growing
disparity between federal and private sector pay in the 1980s. ECI data on the militaryprivate sector pay gap between 1981 and 1988 is provided in Figures 11 and 14. It
highlights how the relative pay raises between 1983 and 1988 increased at a slower rate
for military personnel than their private sector equivalents.50 (The bar with a negative
percentage measure indicates a slower pay raise than the private sector.) Figure 12
supports similar findings as it charts the difference between changes in regular military
compensation (basic pay, allowances for housing and subsistence and federal tax
advantage that occurs because allowances are not taxed) and the civilian ECI index. The
data indicates that military pay grew slower than private sector pay through 1988. Most
DoD personnel were a cost savings in comparison to their private sector equivalents,
based on pay differences. The pay gap data, which favored private sector pay growing
faster than military pay through 1988, provided further support for the cost-advantage of
military personnel and less incentive to outsource for efficiency purposes.
Wage growth for civilians in the private sector who were demographically similar
to officers and enlisted personnel on active duty is also tracked using the Defense

50

The lack of a military pay gap in 1982 was the result of a large military pay increase amounting to 25
percent of base pay aimed at countering recruitment and retention issues arising from the introduction of
the all-volunteer force in 1973 (Hosek, Peterson, Heilbrunn 1994).

115
Employment Cost Index. Figure 15 notes that between 1982 and 1988, officer pay grew
slower than private sector equivalents while the enlisted force had pay-growth parity with
their private sector equivalents. Within the enlisted force, Figure 16 compares senior and
junior enlisted pay with their private sector equivalents. Senior enlisted pay grew slower
from 1984–1988, while junior enlisted pay grew faster from 1983–1988. While junior
enlisted pay grew faster than civilian equivalents, pay rates for junior and senior enlisted
personnel remained below the 70th percentile and a cost savings to the DoD.
Comparing pay-growth by categories in Figure 17 such as professional/technical,
administrative, service, etc. further specifies where (functional areas) cost savings
advantage existed for either the DoD or private sector. For example, in the professional
and technical functional areas such as health, law, staff, computer, satellite, etc., military
pay-growth was significantly behind the pay-growth of their civilian counterparts from
1984–1988. In these functional areas, we were less likely to see outsourcing activity due
to the cost savings of military personnel. Yet, in activities categorized as operators,
laborers, craft and production such as groundskeepers, vehicle drivers, and facility
maintenance outsourcing activity was more likely after 1982 due to the increased growth
of pay for military personnel assigned to less skilled activities as compared to their
civilian counterparts.
Overall, in the 1980s, the pay comparison data suggests that since mid-1982, basic
pay for mid to senior enlisted personnel, officers and GS wage rate pay for federal
civilians were cost effective for DoD. The DoD was able to employ qualified personnel
for below the 70th percentile market value. While DoD employed a cost-effective
workforce where pay remained behind private sector equivalents for enlisted force and
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mid-senior level military, by 1988 medical spending for DoD personnel had grown by
nearly two and half times that for private sector employee’s suggesting the cost savings
advantage of military personnel would begin to decline. Throughout the 1980s strategic
efficiency expected minimal outsourcing activity associated with activities requiring the
senior non-commissioned officer enlisted force and mid-senior level officers and federal
civilian personnel. Increased outsourcing activity was expected for entry-level activities
with less skill requirements and with lower graded personnel.
The type of commercial activities procured in large quantity through procurement
during this period included utilities and housekeeping, maintenance of equipment and
professional, management support. For many of these routine activities, the market
offered the most efficient provider as competition was abundant and transaction hazards
minimal. Through 1988, utilities and housekeeping services consumed about 30 percent
of O&M dollars. While many of these activities were aligned with expectations from
strategic efficiency theory, the outsourcing of professional management support activities
did not support the strategic efficiency framework. Though some junior officer positions
(who were not a cost advantage during the early part of the period) were likely employed
by these activities, the majority of personnel staffing these positions were more likely to
be experienced officers or mid to senior level enlisted personnel. Overall, between 1981
and 1988, the percent of O&M budget spent on outsourcing through procured services
increased by 11.7 percent.
Strategic Efficiency was effective in explaining a majority of outsourcing through
competitive sourcing. Competitive sourcing activity between 1980 and 1988 was
significant as marked by the extensive activity around cost-comparison studies of in-
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house commercial activities. Cost comparison studies increased from 99 in 1979 to 379 in
1983 with an annual average of 210 between 1980 and 1988. Between 1981 and 1988,
outsourcing of services through competitive sourcing grew by 37 percent over the
previous period.
75 percent of the activities competed through 1986 (Table 4) were for low-skilled
support activities not requiring advanced training or mid to senior level personnel.
Outsourcing was expected in these areas, as DoD personnel were not as cost-effective
here as they were in higher skilled areas and pay rates were increasing for DoD personnel
in low-skilled support activities as compared to their civilian equivalents.

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 1981–1988

Reagan Administration
The 1980 election changed Congress dramatically, creating the first Republican
majority in the Senate since 1955 and a nominally Democratic majority in the House of
Representatives (Edelstein 1982, 1). In 1981, the Reagan administration and the 97th
Congress, created significant changes in the role and scope of government, using the new
conservative majority in the House and Senate to shape government in favor of big
business industry and the military (Edelstein 1982, 1).
The election of Ronald Reagan, the most prominent leader of the American
conservative movement during this period, resulted in a marked increase in ideological
polarization among party leaders and activists in the United States (Abramowitz and
Saunders 1998, 636). Reagan’s administration represented the anti-government sentiment
harbored by many Americans as a result of the nation’s poor economic conditions
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(McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006, 173). The conservative and neoliberal economic
aims of the Reagan administration were to reduce the size of government, cut public
programs, promote free enterprise and free markets in order to stimulate the economy.
The administration had success reducing the individual tax rate and fighting
inflation by reducing it to under four percent by 1982 (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998, 335).
Efforts to realize a reduction in spending proved very difficult. Reducing entitlements
was unpopular and interest in building up the military produced increased deficits
through both terms. During the Reagan presidency, the annual deficit almost tripled and
the gross national debt rose from $995 billion to $2.9 trillion (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998,
336). Reagan’s economic policies demonstrated a mix of neoliberal and state
intervention influences. Yet, his program of tax cuts, increased military expenditures, and
reductions in domestic social programs divided the nation along ideological lines and
produced the highest level of party unity in Congress in decades (Abramowitz and
Saunders 1998, 636–637).
The Reagan administration used a neoliberal strategy to affect governance and the
increased growth of outsourcing within the DoD. Reagan was initially active in
overhauling government regulation of business (Cox and Skidmore-Hess 1999, 168).
This indirectly supported his outsourcing ambitions as it provided increased opportunities
for business in all sectors and weakened unions. Reagan’s market ideals for government
did not help the federal labor-management relationship. It was an adversarial relationship
between labor and management that controlled the outsourcing process (Naff 1991, 27).
In general, the federal unions viewed privatization as a threat that must be opposed
at all costs to support their members and maintain union strength (Naff 1991, 24,27). The
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delegation of exclusive right to make contracting-out decisions to management by the
federal labor relations statue left little room for unions to oppose outsourcing actions and
there was no mechanism for union or employees to appeal a decision to contract outside
the agency (Naff 1991, 25). Federal unions used a variety of strategies to protect the
interests of members from contract-out decisions and attempted to have contracting-out
included in their collective bargaining arrangement. However, the courts consistently
upheld management’s right to make the decision to contract out and generally prevented
the union from interfering with these decisions (Naff 1991, 26).
As the Reagan administration faced limited opposition from federal unions, it began
to formulate aggressive proposals for the sale of a wide range of state assets. These
included the sale of federally owned park and wilderness lands, National Weather Service
satellites, Conrail and AMTRAK, and a major petroleum reserve (Feigenbaum, Henig,
and Hamnett 1999, 135). The Reagan administration also adopted the argument that
privatization, rather than representing a rejection of the goals associated with the welfare
state, represented an adoption of private means to pursue public goals.
Reagan’s Executive Orders displayed his commitment to fulfill on ideas to reduce
the size of government, increase competition and provide the private sector with greater
economic opportunities in the public sector. These were captured in Executive Order
(EO) 12329 delivered in October 1981 establishing a Presidential Task Force on Private
Sector Initiatives aimed at greater public-private partnerships and to decrease the
dependence on government (Reagan 1981). The implementation of EO 12352 addressed
federal procurement reforms to include remaking it easier for agencies to procure goods
and services and to enhance effective competition and limit noncompetitive actions in the
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procurement process (Reagan 1982). The establishment of the White House Office of
Private Sector Initiatives and its associated Advisory Council (EO 12427) aimed at
removing barriers to social programs administered by private organizations and
increasing awareness of importance of public/private partnerships (Reagan 1983).
In 1987, Reagan’s Executive Orders 12607 and 12615 directly addressed
privatization and the outsourcing of commercial activities.

Executive Order 12607

established the President’s Commission on Privatization tasked to study and evaluate the
privatization phenomenon (Linowes 1988, 257–259). The committee was tasked with
developing a framework for a privatization program. This task included identifying
opportunities, legislative and administrative actions necessary to affect privatization
initiatives, removing existing privatization restrictions, and actions necessary to create
broad-based support and a conducive environment for privatization (Woolley and Peters
2006).
Executive Order 12615 was the first order issued since the establishment of Circular
A-76 with the objective to acquire government commercial-type activities in the most
economic and efficient manner with private industry given priority in providing new
federal government requirements where reasonable (Reagan 1987). It expressed
Reagan’s commitment to increase the role of the private sector in providing federal
services and directed agencies to ensure new government requirements for commercial
activities are provided by private industry, wherever possible. It also requested agencies
to identify A-76 study goals and anticipated savings in their annual budget submissions.
Reagan’s aggressive actions to outsource federal positions prompted significant job
competition at the Defense Department and throughout federal agencies as it held agency
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leaders to reviewing and holding competitions for at least three percent of all commercial
activities annually until all activities were reviewed (Kettl 1993, 49; Woolley and Peters
2006). The results of these actions were highlighted earlier in Table 5 showing a
significant growth in completed cost-comparison studies of in-house commercial
activities services during the years of the Reagan presidency.
The Reagan administration targeted a review of nearly 380,000 federal employee
positions that were considered activities subject to private competition. He also required
quarterly briefings from the Director of the Office of Management and Budget on
outsourcing progress throughout the federal system (Woolley and Peters 2006). His
focus on revising the A-76 policy in conjunction with EO 12607 and 12615, were
elements of the administration’s agenda to establish a structured and ongoing competitive
process between the government and private sector for the fulfillment of government
services. It highlighted his belief in neoliberal economic methods and was a keystone in
his ideological appeal for the government’s privatization movement.
As noted earlier, the growth of congressional involvement in the annual
authorization process became an instrument to further ideological strategies. Increased
scrutiny of the defense budget expanded opportunities for Party goals and ideals of
congressmen to be infused in decisions on what got funded and how much. Within
Congress, the impact of Reagan’s ideas, through the Republican controlled Senate, was
felt in the budget with an increase in strategic-military spending and procurement of
support services.
The amount spent on DoD outsourcing rose by nearly 41 percent from $61.9 to
$87.2 billion from 1981 to 1988. Between 1981 and 1988, the percent of O&M spent on
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procured services rose by 11.7 percent increasing from 52.1 to 63.8 percent with peaks of
70.6, 68.8, and 67.3 percent in 1982, 1985 and 1987, respectively. As noted in Figure 5,
the growth of military positions in A-76 competitions rose from 5000 in 1979 to nearly
11,000 in 1983 with a steady annual average between 7,000 and 11,000 through 1988
(Cohen 1997a, 30). The amount of completed cost studies for private sector competition
(Table 5) was significant as compared to periods before and after the Reagan period.
More than 1500 cost-comparison studies were completed during the period as compared
to 154 studies between 1978 and 1980 and 205 studies between 1989 and 1996. As the
Reagan administration grew the size of the military and DoD civilian force by five and
seven percent respectively, at an increased cost of 12.8 and 9.8 percent (Figure 4), he
maintained a commitment to increased outsourcing within the DoD that became a large
growth area for the private sector.

Challenges to Reagan’s Neoliberal Strategy
Despite Reagan’s interest in outsourcing DoD activities, they were not fully
embraced by all members in Congress. Congress was divided with Republicans
controlling the Senate and Democrats controlling the House from 1981–1987. Between
1983 and 1987 a coalition emerged in the Democratic controlled House critical of the
Pentagon’s purchasing system. Though the main interest centered on larger weapon
systems, its impact permeated the entire procurement process. A bipartisan coalition of
procurement reformers became active during the House action on the annual defense bill
offering several proposals aimed at changing the way the Pentagon procured its weapons,
parts and services (Congressional Quarterly 1987, 234). In 1985, demands for
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procurement reform came from those in Congress opposed to the pace of Reagan’s
defense buildup. The Democrat controlled Congress could not confront President Reagan
directly due to the popular support for his military buildup (Sapolsky and Gholz 1996, 5).
Driven by widespread reports of overpricing and other abuses in Pentagon purchasing of
weapon systems and parts, Congress attempted to hobble the military buildup through
regulation that would reduce fraud, waste, and abuse in defense contracting and change
the way the Pentagon purchased goods and services (Congressional Quarterly 1985, 164;
Sapolsky and Gholz 1996, 5).
The increasing polarization in Congress limited bipartisanship and appeared to have
a direct impact on competitive sourcing activities. On May 11, 1987, Democrats firmly
controlled the House of Representatives by a margin of 71 members and expressed
concern that the contracting-out process would erode the capability of more complex and
core military functions and ultimately impair mission capability and readiness.
Democratic Representative Bill Nichols (D) introduced an amendment to the House floor
calling for the commanding officer at each military installation to have the option of
which job functions to study for contracting out under the A-76 program (Congressional
Record 1987).
Representative Nichols saw the need for local installation commanders to have
more input into the process since they were the most affected by the actions. A variety of
factors appeared to contribute to giving commanders increased authority in the
outsourcing process to include: the length of time it took to complete A-76 competitions,
lack of commander control over outsourced activities, inadequate oversight of contractor
activities, substantial cost increases to contracts in follow-on years due to inadequate
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initial contract design, reduction in unit budget and personnel size. Commanders had
little interest in competing activities that would ultimately limit their flexibility and
control over the mission and possibly reduce the size of their budget. The Nichols
amendment argued for organizational leaders at the level being impacted, instead of
senior DoD or national leaders, to have responsibility in determining whether competition
should occur and if so, which activities would be competed.
While the amendment focused on giving commanders greater authority in the A-76
outsourcing process, it also provided a convenient legislative mechanism to counter the
neoliberal efforts at increasing private sector opportunities in the public sector. It led to a
significant reduction in DoD competitive sourcing activity. The amendment
H.AMDT.95 was passed in Committee of the Whole by voice vote (Congress 2007). In
addition, the House amendment H.ADMT. 96 prohibiting the contracting out of security
guard functions at any military installation or facility was passed (Congress 1987;
Congressional Record 1987).
Between 1988 and 1995, Democrats controlled the Senate by an average margin of
10 members and controlled the House by an average of nearly 85 members. The Nichols
Amendment, 10 U.S.C. 2468, was adopted in the 1988–89 National Defense
Authorization Act and was effective through September 30, 1995. The Nichols
amendment gave leverage to DOD leaders to resist President Reagan’s neoliberal based
goal of reducing in-house positions through a three percent outsourcing target
(Congressional Quarterly 1987, 238; GAO 1997, 2). Commanders were given the
authority to decide whether to conduct A-76 competitions and which activities would be
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subject to A-76 review without quota requirements (Congressional Quarterly 1987;
Warren 1997, 7).
An example of another roll call vote demonstrating the ideological shift in Congress
at the end of Reagan’s second administration, with a Democratically controlled Congress,
was the congressional vote on an amendment to prohibit the privatization (contracting
out of major agency functions to private firms) of the National Technical Institute
Service. Introduced to the House on September 26, 1988, by Representative Doug
Walgren, the amendment passed in committee of the Whole by recorded vote of 219–116
(THOMAS 2007).

Reagan’s Impact on DoD Outsourcing
Despite the defeats in outsourcing strategy at the end of his second term, Reagan’s
belief and subsequent market strategy (with congressional support) for a majority of the
period, was significant in explaining DOD outsourcing behavior. Funding for DoD
outsourced activities had its greatest peacetime increase, as compared to activity before
and after this time frame, with an increase of nearly 41 percent. The percent of O&M
spent on procured services increased by 11.7 percent during this period. The amount of
DoD cost-comparison studies and positions competed within A-76 studies were larger
than periods before and after Reagan’s presidency.

ORGANIZATION FACTORS 1981–1988

The attributes of the defense organization from the 1970s had not changed through
the first half of the 1980s as service independence had extremely altered the balance of

126
influence with the DoD. Two notable concerns with the organization was its comfort with
the past, resistance to change and not making a sufficiently rigorous examination of
defense requirements and alternatives (Jones 1996, 23). DoD had evolved into a
grouping of large, rigid bureaucracies embracing the past and adapting new technologies
to fit traditional missions and methods (Jones 1996, 23).
Considering the nature of the DoD organization during the first half of the 1980s,
what affect did this have on outsourcing behavior? Though Congress introduced the
Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 to empower the Chairman of the JCS and joint force
commanders, improve the quality of military advice and reduce the service role in
shaping resource decisions, it had little affect through 1988 on the climate within service
organizations (Locher 1996, 12–16). As services interests dominated the DoD
environment, the Reagan budget increase began to impact the defense structure. From
1981 through 1988 the DOD budget increased by more than 30 percent. Given the
relative power and independence of the services and their sub-organizations, outsourcing
activity for support services remained at the local level to support subjective requirements
or activities.
Mostly, DOD organizations would remain committed to their primary Cold War
defense missions. The rising budget and Reagan’s commitment to a strong defense put
little pressure on DOD organizations to change their behavior or reduce their size. The
increased size of the military force was impetus to reduce the size of outsourcing.
Organizations would seek to maintain the status quo, protect their personnel from
potential job loss and seek to increase their budgets through larger missions and taskings.
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However, outsourcing activity did not reflect the expected behavior in the
framework of organization factors. The percent of O&M spent on the procurement of
services increased from 52 to 70 percent between 1981 and 1982, with peaks of 69 and
67 percent in 1985 and 1987, respectively. For the overall period, the percent of O&M
increased by 11.7 percent and averaged 64.2 percent. The amount of O&M spent on
procured services increased considerable in comparison to a decade earlier. Using 2005
dollars, the increase between 1981 and 1982 for the amount spent on procuring support
services was 43 percent. This was the largest one-year increase since the start of the
study in 1970 and expenditures through 1988 remained relatively high in comparison to
the 1970s. Competitive sourcing activity also increased during this period.
The services procured utilities and housekeeping services consumed about 30
percent of O&M dollars. These services would be an expected procurement action in
most organizations due to their nature. However, the procurement of support services,
some with direct relevance to primary missions in areas of quality control, maintenance
of equipment, professional and management support appeared less likely from an
organization perspective given an increasing budget, manpower and service autonomy
where service roles and missions remained relatively stable throughout the case-study.
Functions/services contracted out included preparing strategic plans, participating in
the preparation of acquisition plans, source selection plans, contract administration and
quality assurance on other contractors’ operations, maintaining, repairing, modifying,
testing, and inspecting weapons and weapon systems (DoD IG 2000, 5; DOD/SIAD
2006, MN02). Between 1980 and 1988, quality control, testing and inspection services
increased from $139M to $486M, maintenance, repair and modification of equipment
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services increased from $2.9B to $5.1B, and professional, administrative and
management support services increased from $3.1B to $8.3B.
The services allocated limited resources among their traditional missions and
sought ways to justify a greater share of the budget where each attempted to out game the
others without sufficient regard for cross-service programs (Jones 1996, 26). It resulted in
a budget derived from the disparate desires of the individual services rather than a well
integrated plan with civilian and military leadership working together (Jones 1996, 26).
Bureaucratic resistance to change was enormous and reinforced by allies of the services
who were bent on keeping the past enthroned (Jones 1996, 27).
Additionally, Congress found numerous obstacles precluding exercise of effective
civilian authority , particularly by the Secretary of Defense (Locher 1996, 11). In the
congressional report Defense Organization published in 1985, the Secretary’s efforts
were seen as seriously hampered by the absence of a source of truly independent military
advice (Locher 1996, 11). As noted by Congress, the overall result of inter-service
logrolling was a highly undesirable lessening of civilian control of the military (Locher
1996, 11). The natural consequence was a heightening of civil-military disagreement, a
loss of information critical to effective decision making, and political weakening of the
Secretary of Defense and his OSD staff (Locher 1996, 11).
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CHAPTER SIX

CASE STUDY - DEFENSE OUTSOURCING 1989–1995
In the 1989–1995 period, the average percent of O&M spent on procurement
decreased to 61.6 percent. The procurement of services increased by 1.2 percent during
this period, reflecting the decrease in DoD’s O&M budget as yearly outsourcing
(procurement costs) declined from $80 to $78 billion.51 Strategic efficiency appeared
useful in explaining the decreased outsourcing activity for procured services as military
personnel were a better cost savings than the private sector. However, it was ineffective
in explaining the large decrease in competitive sourcing activities, especially in lower
skilled areas where the private sector provided a cost savings, as measured through cost
comparison studies and the annual amount of positions studied. Completed cost
comparison studies declined to 202 between 1989 and 1995. Total positions studied
declined from 12,000 in 1988 to 2,128 in 1995.
Political ideology was useful in explaining reduced outsourcing, especially in the
competitive sourcing realm, as congressional legislation put extreme limitations on new
outsourcing and the federal A-76 competitions. Democrats favored a controlled and
limited role of competition and private sector participation within the federal government
as procurement abuses within the DoD during the 1980s reinforced the Democratic
interest in limiting private enterprise in the public sector. Once Democrats gained control
of Congress in 1989, the success of neoliberal based actions supporting competition of
internal federal positions diminished.

51

Outsourcing activity measured in 2005 dollars.
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Organizational commanders were supported by congressional legislation that
assisted their efforts in avoiding competitive sourcing activities. Commanders were
empowered by federal law allowing them to directly determine the extent of outsourcing
in their organizations. Commanders were able to limit and in many cases stop
competitive sourcing activities at their local organizations during the 1989–1995 period.
The outsourcing process continued to highlight inefficiency and relative weakness in
providing a consolidated national defense.
Service orientated outsourcing objectives, with a decentralized local flavor,
continued to dominate the landscape with no apparent relationship to a bigger mission
objective. Similar to earlier periods, each service worked autonomously within its own
procedures for identifying peacetime personnel requirements in support positions to
determine the most efficient personnel mix for performing assigned missions and tasks.
This process was based on a subjective determination of positions considered essential
and non-essential for military incumbency. The interests and objectives of each service,
as demonstrated in procurement and competitive sourcing behavior, appeared to rise
above the requirements of a unified support/operational defense plan.

STRATEGIC EFFICIENCY 1989–1995

Comparing Military with Private Sector Pay
Between 1989 and 1995 military personnel appeared more cost-effective than their
private sector counterparts. Data for basic military pay as a percentile of private sector
pay for male enlisted and officer personnel from 1989 through 1995 is provided in Table
8. It supports the cost-savings of the majority of military personnel where pay ranged
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between the 50th and 60th percentiles. Figure 12 highlights the growing disparity
between military and private sector pay-growth during this period. The higher rate of
pay-growth for private sector personnel led to a pay gap of 25 percent between federal
and private salaries by 1993, as noted in Figure 20 (Masia and Holen 1997, 10).52
Military pay for junior (0-3) and mid-level (0-4) male officers as a percentile of
private sector pay from 1989 through 1995 is provided in Figure 10. Mid-level officers
offered a cost savings for most of the period as their pay hovered between the 50th and
60th percentile area, while pay for junior grade officers was in the 60th to 70th percentile
range through 1995 (Hosek 2001, 73). The 0-4 pay (mid-level officers) percentile lies
below that of the 0-3 (junior grade) indicating that military officers became a better cost
savings as they gained experience and increased their time in the DoD. Equivalent
private sector workers were better compensated and less of a cost savings for the DoD as
their pay was such that it increased more rapidly than military pay as workers gained job
experience and served longer (Hosek 2001, 74).
Specific functional specialty areas in Figure 17 further refines the comparison of
military and civilian pay-growth between 1989 and 1992. Similar to the 1980–1988
period, personnel in the professional/technical, administrative, and service areas offered
the DoD a greater cost savings than private sector equivalents. Yet, in activities
categorized as operators, laborers, craft and production such as groundskeepers, vehicle
drivers, and facility maintenance increased pay-growth for military personnel assigned to
these activities gave the cost savings advantage to their civilian counterparts.

52

The assumption of a zero pay gap for 1977 relies on governmental pay surveys (Masia and Musell 1997,
11).
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In addition to military pay not being competitive with private sector counterparts,
the majority of military pay grew slower than civilian pay from 1989–1995 as noted in
Figure 14. Within the enlisted force, Figure 16 compares senior and junior enlisted pay
with their private sector equivalents. Senior enlisted pay grew slower from 1989–1992
with small growth in 1993–1994, while junior enlisted pay grew faster from 1991–1995.

Non-Pay and Deferred Benefits Analysis
Non-pay and deferred benefits are conditional variables because of their indirect
affect on the results of a competitive sourcing and procurement activity. When combined
with pay variables, they could affect outsourcing behavior and whether the private sector
is more or less cost-effective. These variables appear to factor into the cost effectiveness
of military personnel narrowing in comparison to private sector workers in the 1990s.
The affect of non-pay benefits such as medical coverage and retirement costs on a DoD
cost savings analysis is very difficult to capture as less than 50 percent officer and 15
percent of enlisted personnel remain on active duty for 20 years (Figure 21) and the
nature of medical expenses vary across individual and family. There is no wellestablished indicator or adjustment to add to the DoD’s RMC to provide for this
comparison with the private sector.

Medical Spending Growth
One of the larger non-pay benefits that contributed to the decrease in military costeffectiveness is medical care. The growth of medical spending climbed from the mid
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1980s through 1995 and contributed to the increased costs for DoD personnel.53 Over half
(56 percent) of the total growth in spending per active-duty service member from 1988 to
2003 can be generally attributed to national changes in health care costs (Percy, ClayMendez, and Gilmore 2003, ix). Figure 25 charts the growth of DoD’s medical spending
in comparison to the decline of the active duty force.
Medical spending is substantially higher per dollar of cash compensation for
members of the military than for federal civilian employees or private-sector workers due
to the early age of military retirement and the high rate at which DoD’s beneficiaries
utilize health care services (Percy, Clay-Mendez, and Gilmore 2003, x-xi). Figure 26
provides a comparison of medical spending per dollar for service members and federal
and private sector employees from 1988. It illustrates the significant rise in medical costs
($13,000) for service members between 1988 and 2003 as compared to federal civilian
and private sector employees.
Private employers were able to avoid significant cost increases in employee health
benefits by shifting costs to the employees (Percy, Clay-Mendez, and Gilmore 2003, 8).54
From a strategic efficiency perspective, this gives the private employer a competitive
advantage over the DoD. The employer continues to provide required employee medical
coverage but not at an overwhelming cost while shifting more medical costs and
responsibility onto the employee. As noted in Figure 26, the ratio of the average private
firms’ spending on medical benefits to spending on salaries and wages decreased during
53

The DoD views many of its medical costs as unavoidable and argues that it must operate its own inhouse system of health care providers and military medical treatment facilities to ensure the U.S. forces
will have reliable, high quality medical care in time of war and to attract and retain high-quality active-duty
and reserve forces during peacetime (Percy, Clay-Mendez, and Gilmore 2003, ix).
54
Employers limited their health care increases by either dropping health insurance coverage, requiring
higher contributions from employees toward premiums, shifting to preferred provider plans and away from
more costly fee-for-service plans, or offering plans with higher deductibles and co-payments (Percy, ClayMendez, and Gilmore 2003, 8).
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this period from 8.3 percent in 1991 to 7.5 percent in 2000 (Percy, Clay-Mendez, and
Gilmore 2003, 9).
During this period, military and federal civilian pay in the middle and senior level
enlisted and officer positions continued to offer a cost savings when compared to their
private sector equivalents. Junior officer and enlisted personnel pay grew closer to the
70th percentile towards the end of the period yet remained a cost savings to the DoD.
Medical expenditures marked a significant increase in the cost of DoD personnel that
added to a narrowing cost savings gap between DoD and private sector workers.
Outsourcing activity would be expected during the 1990s in the low-skilled and juniorlevel positions where private sector personnel remained a cost savings.
Strategic efficiency was useful in explaining decreased outsourcing activity for
procuring skilled services, however, it was not useful in explaining the decrease in
procurement and competitively sourcing activity for low skilled services where private
sector offered a cost savings. While the cost of outsourcing through procurement
activities decreased from $80.8 billion to $78.3 billion, competitive sourcing activity
decreased by nearly six times as measured through cost comparison studies and the
annual amount of positions studied. Completed cost comparison studies declined from
more than 1,200 in the 1980–1988 period to 202 in the 1989–1995 period (Table 5), and
total positions studied declined from 12,000 in 1988 to 2,128 in 1995 (Table 7).
Strategic efficiency expected an increase in competitive sourcing and procurement
for low-skilled areas where the private sector had a cost advantage, i.e. utilities and
housekeeping positions. Procurement in these positions declined annually from $3.3 to
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$3.1 billion while in-house cost comparisons declined across all areas between 1990 and
1995 (Figure 29).

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 1989-1995

G.H.W. Bush Administration
George H. W. Bush was elected president in part because he promised to continue
Reagan’s policies (Meeropol 1998, 207). President Bush-1 had been associated with a
more moderate wing of the Republican Party before becoming Ronald Reagan’s Vice
President and favored a restrained approach towards the size and responsibilities of
government (Feigenbaum, Henig, and Hamnett 1999, 139). Actions supporting
neoliberal behavior included the desire to reduce regulation to allow American businesses
to compete in the global marketplace through the Council on Competitiveness with Vice
President Quayle as the chair (Meeropol 1998, 207). The Council on Competitiveness
worked with the OMB to review regulations drafted by federal agencies seeking to
prevent excessive costs to businesses in the private sector (Feigenbaum, Henig, and
Hamnett 1999, 140).
However, the Democratically controlled Congress appeared successful at limiting
the extent of neoliberal influence in policymaking. For example, in efforts at cutting the
deficit, the Democratic leadership in Congress insisted that raising taxes on the highestincome Americans, so as to make the tax system fair, was essential if they were to agree
to any budget cutting. The president had to explicitly support the decision to make the
tax increase bipartisan (Meeropol 1998, 208). The president acquiesced by signing the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1990, which combined fairly stringent rules controlling
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spending with an increase in taxation. Additionally, despite Bush’s strong ideological
commitment to reducing regulation, the American Disabilities Act of 1990 increased the
regulatory burden and cost to American business (Meeropol 1998, 215).
The impact of market-centric actions on DoD outsourcing activity during the Bush
administration appeared insignificant due to the power of the Democratically controlled
Congress. While Bush remained committed to privatization efforts started by Reagan, the
average percent of O&M spent on procurement of support services increased by 2.5
percent between 1989 and 1992 as compared to the 11.7 percent increase during the
Reagan era (Feigenbaum, Henig, and Hamnett 1999, 140). The 2.5 percent increase
came in an environment of a shrinking O&M budget (with the Gulf War in 1991 being an
exception) and a slight decrease in procurement expenditures.
While Congress was controlled by the Democrats from 1988 through 1994 and had
little impact on procurement activities in the support realm, it had greater influence than
the Executive on the competitive sourcing aspects of outsourcing behavior. It passed
legislation to restrain the A-76 process and undercut the private sector cost comparison
goals set by OMB across federal agencies (GAO 1997, 2). In addition to the Nichols
amendment, Congress ensured the 1991–1994 DOD Appropriation Acts prohibited
funding for A-76 reviews of a single function that lasted more than two years and
multiple functions lasting more than four years (DOD 1993; Warren 1997, 7).
Outsourcing through competitive sourcing activities was affected during this period
with a decline in the number of cost studies and competitions. Table 5 shows a
significant decrease in the amount of completed cost-comparison studies of in-house
commercial activities between 1989 and 1992 with 174 completed studies as compared
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with 683 completed studies from 1985 through 1988. Figure 5 and Table 7 also show a
significant drop in the number of DoD positions competed between 1989 and 1992
declining from 6,100 to 496.

Clinton Administration
President Clinton’s government in many respects represented a conventional centerright agenda akin – as Clinton himself put it – to an Eisenhower Republican stance
updated to the post-Cold War epoch (Pollin 2003, 5). As a reform-minded, free trade
Democrat who supported the ratification of NAFTA, President Clinton entered the Oval
Office promising to get the economy moving and to reign in the budget deficit. He
successfully gained support for the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 that
accomplished deficit reduction and an increased tax rate for high income earners. His
administration was defined by reductions in government spending, enthusiasm for free
trade, inconsistent efforts to assist working people in labor markets, and deregulation of
financial markets with the support of the Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Republican
Alan Greenspan (Pollin 2003, 5–6).
During Clinton’s first term, in the climate of deficit reduction and minimal
government spending, efforts at reinventing government urged increased competition in
the public sector to improve performance and increase efficiency. Yet, despite interest in
improving government effectiveness through competition, he was unsuccessful in
bringing change in the A-76 competitive sourcing process of the DoD. Rather, a strong
Democratic Congress was significant in the reduction of outsourcing activities in DoD’s
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competitive sourcing process by maintaining the policy established by the Nichols
amendment to give competitive sourcing decision making to installation commanders.
While Congress impacted the DoD outsourcing of services through its internal
competitive sourcing practices based on legislation giving local organizational leaders
freedom and discretion around competition, it did not have the same influence when it
came to outsourcing of services through procurement. Procurement of services was
funded through O&M accounts of local DoD organizations and, for the most part, outside
the congressional realm. While the amount spent on procurement decreased slightly
during this period within a declining O&M budget, it still allowed for the percent of
O&M spent on procurement of services to increase between 1992 and 1996 by four
percent. Considering the Clinton priority to reduce the budget deficit and reduce the
growth of government, procurement activity suggested the continued dependence on the
private sector for supporting the mission and new requirements as DoD personnel were
reduced as part of a smaller government.
To evaluate whether political ideology is a factor in explaining DoD outsourcing
behavior during Clinton’s first administration, I’ll examine the results of outsourcing
activities, the administration’s policy actions as they apply to the DoD, and an evaluation
of the effect of congressional actions.
Within three weeks of his inauguration, the President, by executive order, called on
agencies to cut 100,000 federal jobs over three years (Goldenkoff 1997, 1). In 1993,
Vice President Gore’s National Performance Review (NPR) expanded the
administration’s downsizing goal to 252,000 positions in five years (Goldenkoff 1997, 1).
In addition to the President’s NPR initiative to reinvent government and reduce the size
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of the bureaucracy, the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Outsourcing and
Privatization, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM), and
the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) addressed the role of outsourcing in downsizing the
DoD and improving efficiency. Each of these activities supported the construction of
Clinton’s strategy to reinvent government through competition and downsizing.
As opposed to the Reagan and G.H.W. Bush administrations, President Clinton
pledged to do more to get federal unions involved in management decisions. Clinton’s
1993 Executive Order 12871 called on agency heads to establish labor-management
partnerships, in which union leaders would be involved in more decisions, and to
negotiate with unions over permissive issues, including the numbers of jobs in agencies
(Friel 1999b). Clinton’s efforts to appease unions with increased involvement at the
bargaining table prevented strong union objections to his announced manpower cuts
(Friel 2003, 3).

Congress
Democrats controlled Congress through 1995 with a margin of nearly 12 members
in the Senate and 90 members in the House. Congressional legislation regarding DoD
outsourcing, established during the Democratically controlled Congress prior to and
during Clinton’s first term, was not pro-competition. For example, congressional
provisions in the Defense Authorization Acts of 1993 and 1994 prohibiting DOD from
entering into contracts resulting from cost studies done under OMB Cir. A-76 through
April 1,1994 (Warren 1997, 7). It put extreme limitations on new outsourcing and the
federal A-76 competitive sourcing program.
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Legislation established within the Democratically controlled Congress prior to the
Clinton administration and still applicable included the Nichols amendment restricting
the growth of outsourcing in the DoD by giving local installation commanders control of
the process. The Nichols amendment ran through the 103rd Congress in 1995 and
exemplified how competitive sourcing activity was an easy target for Congress to affect
outsourcing, since they could create legislation to modify Circular A-76 and the ability of
federal agencies to competitively source positions.
Congressional Democrats favored a controlled and limited role of competition and
private sector participation within the federal government, as procurement abuses within
the DoD during the 1980s reinforced the bad opinion Democrats had of private enterprise
operating in the public sector and the surge of federal services sourced to the private
sector in the Reagan administration. Democrats in Congress voiced concerns over its
impact on national defense and constituents affected by these competitions
(Congressional Quarterly 1987). Once Democrats gained control of Congress in 1989,
the success of neoliberal-based actions supporting competition of internal federal
positions faded.

Executive Initiatives to Reinvent Government – National Performance Review
In contrast to the Democrat-controlled Congress who saw competitive decisions
best managed at the lowest levels of the organization (e.g. installation commanders),
President Clinton used a macro approach to instill competition and change in the
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government. He started with NPR to set the groundwork for facilitating reforms.55 In
March 1993, President Clinton followed up on his interest in using the market to leverage
change by appointing Vice President Al Gore to oversee the NPR. His objective was to
make specific recommendations for creating government with less bureaucracy and more
independent decision making and action (Feigenbaum, Henig, and Hamnett 1999, 143144).
The 1993 NPR was one of his first initiatives aimed at establishing an effective,
efficient and responsive government (Harney 1998, 58). The NPR sought to find a
cheaper way to provide government services. Competition was the key element in the
NPR for producing effectiveness, as government organizations would compete amongst
themselves and the private sector. The NPR appeared to embrace the existing federal A76 competitive sourcing process for initiating competition and savings.
The results of the review engaged the Clinton administration into strongly
supporting efforts to reengineer the government, downsize the federal workforce, and
emphasize competition across government services (Harney 1998, 53). The NPR aimed
at using market incentives to solve problems by using the power of the federal
government to trigger greater activity within the private sector.
The NPR concluded that the DOD could no longer afford to conduct business as
usual. They challenged DoD service organizations to erase their cultural bias against
outsourcing and criticized the DOD for not fully embracing the free market concept
(Harney 1998, 54). It noted that statutory roadblocks had prevented the DOD from
outsourcing, citing how Congress stopped the DOD from outsourcing further work to
55

A “macro” approach refers to Clinton’s interest in looking at the objective of government reduction from
a wide perspective, using initiatives such as the National Performance Review, task forces, and
commissions to provide recommendations for adoption that included outsourcing.
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contractors. In an effort to spark competition within the federal government, utilize
expertise, and reduce costs the administration requested that agencies obtain in-house
assistance for construction and design services from either the Army Corps of Engineers
or the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (Harney 1998, n.22). Whether it was
feasible or even a cost-savings for agencies to use these in-house resources was not
addressed.
The NPR recommended the administration propose legislation to remove statutory
barriers, noting that the OMB would review OMB Circular A-76 for potential changes to
ease the contracting process (Harney 1998, n.22). This resulted in Cir. A-76 Supplement:
Performance of Commercial Activities in March 1996 (Harney 1998, 54).56 The NPR
also urged senior Pentagon leaders to face the outsourcing challenge squarely, noting that
while DOD could not outsource command functions, it could outsource support functions
like data processing, billing and payroll. The NPR noted how the Pentagon’s own
defense contractors contract out similar functions without the strenuous efforts required
by the government’s A-76 process (Harney 1998, 54).

Government Reinvention Efforts by DoD Civilian Leaders
Senior DoD civilian leaders supported the Clinton administration’s reinvention
efforts. Dr. Paul Kaminski, Clinton’s Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology, from October 1994 through May 1997, established the Defense Science
Board (DSB) Task Force on Outsourcing and Privatization in October 1995. The task
force was created to assist in the development of an aggressive outsourcing strategy. The
56

The 1996 OMB Circular A-76 revision changed how the DOD could decide to contract a commercial
activity introducing the concept of best value procurement to the outsourcing process.
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administration’s objective was to improve the quality of DOD support services at
significantly reduced cost given the DOD was faced with declining resources for
modernization and a large support structure (DSB 1996). Composed of leading
executives of major defense and commercial companies, retired senior military officers,
and outside experts with extensive experience in outsourcing issues, their
recommendations called for extensive outsourcing of support services and a departure
from the current reliance on the A-76 process that had shortfalls (noted earlier), causing
excessive delays and costly to service organizations (DSB 1996, 12).
DOD’s senior civilian leadership supported President Clinton’s reform agenda and
the findings of both the DSB Task Force results and the Commission on Roles and
Missions of the Armed Forces. They called for increased outsourcing of activities across
a quarter of a million DoD positions engaging in commercial-type including data
processing, base maintenance, logistics, health services and training (Correll 1995).
Secretary of Defense William J. Perry noted how outsourcing initiatives were in line with
his objectives and goals to find savings in support activities and assisting in the
procurement of major weapon systems (Towell 1996). He defended outsourcing as a
means for the DOD to accomplish its missions in an environment of budget reductions,
increased operations tempo and modernization.
In August 1995, then Deputy Defense Secretary John P. White gave renewed
emphasis to the A-76 program when he directed the services to make outsourcing of
support activities a priority seeking outsourcing candidates in a broad range of activities
(White 1995, 3). He sought to reduce operating costs and free up funds for higher
priorities such as weapon systems acquisitions (Holman 2001, 5).

144
In response to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, the
DOD published Improving the Combat Edge Through Outsourcing in March 1996
describing its initiative to determine where outsourcing, privatization and competition
can lower costs and improve readiness (DOD 1996, 2). The DOD report emphasized the
sizable portion of support activities in the defense budget and how these activities were
largely established and organized during the Cold War when DOD depended
predominantly on organic support driven by the possibility of an extended conflict with a
rival superpower and a less sophisticated private, commercial infrastructure (DOD 1996,
1). 57 From October 1995 to January 1997, DOD projected over 34,000 base support
position studies under OMB Cir. A-76, and planned to study nearly 100,000 more
positions over a six-year span (GAO 1997).

Secretary William Cohen
Secretary of Defense William Cohen, a Republican, embraced President Clinton’s
desire to reduce the size of government by applying a competitive private sector approach
to the DOD, and running the Pentagon like a private business, following a similar
approach taken by Secretary Perry (Wilson 2000, 21). Cohen’s priority was focused on
downsizing and shrinking the armed forces by not replacing those who leave and forcing
others out as a tool in the FY1997 budget process. Running the DOD like a private
business and downsizing without replacement all pointed to outsourcing as a key driver
in facilitating mission objectives that still remained relevant.
In the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996, a provision required the DOD
to reevaluate thoroughly its defense strategy every four years with the Quadrennial
57

DOD estimated that $93 billion would be spent in FY96 on operations and maintenance.
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Defense Review (QDR) starting in 1997 (The Defense Monitor 1997, 1). The QDR was
mandated by Congress to address a perceived mismatch between the stated defense
strategy and the forces and resources that were being made available to implement it
(Zakheim 2004, 1). Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to examine defense
programs and policies through 2005 including force structure, defense strategy, budget
and infrastructure. Congress also appointed an outside panel of defense experts to assess
the nation’s future military strategy and force structure with the National Defense Panel
(Robb 1996, 4; Zakheim 2004, 1).
Secretary of Defense Cohen presented QDR to Congress on May 15, 1997
announcing that for the DOD to maintain the “tooth,” or combat readiness of national
defense, it must cut the “tail,” or the support functions (Harney 1998, 54-55). Secretary
Cohen stated that the DOD must identify and then choose between the military’s core
functions and those functions that could be performed by the private sector, noting that a
leaner, more efficient, and cost-effective DOD could serve the war fighter faster, better
and cheaper (Harney 1998, 55). Cohen’s comments echoed what study groups, task
forces, panels and civilian DOD leaders agreed upon throughout the Clinton
presidency— the need to embrace the private sector in order for the DOD to be effective
at providing national defense.

Defense Reform Initiative
After review of the QDR by the House Committee on National Security, Secretary
of Defense Cohen commissioned a Task Force on Defense Reform to further investigate
ways to reduce, streamline and outsource its infrastructure. It produced the Defense
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Reform Initiative (DRI). Secretary Cohen portrayed the DRI as a sweeping program
aimed at reforming the business of the DOD, stating that “American business has blazed
a trail and we intend to emulate their success. We have no alternative if we are to have
the forces we need as we enter the 21st century” (Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense 1997).
The DRI recommended using best business practices from the private sector in
defense support activities, while also recommending the outsourcing of in-house
functions. It created ambitious goals for the DOD, including the competition of 30,000
positions per year between FY1998 and FY2003, and evaluating the entire military and
civilian workforce by 1999, to identify which additional functions are commercial in
nature and could be targeted for competition (Cohen 1997a, 32–38). Secretary Cohen set
an ambitious goal for outsourcing competition between 1997 and 2003 (Figure 5)
supporting the administration’s downsizing objective.

Neoliberal Shift in Congress
The 104th Congress (Republican majority) that began serving in January 1995
proposed significant reductions in government programs and tax cuts as well as a
balanced budget (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998, 337–338). It clearly represented the return
to primacy of neoliberal based policies including outsourcing, as the Nichols amendment
became ineffective after September 30, 1995. In 1996, upon reaching a compromise on a
balanced budget with Congress, Clinton noted how the era of big government was over,
reflecting a redefinition of the relationship of state and marketplace, with more
confidence in the ability of markets to sort things out independent of government (Yergin
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and Stanislaw 1998, 327–328). While Clinton’s rhetoric appeared to support the interests
of the private sector in establishing federal services as a new market, his second term
would reflect mixed results in what was delivered.

Results from Clinton’s First Term
Clinton’s first term produced an increase in outsourcing through the procurement
process. Between 1992 and 1996, the percent of O&M budget spent on the procurement
of support services increased from 61.7 to 65.7 percent, as the slight decrease in
procurement expenditures was less than the larger decrease in the O&M budget. The
relatively stable procurement activity (based on expenditures) marked the lack of
congressional reach on the procurement of support requirements managed by federal
agencies. The data for procured services also highlighted the significant role private
actors developed within the DoD force structure as the overall size of the DoD decreased
by 528,000 personnel (military and civilian).
The DoD accepted the private sector as its first choice for performing many support
activities when essential mission requirements would not be reduced. Private actors were
becoming central to the mission in an era of growing new capabilities and technologies as
the U.S. military became more active abroad in a variety of areas with limited manpower.
The declining amount of in-house personnel reduced the availability of trained military
and civilian forces, leaving many organizations dependent on the commercial sector
when performing mission requirements.
Outsourcing through A-76 competitive sourcing was marked by a significant
slowdown. As indicated in Table 5, DoD’s competitive sourcing program had nearly
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stopped, as cost comparison studies continued to decline, with only 32 being completed
between 1992 and 1996. In Figure 5, the numbers of positions in A-76 competitions
were at their lowest levels during this period, while in Figure 8, the number of announced
DoD competitive sourcing initiatives ranged from 50 to 150 between 1995 and 1996. The
minimal competitive sourcing results appear to stem from the Democratic Congress being
opposed to strategies increasing the private sector role in public activities.
Despite the recommendations from a variety of study groups within the first
Clinton administration to increase competition through the A-76/competitive sourcing
process for service activities/functions, they were not successful in getting the
Democratic Congress to embrace market-orientated actions. As noted above, the A-76
process, as indicated by completed cost-comparison studies of in-house commercial
activities, was scaled back significantly. The Democratic Congress, through its
legislation, did not support the ideas of increased competition, market incentives and the
expansion of the role of the private sector in the federal government.

ORGANIZATION FACTORS 1989–1995

DoD organizations faced budget reductions, threats to their core activities and
outside intervention during this period. These factors are useful in explaining
procurement sourcing activities. Outsourcing activity is expected upon budget decline
and when core activities are threatened. Between 1989 and 1995, the DoD budget was
reduced from $445.5 to $340 billion and the O&M budget declined from $136 to $120
billion as military and DoD manpower were steadily reduced. During this period,
organizations resisted budget cuts and force reduction efforts as members of Congress
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sought to reform and reduce missions due to the end of the Cold War. Due to budget
reductions being greater than the relatively small reductions in procurement spending, the
percent of O&M budget spent on new procurement activity increased from by 1.2 percent
(Figure 1).
While procurement spending declined slightly in comparison to the O&M budget,
competitive sourcing activities decreased significantly and did appear responsive to
budget and core mission factors. Congressional legislation appeared as a significant
factor in providing local organizational leaders with the independence and autonomy to
act according to their mission interests. The loss of budget and manpower, together with
a further reduction of in-house manpower through competition, added to further
organizational change and mission disruption that leaders likely sought to avoid.
Initially, outsourcing behavior was not an easy sell to DoD service chiefs and
commanders, as organizations remained resistant to changing their core missions.
Service organizations found themselves attempting to move from a Cold War system that
defined their missions, operating procedures, resources and funding, to an uncertain
international system with no defined enemies. Ultimately, senior DoD military leaders
had little choice but to reduce their post-Cold War forces and use procurement actions to
augment core missions, limit budget loss, and provide for new capabilities, especially
technically sophisticated activities.
The development of the Base Force in 1990 was the first significant DOD event that
initiated top-down pressure on service organizations to find ways to conduct their
missions and services with less budget resources and personnel. It began a process that
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would cause service organizations to reevaluate activities and functions and seek private
actors for the performance of a variety of functions due to their reduced manning.
In the fall of 1989, General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
began planning for what he called the post-Cold War Base Force (Korb 2000, 1). His
principal challenge was to reshape defense policies and the armed forces in light of the
changing global political and military environment, ballooning federal deficits and
declining defense budgets that would begin to affect military culture and the way it
conducted its business (Jaffe 1993, 13,27; Larson, Orletsky, and Leuschner 2001, xv).
He emphasized to service chiefs the need for a new strategy and force cuts, rather
than continuing to request a force structure that would not be funded, based on the current
international environment (Jaffe 1993, 18,22). He adopted the term Base Force to
designate his recommended minimum force, which the DoD could not go below. He
envisioned a military about 75 percent the size and cost of the military that existed when
he took office in 1989 by reducing the force structure and budget by five percent a year
between 1990 and 1995 (Korb 2000, 1).
However, as organization factors suggests, service chiefs resisted Powell’s plan.
They refused to seriously address the need for force cuts. They believed he was
usurping their force planning prerogatives by proceeding with the Base Force plan
despite their objections (Jaffe 1993, 27). Service chiefs controlled budget submissions
and refused to support Powell’s Base Plan. Through the mid-1990s, Congress vented at
the unchanging military force structure despite significant changes in the international
system and a budget deficit.
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In the 1990–91 Program Object Memorandum (POM)58 cycle, the services did not
accommodate the views of the JCS Chairman with their budget submissions. They
supported only a two percent per annum reduction in real growth in the budget over the
Six Year Defense Plan (Jaffe 1993, 34). Service Chiefs remained reluctant to concede
resources and force cuts despite the changing world environment.
Service chiefs became more receptive to the Base Force concept when
congressional participants in budget negotiations were not going to permit the force
levels in the service POMs (Jaffe 1993, 39,41–42). Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney
directed the services to implement the Base Force in November of 1991 resulting in a 25
percent force structure reduction and a 20 percent active manpower reduction through the
FY 1993–1993 period (Larson, Orletsky, and Leuschner 2001, xvi). General Powell
believed that to survive as effective forces in the changed fiscal environment, the services
had to cease competing with each other for dwindling resources and reduce and
reconfigure (Jaffe 1993, 50). However, this would prove to be a difficult challenge for
the services as competition for the dwindling share of the defense budget increased in the
1990s.
At the onset of the Clinton Administration, in addition to pressure on the DOD
from their senior civilian leadership, Congress put pressure on the DoD to reduce its size
and spending, being concerned with the nature of the defense structure shaped by the
Bush-1 Administration. Congress believed that the Pentagon had continued to use Cold
War era assumptions to develop force and spending requirements (CDI 1998, 1). In July
1992, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), then Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed
58
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Services, suggested a review of the current service roles and missions due to concern
about mission redundancy and duplication of capabilities by different services costing the
government billions of dollars a year (Lussier 1994, 2).
There was a measure of distrust in Congress regarding the DOD, and a perception
that Pentagon leaders were not looking over the horizon and preparing the nation for the
likeliest wars (Wilson 2000, 15). Leaders of the Army, Navy and Air Force argued that
they still might have to fight against Soviet weapons, and resisted giving up their own
Cold War weapons while they pressed civilian leaders to buy a new generation of
weapons (Wilson 2000, 14). Resistance to giving up old mission requirements affecting
the size and nature of the force structure exemplified organization behavior and the desire
to sidestep change while doing what it knows best.
Yet, continued pressure on service organizations to make adjustments was
substantial. DOD and senior government leaders, along with members of the National
Defense Panel, created expectations for service organizations to fulfill. The QDR
recommended further reductions of civilian and military support personnel by adopting
private sector business practices, such as outsourcing, to lower costs and improve
performance (Harney 1998, 55).
The QDR encouraged outsourcing of more non-war fighting support functions,
predicting the DOD would enjoy the same benefits private industry gained from
outsourcing. These included improved quality, responsiveness and access to new
technology and lower costs. The QDR justified its position by noting that 61 percent of
DOD employees in FY 97 performed infrastructure or support functions including
training, logistics support, central personnel services, headquarters functions, medical
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care, science and technology services, and command, control and communications
services (Harney 1998, n.32). The QDR panel also proposed cutting 109,000 civilian and
military personnel involved in support functions, boosting the total infrastructure force
reduction since 1989 to 39 percent (Harney 1998, 32). The panel directed the DOD to
outsource military tasks that mirror commercial functions, especially in the logistics and
support areas (Harney 1998, 32).

Competitive Sourcing
A different dynamic appeared to exist in the competitive sourcing environment as
activity within the DoD nearly ceased (Table 5 and Figure 5). Competitive sourcing had
the greatest reduction of activity since the federal government began tracking it in 1978.
Between 1989 and 1995, the DoD completed 202 cost-comparison studies, as opposed to
the 1,744 completed between 1981 and 1988. Commanders were clearly not in favor of
the competitive sourcing process as it jeopardized their manpower authorizations, which
were already targets for reduction, despite efforts to maintain their steady-state mission
and manage global disorders.
Personnel reductions through competitive sourcing activities did not provide a
mission incentive. Competitions lasted on average anywhere from 18 to 36 months,
introducing organization turmoil and morale problems into the mission. The Army IG
reported in 1989 that Army cost studies were lengthy because installation commanders
did not view the A-76 program as having a high priority and therefore did not emphasize
its importance. Service officials believed the process was adequate and did not plan any
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policy changes or new approaches for shortening cost-study completion times (GAO
1997, 8).
Commanders were also reluctant to reduce the size of their force as it affected their
manpower budget during the next budget cycle (Andrews 2007). Due to downsizing,
local commanders feared they might not receive adequate funds to hire civilian
replacements, or that they could lose the replacement positions through civilian reduction
targets (GAO 1994, 4). Funds allocated to replace military personnel with civilians in
support positions did not have to be used for that purpose (GAO 1994, 4).
Funds for civilian personnel were derived from several accounts that could be used
for a variety of purposes. At one location, civilian employees identified 2,200 military
positions for replacement. The command lost about 2,000 of these military personnel but
gained only 800 civilians (GAO 1994, 4). The command’s budget was reduced, in part
due to downsizing, before civilians could be hired (GAO 1994, 4). Civilian requirements
and budget allocation decisions were made independently of each other (GAO 1994, 4).
Organizations will act to protect their resources, especially if it affects budget outcomes.
They will avoid any behavior that risks losing manning positions and funds that can
ultimately impact their mission.
Organizational commanders were supported by congressional legislation that
assisted their efforts in avoiding competitive sourcing activities. Commanders were
empowered by federal law allowing them to directly determine the extent of outsourcing
in their organizations. Where most force reductions were outside the control of DoD
organizations, the Nichols amendment gave local commanders autonomy and direct
authority in whether or not competitive sourcing activities were utilized. Without the
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pressure and requirements of a political or higher headquarter agenda to reduce force
structure through internal competitions, commanders relished the opportunity to protect
their in-house resources. Commanders were able to limit and in many cases stop
competitive sourcing activities at their local organizations during the 1989–1995 period.
Competitive sourcing activities were low because legislation provided commanders
with increased freedom of action/autonomy in managing their organizations and
protecting their core missions from contractors that often limited their ability that
included commander authority, leverage and autonomy. For example, commanders
raised concerns that private sources of support would not provide the predictable services
needed during unpredictable contingency type missions (Camm, 9). Military leaders
preferred to use in-house personnel because they could exercise greater control over
them. Contractors could not be used for any activities outside those stated in the
contract, unless the contractor agreed to the additional work and was monetarily
compensated. Also, contractor issues could not be handled directly through the
commander but required a contracting officer and quality assurance expert to resolve
problems. Outsourcing presented commanders with additional work, coordination,
visibility and extraneous requirements that limited and obscured their independence and
autonomy.
While procurement and competitive sourcing behavior appeared to have different
influencing factors during this period, service orientated outsourcing objectives with a
decentralized local flavor continued to dominate the landscape with no apparent
relationship to the larger scale joint mission objectives. Similar to earlier periods, each
service worked autonomously within its own procedures to identify peacetime personnel
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requirements for support positions and determine the most efficient personnel mix to
achieve assigned missions and tasks. This process was based on a subjective
determination of positions considered essential and non-essential for military
incumbency.
A 1993 manpower study indicated that services varied significantly in the degree to
which they used military and civilian personnel to perform similar functions. It reflected
their autonomy and individual approach to the federal competitive sourcing program. For
example, the services collectively employed more than 21,000 enlisted military and
civilian equivalent personnel whose primary occupational specialty was computer
operator. Only 17 percent of computer operators in the Air Force were civilian, whereas
in the Navy more than 53 percent were civilian, and in the Army about 68 percent were
civilian (GAO 1994, 21).
The autonomous nature of each service and variation across services in filling
similar positions is supported by the data in Table 12. It shows the occupational
specialties with the greatest amount of variation across the services. The outsourcing
process continued to highlight inefficiency and relative weakness in providing a
consolidated/joint national defense. The interests and objectives of each service, as
demonstrated in procurement and competitive sourcing behavior, took priority over the
requirements of a unified support/operational defense plan involving all of DoD’s service
organizations.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

CASE STUDY — DEFENSE OUTSOURCING 1996–2000
In the 1996 through 2000 case study, the average percent of O&M budget spent on
procured services increased to 64.8 percent. The three percent decrease in O&M
spending on procured services during the period was attributed in part to an increased
O&M budget from 1998 through 2000, as procurement costs remained relatively
steady.59 As the cost savings from DoD personnel appeared to be diminishing in some
areas, in comparison to the private sector, procurement activity remained relative steady
during this period. Competitive sourcing activity including announcements and
competitions increased and was consistent with the strategic efficiency framework.
President Clinton’s relatively market-focused agenda did not support DoD’s
outsourcing activity, as poorly structured manpower reductions, ambivalence towards the
federal competitive sourcing process, and alignment with federal unions conflicted with
the goal of an increased role for the private sector in providing DoD support services.
Organization factors were significant in explaining outsourcing behavior, as service
chiefs faced mounting force size reductions and the lowest budget since the 1970s, which
jeopardized weapon system modernization efforts and core missions. Modernizing
weapon systems was a fundamental interest of each service, in order to maintain its
organizational strength and primary missions.
The case-study notes the reluctance of Congress to reform itself and improve the
process of spending defense dollars, coupled with a business-as-usual approach in the
services to continue to build Cold War era weapon systems. It highlighted the ongoing
59
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conflict and inefficient nature of policymaking in the procurement realm among senior
civilian and defense leaders as war fighting priorities, the ultimate justification for
outsourcing efforts, appeared misguided, service dominated, and enamored of
congressional politics.

STRATEGIC EFFICIENCY 1996–2000

Throughout the 1990s as pay increased relative to the private sector for the junior
enlisted and officer force, those positions remained a slight cost savings as their pay
remained below the 70th percentile for the majority of personnel. Yet, with the growing
DoD medical expenses increasing by 40 percent per person between 1988 and 2000, we
would expect to see increased outsourcing activity as DoD personnel became less of a
cost savings when considering both pay and non-pay benefits.
Basic military pay as a percentile of private sector pay from 1996 through 1999 for
male enlisted and officer personnel is provided in Table 8 and supports the cost savings
of the majority of enlisted and mid-to-senior officer personnel. Figures 9 and 10 also
highlight the cost savings of the enlisted and officer corps during this period. Figure 9
indicates that most junior-to-mid level enlisted personnel were in the 60–65 percentile
(positive cost savings) while junior enlisted with the least amount of educational skills
(high school) ranged from mid-60s to more than 70 percent (less of a cost savings).
Figure 10 reflects the military pay of junior (0-3) and mid-level (0-4) male officers
as a percentile of private sector pay from 1996 through 2000. Mid-level-to-senior
officers were a cost savings for most of the period as pay for mid-level officers hovered
below the 60th percentile area while pay for junior grade officers remained less of a cost
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savings as their pay rate bounced between the 60th and 70th percentile range between
1996 and 2000 (Hosek 2001, 73).
The 0-4 pay (mid-level officers) percentile line lies below the 0-3 (junior grade)
line, indicating that military officers remained a better cost savings as they gained
experience and increased their service time in the DoD. Equivalent private sector
workers were less of a cost advantage as they were better compensated and their pay
increased more rapidly than those in the military (mid/senior-level officers) who gained
job experience and served longer (Hosek 2001, 74). Figure 12 supports similar findings
as it charts the difference between changes in regular military compensation and the
civilian ECI index between 1996 and 2000. The data indicates that military pay grew
more slowly than private sector pay through 2000.
Non-pay and deferred benefits appear to factor into some military personnel being
less cost-effective than federal civilians or private sector workers during this period, as
the complete military compensation package for the average active duty service members
grew by nearly 80 percent from 1988 to 2005, while total military end strength declined
by nearly 700,000 personnel.60 Thus, despite the reduction in force and expected cost
savings with fewer DoD members, the rising costs associated with military compensation
appeared to limit the expected savings.
One of the larger non-cash benefits was medical care.61 By 2000, it accounted for
nearly 40 percent of the cash compensation to DoD service members, as compared to 15
60

Military compensation includes: basic pay, housing allowance, subsistence allowance, tax advantage,
installation-based benefits, active duty health care, social security, retiree benefits and retirement pay
accrual.
61
The DoD views many of its medical costs as unavoidable and argues that it must operate its own inhouse system of health care providers and military medical treatment facilities to ensure that U.S. forces
will have reliable, high quality medical care in time of war and to attract and retain high-quality active-duty
and reserve forces during peacetime (Percy, Clay-Mendez, and Gilmore 2003, ix).
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percent for federal civilian and nine percent for private sector employees.

As noted

earlier, private employers avoided significant cost increases in employee health benefits
by shifting costs to the employees (Percy, Clay-Mendez, and Gilmore 2003, 8).62 This
shift was noticeable in the increasing rise of employee deductibles and co-payments. The
cost for employee deductibles and co-payments in preferred provider plans had risen by
37 percent since 1996 (Percy, Clay-Mendez, and Gilmore 2003, 8–9).
Table 10 provides a 1998 CBO comparison of the annual value of federal and
private sector benefits for five hypothetical employees. The analysis compares the dollar
value of benefits that various types of hypothetical employees earn in a year (Musell and
Holen 1998, vi). The analysis suggests that employee benefits represent a significant
portion of the compensation packages of both the federal government and large private
firms ranging from 26 to 50 percent of pay for federal employees and 24 to 44 percent of
pay for private sector employees (Musell and Holen 1998, vi). The value of the federal
government’s benefit package exceeded the private sector package by up to 7.2 percent.
This supports CBO’s overall findings for federal employees with pay near the level of
their private-sector counterparts — the advantage in employee benefits puts the value of
the entire compensation package (pay and benefits) at or above the private sector.
The increased cost of military and federal civilian compensation, including pay and
non-pay benefits such as medical care, and growing pay competitiveness for a range of
federal employees suggested an increased growth in outsourcing activity, through the lens
of strategic efficiency, as the size of the military and federal cost advantage appeared to
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Employers limited their health care increases by either dropping health insurance coverage, requiring
higher contributions from employees toward premiums, shifting to preferred provider plans and away from
more costly fee-for-service plans, or offering plans with higher deductibles and co-payments (Percy, ClayMendez, and Gilmore 2003,8).

161
be shrinking. The decline in the amount of O&M spent on service procurement activities
did not support the strategic efficiency framework, yet, the average percent of O&M
spent on procurement increased relative to the 1989–1995 period. Thus, while DoD did
not commit as much of its O&M budget to service procurements, its O&M budget
increased during this period, and the actual procurement dollars spent remained steady
throughout the period. The data suggests that the DoD remained committed to
outsourcing and that strategic efficiency was useful in explaining this behavior.
Despite the combination of rising costs and a decline of DoD personnel, the
significant jump in competitive sourcing activities is concerning from a transaction cost
perspective. The jump seems to indicate an expansion in the types of services being
considered for competition where the cost of potential transaction hazards had not been
fully considered and built into DoD contracts. Whether the DoD or the market was the
most efficient source for providing DoD services, based on the ability to mitigate
potential transaction hazards, did not appear to be significant in the A-76 competitions.
Monitoring and contract surveillance continued to be a problem throughout this period.
The annual amount spent on procurement in 1996 was $76.3 billion compared to
$75.1 billion in 2000.63 While procurement of services remained relatively steady with
some decline, competitive sourcing activity significantly increased during this period and
did represent expectations from a strategic efficiency perspective. A-76 competitions
increased from 20 in 1996 to 210 in 2000. DoD competitive sourcing initiatives
increased from 50 in 1995 to nearly 450 in 1999, and positions competed increased from
under 100 in 1996 to 8000 in 2000. The results were aligned with the strategic
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Outsourcing measured in 2005 dollars.
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efficiency framework considering the rising cost of DoD personnel and their decreased
cost savings value in organizations when compared to the private sector.

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 1996–2000

Clinton’s Second Term
The Clinton administration and Republican Congress generally shared common
aims on reducing the size and cost of government (Pollin 2003, 75). The core of
Clinton’s economic policies appeared neoliberal. For example, in 1996 both agreed on
balancing the budget through tax and spending cuts, though each proposed different
solutions to accomplish the goal (Meeropol 1998, 249–250). Spending on government
programs, relative to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), dropped from 21.9 percent of GDP
in the last year of the Bush-1 presidency to 18.1 percent by the end of Clinton’s second
term (Pollin 2003, 72). Wage inequality appeared to be growing. Between 1983 and
1997, the percentage of personal income received as wage and salaries fell from 58.5
percent to 56.4 percent, and in manufacturing industries it fell from 13.8 percent of
personal income to 10.3 percent (Meeropol 1998). At the same time, the share of
corporate profits in national income rose from 7.6 percent in 1983 to 10.8 percent in 1996
(Meeropol 1998, 250).
President Clinton’s policy actions continued to deviate from traditional Democratic
tax and spend initiatives. Vice President Gore introduced the next phase of the
administration’s reinventing government initiative that included privatization as a tool to
sell off some commercial activities within the government (Shoop 1995, 1). In the
President’s 1996 budget, he proposed privatizing the following activities:
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- The Energy Department’s power marketing administration
- The Naval Petroleum Reserve ($1.6 billion)
- Three of five federal minimum and low security prisons and one detention center
- Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) training operation and investigations
Group
- Government helium reserves
- Parts of NASA and the National Weather Service
Additionally, the administration sought privatization studies for service functions of
the Government Services Administration. As the administration proceeded to initiate
privatization type actions, officials appeared to have a narrow view of privatization.
Elaine Kamarck ran Vice President Gore’s NPR and defined privatization as purely
divesting the government function and not contracting out (Shoop 1995, 3). In Clinton’s
eagerness to privatize select federal activities, there appeared to be minimal consideration
to keep these activities in-house. There was no effort at using the existing A-76 process
to competitively source positions and determine whether a private organization could
provide similar services and capabilities, or whether private sector competition existed
for providing the services. Once privatized, there was no plan to ensure that the activities
were being provided in a more efficient manner through oversight mechanisms. The
Clinton administration reduced contracting and procurement professionals by nearly 50
percent. Ultimately, the interest in cutting government costs did not appear aligned with
improving the efficiency of activities.
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Evaluation of Clinton’s Actions on DoD Outsourcing in Second Term
Though President Clinton appeared aligned with a neoliberal focus in a variety of
economic policies to reduce the size and scope of government that included privatization,
political ideology was limited in explaining DoD’s outsourcing results from the
procurement of services and competitive sourcing. The annual expenditures of DoD
outsourcing for procured services decreased by 1.2 billion between 1996 and 2000 but
remained relatively steady despite the decrease. The percent of O&M spent on procured
services decreased by three percent as the overall O&M budget increased by $5 billion
and the DoD payroll (active military and civilian) dropped by nearly 21 percent. The
data supports neoliberal expectations for maintaining procurement activity given mission
requirements, the reduced force size and the opportunity to create an increased private
sector footprint in the public domain.
While the outsourcing results were aligned with a neoliberal agenda, poorly
structured manpower reductions, ambivalence towards the federal competitive sourcing
process and on Executive conflict with legislation supporting increased competition and
outsourcing efforts were factors questioning the significance of market-centric ideals in
the administration’s decision making and the results of DoD outsourcing activity. Poorly

Manpower Reductions
There was little evidence that the significant reduction in manpower was carried out
within a comprehensive and mission focused plan to reshape the workforce through
carefully planned cuts aimed at positions no longer essential to the core missions within
each service (Goldenkoff 1997, 1). Professor Don Kettl, Director of the Fels Institute of
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Government and Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, noted
how the federal government took a haphazard approach to downsizing, selecting
reduction goals without thinking about downsizing strategically (Friel 1998b, 1). There
was no consideration that agencies would be able to ensure their work could be
accomplished efficiently and effectively. Paul Light, the Paulette Goddard Professor of
Public Services at New York University, noted how the Clinton administration failed to
systematically look at how it should structure the federal workforce to carry out the
variety of government missions (Friel 2000, 2). While the Clinton administration had the
intention of using privatization for select federal activities, its narrow vision and
implementation of the process limited the ideals of competition for providing increased
efficiency.

Competitive Sourcing Ambivalence
The narrow approach to privatization was also reflected in the administration’s
ambivalence in supporting competitive sourcing objectives within government agencies.
In the recommendations made by the NPR, DSB, CORM and DRI to increase
outsourcing within the DoD, the vehicle to achieve those results was through competitive
sourcing. Both the competitive sourcing and procurement of service processes depend on
a skilled professional workforce that plans, competes, awards and manages sophisticated
long-term service contracts (Schooner 2004, 1). Despite mandates from the above study
groups to contract-out functions, the administration placed no concurrent emphasis on
retraining or obtaining suitable acquisition personnel to facilitate these recommendations
(Schooner 2004, 1).
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The civilian acquisition workforce comprised professionals intimate with the
outsourcing and contract compliance process. DoD reduced the acquisition workforce by
half from a peak of 310,000 workers in 1989 to about 150,000 in 2001 despite an increase
in the contracting workload of 12 percent over the same period (Cahlink 2001, 1;
Peterson 2003, 1). Robert Lieberman, DoD’s assistant Inspector General for auditing,
studied the impact of workforce reductions on acquisition reform. He noted that
Congress and the Clinton administration’s reinvention of government efforts shared in
some of the blame for haphazardly handing out pink slips and facilitating a theme
throughout the decade to downsize for the sake of downsizing (Cahlink 2001, 2).

Legislative Conflicts in Development of the FAIR Act
The White House position on developing the Federal Activities Inventory Reform
(FAIR) Act conflicted with outsourcing recommendations from government study groups
seeking a positive impact in reducing the size of DoD’s federal workforce. For example,
between 1993 and 1997, Sen. Craig Thomas, R-Wyoming, began drafting the Freedom
from Government Competition Act that was introduced in February 1997 and would
privatize any program deemed “not inherently governmental” (Friel 1998a, 1; Light
1999, 1).64 The Bill met with opposition from the Clinton administration and federal
employee unions. Later versions of the Bill that did not require wholesale privatization,
but mandated public-private competitions for non-inherently governmental programs was
still opposed by the administration (Friel 1998a, 1).
The Bill eventually evolved into the FAIR Act of 1998 and was signed by President
Clinton, requiring federal agencies to review their activities and define them as either
64

Privatize is used in the broader sense where contracting-out is included as an activity.

167
inherently governmental or commercial. The Act highlighted activities that could be
subject to competitive sourcing but did not mandate contracting-out (Friel 1998a, 1;
Jacobson 1998a, 1). The measure signed by President Clinton was a weaker version of
legislation sought since 1997. It mollified most critics of the initial legislation, including
the Clinton administration, because it seemed mostly to codify the A-76 Budget Circular
that already existed (Jacobson 1998b).
The ambivalence of the Clinton administration towards outsourcing was evident
from the fact that the FAIR Act simply mandated compliance with a longstanding A-76
provision that OMB did not consistently enforce in the past. In addition, the Clinton
administration and congressional supporters of outsourcing continually sparred over the
FAIR Act inventories once the law was passed (Cahlink 2000, 1). In 1999, OMB
released lists that found nearly half of all federal jobs were commercial in nature, but
found reasons for exempting many from public-private competition (Cahlink 2000, 1).

DoD’s Outsourcing Environment
Results from DoD’s competitive sourcing program in Clinton’s second term
fluctuated yearly due likely various influences such as the DSB, CORM, DRI, and
congressional legislative changes. As noted earlier, the percent of O&M spent on
procurement of support services decreased by three percent between 1996 and 2000, as
actual procurement costs for services remained relatively steady. Yet, the growth in
outsourcing from competitive sourcing activities was similar to the Reagan period.
Figure 8 highlights the substantial growth of announced DoD competitive sourcing
initiatives between 1995 and 2000. DoD announced 41 competitive sourcing initiatives
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in FY 1995, 164 initiatives in FY 1996, 417 initiatives in FY 1997 and 400 initiatives in
FY 1998 and 453 initiatives in FY 1999 (Kleinknecht et al. 2005, 5,8). Figures 6 and 7
note how the average number of positions studied for competition rose from under 1,000
to nearly 8,000 positions by 2000, while the number of DoD competitions rose from 70 to
nearly 210.
DoD’s A-76 program manager suggests that the increase in DoD competitive
sourcing during the late 1990’s is not necessarily attributable to Clinton’s reinventing
government initiative or an ideological interest (Andrews 2007). Annie Andrews notes
how the Clinton administration did not provide top-down leadership in the DoD or across
federal agencies supporting the benefits of cost-saving opportunities available from the
A-76 competitive sourcing process (Andrews 2007). As noted by his opposition towards
the FAIR Act legislation, the President had conflicting interests between the government
drawdown and increasing competition across the federal workforce.
While President Clinton wanted to support a government drawdown through
recommendations provided by the NPR and other studies, he was aligned with federal
employee union interests to protect federal positions from mandatory competitive
sourcing competitions (Jacobson 1998b, 1). His support for unions was also represented
in the 1999 efforts to reengage labor-management relations started in Executive Order
12871 by tasking agencies to improve their efforts to bargain with unions over workplace
issues (Friel 1999a). Many federal managers resisted the order’s call to bargain over
issues such as employee size, as the U.S. Court of Appeals continued to rule that
Clinton’s order gave unions no legal rights (Friel 1999a). Jacques Gansler, the
Pentagon’s acquisitions chief during the latter half of the Clinton administration, noted
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how defense officials were eager to open more jobs to competition in the late 1990s but
ran into opposition from the White House, particularly from Vice President Gore, who
did not want to lose the support of federal unions (Cahlink 2003, 2).

ORGANIZATION FACTORS 1996–2000

During this period, organization factors appear to be significant in explaining
outsourcing behavior. Service chiefs faced mounting force size reductions and the DoD
budget saw its lowest levels since 1976.65 The smaller budget jeopardized weapon
systems modernization, directly impacting core missions. Modernizing weapon systems
was a fundamental interest of each service to maintain its organizational strength and
primary missions. New and improved weapon systems and technology allowed
organizations to compete for larger shares of the defense budget and bolster the
effectiveness of their missions. Service chiefs ultimately became more proactive in
reducing manpower costs, enabling funding for modernized weapons in order to preserve
combat capability/core missions (Wilson 2000, 20).
Service chiefs readdressed outsourcing, primarily competitive sourcing activities,
when funding for weapons systems was threatened. DoD’s widespread efforts to open up
its activities to competition with private firms was driven primarily within the DoD to
address fiscal problems and funding shortfalls estimated at more than $20 billion a year
(Peters 1999, 1,2). The average percent of O&M budget spent on procured services
during the period was 64.8 percent, an increase of 3.2 percent from the 1989–95 period,
indicating that the DoD was allocating more money towards the procurement of services
to support mission needs. Competitive sourcing activity also increased significantly as
65

Measured in 2005 dollars.
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DoD leaders appeared to seek savings from within their organizations to fund weapons
modernization.
The independence and autonomy of service leaders was reduced as they had
minimal control over the magnitude and pace of personnel reductions and directed
organizational leaders at every level to push force reductions through downsizing. While
organizational leaders made the critical decisions concerning downsizing efforts, there
was no doubt that force reduction results were expected (McCormick 1998, 63). For
example, in 1998 the Air Force asked each of its major commands to determine which
service functions should be outsourced to industry in an effort to save $2.4 billion for
weapons modernization by 2003 (Muradian 1997, 1). As noted by Loren Thompson, a
senior fellow at the Alexis de Tocqueville Institute, the Cold War leadership of the Air
Force gave way to a new generation of general officers who had more of a bottom-line,
results-orientated management style.
Each of the services addressed their situation similarly by reevaluating old ways of
doing business as compared to new methods and means to maintain their forces and
capabilities in the fiscally constrained environment. Management culture began to
change when general officers began turning to the marketplace as a vehicle to save
money that was being wasted in inefficient or outdated activities. In the Air Force, the
change was fostered from the top down by former Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ronald
Fogelman (Muradian 1997, 3). Some argued that competitive sourcing offered the
potential opportunity to find savings in activities on average of 30–40 percent (Gansler
2003b, 1).
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From an organization perspective, these potential cost savings could be
programmed towards weapon systems and modernization efforts affecting the core
missions. Thus, leaders began to seek out as many commercial activity opportunities
within the DoD as could be competed. Commercial sourcing activities (A-76
competitions) rose dramatically (see Figure 6 and 7) as announced DoD competitive
sourcing initiatives peaked in 2000 with nearly 450 (Figure 8).
DoD organizations also began to reevaluate which functions were being defined as
DoD-only or “inherently governmental,” and redefine these functions to provide a larger
array of activities available for civilian competition.66 This would ultimately have the
effect of reducing in-house manpower costs wherever private enterprise won
competitions. These cost savings would go towards the organizational objectives of
modernization and new weapon systems. Organizations began focusing their in-house
personnel strength on core activities, with non-core activities available for civilian
competition.
DoD civilian leaders such as Secretary’s Perry and Cohen attempted to run the
Pentagon like a private business. Secretary Cohen noted that “to preserve combat
capability and readiness, the services targeted their force reductions by streamlining
infrastructure and outsourcing non-military essential functions” (Cohen 1997b). The
professional and management support, medical and technology areas showed tremendous
growth in procured services between 1995 and 2005 (Table 1) that can be attributed to
new systems, commercial-type activities and an increase in DOD requirements.
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DoD personnel can only perform inherently governmental activities. Each service determines what is
inherently governmental for their missions.

172
Figure 29 highlights the type of commercial activities outsourced by the military
services. It was not surprising for support services to be targeted for competition as a
significant portion of the DoD budget funded these services not considered core
capabilities or weapon systems. Support missions had limited budget growth and faced
competition from private sector enterprises as compared to core missions that, for the
most part, were unique to military organizations, central to the DoD’s existence and the
primary focus for budget growth.
A growing aspect affecting all missions throughout the DoD was the advancement
of new, sophisticated technologies essential in integrating into DoD operations and for
the success of many core missions. Significant change and improvement took place in
technical skill areas. New requirements for sophisticated technology to support core
missions, weapon systems and the complex data infrastructure (the backbone of the DoD)
required an exponential growth of expertise.
As noted earlier, Table 1 and Figure 29 highlight the large increase in ADP and
Telecom procurement growth in the last 10 years of the study. The DoD did not have
sufficient training resources or manpower to attempt to provide the growing volume of
sophisticated technology services internally. They also did not appear willing to compete
with the private sector to make significant investments in establishing a robust timesensitive training and R&D infrastructure requiring regular investments of the latest
technology. In a period when the DoD faced force reductions and needed to find money
for weapons modernization, this option appeared unlikely.
The improved economic opportunities for civilians with high-tech skills, as
compared with military and federal personnel, placed a burden on the efforts of each
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service to meet their high tech requirements with quality personnel. It was difficult to
retain highly qualified military or federal civilian experts, in high tech areas, due to
competition from the private sector who offered much greater financial benefits (Soloway
2007). Outsourcing provided DoD organizations with an avenue of easy access to instant
capability, required expertise and knowledge that were either limited or not available in
service organizations. A significant investment in R&D, training and increased force
structure was unnecessary when utilizing the private sector for these services. Figure 29
shows a five-fold growth of technology outsourcing expenditures in the DOD during the
1990s through 2005. The dependence on the private sector for providing mission support
services had begun and grew with intensity as the DoD turned to a technologically
sophisticated infrastructure to support its mission objectives.
While increased outsourcing behavior for support services reflected the need for
weapons modernization and reshaping in an environment of reduced budgets and force
reductions, the war fighting priorities — the ultimate justification for these outsourcing
efforts — appeared misguided, service-dominated, and enamored in congressional
politics, despite the input of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (the principle
military advisor to the President, National Security Council and the Secretary of
Defense). For example, in 1999 General Shelton, the JCS Chairman, expressed concern
about Congress’s desire to have the DoD spend too much on missile defense, leaving
other threats uncovered (Wilson 2000, 181). His foremost concern for the nation in the
Twenty-first century was asymmetric threats, or those that attack and disable the U.S.
computerized network and cause havoc to civil society and military operations (Wilson
2000, 180). Based on his assessment of the future, the chairman’s responsibilities
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included crafting plans for wars and ensuring that the services buy the right kinds of
weapons and resources for the next war, not the previous one (Wilson 2000, 179–180).
However, Congress permitted the military services to continue to buy or improve
weapons designed for the Gulf War and the Cold War. Civilian leaders allowed the
Army to overbuy M-1 tanks despite the need to make the Army lighter and more mobile;
the Navy was allowed to continue to buy, at $2 billion each, nuclear powered attack
submarines designed to hunt and destroy Soviet submarines during the Cold War; the Air
Force was permitted to develop and produce F-22 fighters designed to engage Warsaw
Pact aircraft that were no longer a threat (Wilson 2000, 195–196).
The unwillingness of Congress to reform itself and improve the process of
spending defense dollars, coupled with a business-as-usual approach in service efforts to
build Cold War era weapon systems, highlighted the conflicting and inefficient nature of
policymaking in the procurement realm among senior civilian and defense leaders since
the start of the study.
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CHAPTER EIGHT

CASE STUDY - DEFENSE OUTSOURCING 2001-2005
In the 2001 through 2005 case-study, yearly outsourcing activity costs grew from
$78 billion to $130 billion, while the percent of O&M budget spent on service
procurement ranged from 59 to 66 percent.67 The findings suggest that procurement
activity occurred in both low and high skilled areas, rather than in the most economical
and efficient activities. The likelihood of complex transactions being managed by the
market increased, suggesting transaction hazards were less likely to be successfully
mitigated, producing increased inefficiency in outsourced activities.
The expansion of DoD services to be procured as a result of conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan increased the possibility of inherently governmental activities being
outsourced to the market and hazards to probity that included non-compliance by service
providers resulting in a lack of confidence in information and assessments in situations.
Additionally, it created a perceived threat to the democratic principle of accountability
and diffused government responsibility with non-state actors undermining the state’s
capacity to govern.
The trend towards lower competitions and announcements in the competitive
sourcing arena did not support strategic efficiency expectations, as many enlisted, junior
officer and some junior government civilian positions were not a cost savings to the DoD
when compared with private sector personnel. Political ideology was useful in
explaining the increase in outsourcing through procurement but was not as successful in
explaining the decline in competitive sourcing activity in the market-centric
67
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administration. Organization factors appeared useful in explaining increased
procurement activity. Increased technology and activities resulting from the conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan required more personnel to accomplish organizational mission
requirements. Additionally, organizations had little interest in competitive sourcing
activities, as increased budgets, reduced threat to core missions, and relative autonomy
led to decreased activity.
In this case study, the increased level of outsourcing, particularly procurement of
support and operational services, led to concerns over transparency, accountability and
contract surveillance/monitoring. These concerns were highlighted by public reports of
contract abuses during the U.S. war fighting effort, potentially undermining the
effectiveness of the U.S. government. The DoD’s war fighting effort was marked by
areas where power and control had ceded to DoD contractors.

STRATEGIC EFFICIENCY 2001–2005

Between 1999 and 2005, pay raises became aligned with ECI increases for the
private sector and military pay and compensation increased for active duty military
personnel. As noted in Table 9, basic pay increased by 21 percent while total cash
compensations, including basic pay, housing, tax advantage and other pay and
allowances, increased by 25 percent. Non-cash benefits increased by 44 percent and the
cumulative compensation of cash and non-cash increased by 33 percent. These
compensation increases added to the growing cost of military personnel. Figure 12 tracks
the cumulative difference between changes in the RMC and the civilian ECI, and notes
how the growing cost of military personnel increased the cost savings of private sector
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personnel. Figure 12 highlights how the RMC for military personnel increased faster
than the civilian ECI after 2000, suggesting that military personnel were becoming more
costly than comparable private sector personnel. Strategic efficiency theory would
expect increased outsourcing in commercial-type activities supported by most enlisted
and junior officer personnel who had become less of a cost savings.
A measure that captures a more targeted pay comparison is the estimated
distribution of federal and private salary differences for selected professional and
administrative occupations. The data provides a snapshot of the differences between
federal and private sector pay for select professional, administrative, technical and
clerical occupations, using data from 2000. Figures 18 and 19 provide comparisons of
the percentage differences in salary for federal and private pay among federal employees.
In Figure 18, federal pay is lower, and in many cases substantially lower by more
than 21 percent, for professional and administrative occupations. More than 20,000
federal employees had salaries that were from 21 to more than 30 percent lower than
private pay. Figure 19 indicates that in the technical and clerical occupations there was
more diversity among salaries, but federal pay still appears to be lower than private pay.
The salary of more than 12,000 federal employees were up to 10 percent lower than
private pay, while the salary of nearly 3,000 were between 11 and 20 percent lower than
private pay. While a substantial amount of federal employees were a cost savings for the
DoD, small percentages were not. Nearly 4,000 federal employees had salaries up to 10
percent higher than private sector pay and more than 2,000 had salaries up to 29 percent
higher.
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The data indicates that it is more common for federal workers to earn less than their
private sector counterparts, particularly when they are in higher paying, white-collar jobs,
as in the professional and administrative occupations (Losey 2007, 1). These are mostly
comparable to mid-to-senior level officer and enlisted personnel. As noted by the
president of the National Treasury Employees Union, the federal workforce is a whitecollar one, and more and more federal jobs are in the professional categories, indicating
that pay disparity affects a large majority of federal workers (Rutzick 2006, 1). The
strategic efficiency framework would suggest increased outsourcing in junior level
occupations such as technical and clerical activities where pay can be higher than privatesector pay and limited outsourcing for higher graded and skilled positions where DoD
and federal personnel were still a cost savings.
Results, however, appeared mixed, with some outsourcing activity not aligned with
predicted behavior. Predictions were not accurate in areas where DoD personnel were
more cost effective in mid-to-senior level officers, civilians and higher skilled
technicians. Procurement continued to grow with private sector skilled and experienced
professionals despite the DoD cost savings. As noted in Figure 29, between 2000 and
2005, procurement in professional, administrative and management support services
increased from $11.8 billion to $28.5 billion, and IT increased from $5 billion to $10.3
billion. In areas where DoD was less cost-effective and higher outsourcing activity was
expected (i.e., utilities and housekeeping, technical and clerical positions), strategic
efficiency predictions were accurate, as procurement for these services increased by $4
billion.
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The findings suggest that outsourcing activity occurred across the board, rather than
where it would be most economical and efficient. The percent of O&M dollars spent on
procured services increased by 3.8 percent, from 61.9 in 2001 to 65.7 in 2005. The
likelihood of complex transactions being managed by the market increased, suggesting
transaction hazards were less likely to be successfully mitigated. The expansion of DoD
services to be procured increased the possibility of inherently governmental activities
being outsourced to the market, and the hazard to probity.68 A detriment to strategic
efficiency is the lack of competition in outsourcing efforts. Only 40 percent of Pentagon
contracts supporting the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan were conducted under full and
open competition while 44 percent of contracts were given under other than full and
open competition—usually as sole source contracts (Makinson 2004, 2).
Competitive sourcing activity, as measured by the annual amount of A-76
competitions, average number of positions competed, and announced competitive
sourcing initiatives, decreased throughout this period. The average amount of positions
annually competed declined to fewer than 14,000 in 2003. A-76 competitions decreased
from over 200 in 2000 to 160 in 2003, and announced competitive sourcing initiatives
declined from 450 in 1999 to under 50 in 2004.
The trend towards a lower amount of competitions and announcements is
inconsistent with strategic efficiency expectations since many enlisted, junior officer and
some junior civilian positions were not a cost advantage to the DoD when compared with
the cost savings potential for private sector personnel. Considering the decreased cost
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(Williamson 1999, 321).
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savings from DoD personnel as compared to the earlier period, increased competitive
sourcing activity would be expected.

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 2001–2005

G. W. Bush
Political ideology does have some explanatory power in the G.W. Bush
administration in regards to outsourcing behavior. The G.W. Bush administration aligned
itself with neoliberal principles to reduce the size of government and increase the role of
private actors performing DOD services through both competitive sourcing and direct
procurement. Competitive sourcing, though a relatively small activity when compared
with overall procurement of commercial services, remained an important activity in
distinguishing the extent to which ideology was a factor in explaining DoD outsourcing
behavior.
Congress enacted legislation mandating a study of the government’s competitive
sourcing process in October 2000 due to continued deficiencies within the A-76 process
(Walker 2003, 1). The Commercial Activities Panel was formed as part of the
congressional mandate to recommend a way forward on competitive sourcing (Soloway
2004, 2). President Bush made competitive sourcing a key part of his initial Presidential
Management Agenda (PMA).
In contrast to President Clinton, President Bush used top-down leadership to initiate his
competitive sourcing objectives through PMA, and used the FAIR Act as a vehicle for
selecting functions to compete (Andrews 2007; Peckenpaugh 2001a, 1). For example,
the President made competitive sourcing one of his top five initiatives in the 2001 PMA,
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targeting a better managed and more entrepreneurial government using private industry to
provide public services (Grasso 2005, 14). This was the first time since the inception of
Circular A-76 that an administration enforced the requirements of the circular across all
federal agencies (Andrews 2007). Earlier administrations did not appear to be actively
engaged in implementing A-76 requirements. The Bush PMA made competitive
sourcing mandatory across all federal agencies (Bersch 2007).
The PMA provided the objectives of the administration and drove the priorities and
actions of all federal agencies (Bersch 2007). The competitive sourcing initiative sought
to reduce costs through increased competition as federal agencies assessed what functions
and transactions the private sector could perform (Walker 2005a). The President
supported a market based strategy for the federal government through increased
competition for federal activities (Gansler and Lucyshyn 2004, 14).
The G.W. Bush administration was the first to require all federal agencies to use
FAIR Act job inventories as a guide for outsourcing goals, as OMB Deputy Director
Sean O’Keefe directed agencies to develop plans for competing positions listed on their
FAIR Act inventories (Peckenpaugh 2001a, 1). In addition, the OMB directed agencies
to submit lists of jobs classified as inherently governmental, with their FAIR Act
inventories to be released and accessible to the public at a later date (Peckenpaugh 2001d,
1). Federal union officials protested the cataloging of inherently governmental jobs as a
violation of the spirit of the FAIR Act, arguing that the pro-contractor bias of the Bush
administration used regulation to get done what it could not accomplish legislatively
(Peckenpaugh 2001d, 1).
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The outsourcing of federal jobs was among the toughest issues for federal unions to
tackle in the G.W.Bush administration, as the administration expected to eliminate
40,000 middle management jobs in the federal government and open up 450,000 jobs
through competition by 2005 (Makinson 2004, 18; Saldarini 2000). The Bush
administration pulled back from the agreement that President Clinton signed in Executive
Order 12871 to improve union-management relations (Friel 2003, 3). They also opposed
unionization for 50,000 screeners at the Transportation Security Administration and
revoked bargaining rights for Justice Department employees, leading unions to further
distrust the Bush administration on competitive sourcing (Friel 2003, 3). Federal law
affecting unions did not change much throughout the period of the study and prevented
unions from striking as they could not force management to bargain over the number of
jobs or the method or means of work (Friel 2003, 1). To fight outsourcing, unions
attempted to publicize their battles with the Bush administration and seek assistance from
Congress.
While President Bush embraced conservative, neoliberal ideals of market
competition in the government sector through the procurement and the A-76 process,
congressional support was not as forthcoming. From 2001 to 2003, the 107th Congress
was composed of a Republican-controlled House while Democrats controlled the Senate
with a narrow 50-49 majority. From 2003–2005, Republicans controlled the 108th
Congress with a narrow 51-48 majority in the Senate. The Republican Congress was not
able to align its legislation to support the Bush agenda for increased competitive sourcing
within the DoD, due in part to the slight majority, the possible effect on constituents
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fearful of losing their jobs, and questions regarding the fairness and equity of the A-76
process.
Concerns regarding the loss of federal jobs, the fairness of the A-76 process toward
government employees, and doubts as to whether A-76 saved the government money
promulgated an anti-competition/outsourcing environment in Congress. Legislation and
administrative actions to improve the federal competitive sourcing environment were
either blocked, delayed or challenged with anti-competitive sourcing legislation
throughout the post-2000 period (Andrews 2007). These actions had an impact on
reducing competitive sourcing behavior within the DoD.
After 2000, the number of DoD A-76 competitions remained relatively high but
began to decline (Figure 7), as the total number of positions competed for each year
began to decline after 2002 (Figure 6). The announced DoD competitive sourcing
initiatives declined substantially between 2000 and 2005 (Figure 8). The decline appeared
to be in part a case of congressional resistance to Bush’s competitive sourcing initiatives
in general, and specifically to OMB’s 2003 revision to Circular A-76 that resulted from
the findings of the Commercial Activities Panel.69
In 2002, the OMB directed agencies to outsource or hold public-private job
competitions for 15 percent of federal jobs deemed commercial by the end of FY 2003,
and eventually open to competition 50 percent of their commercial jobs, a percent set by
President Bush (Peckenpaugh 2002, 1). A bipartisan group of Senators assailed the Bush
administration plan to let private firms bid on thousands of federal jobs, as they feared the
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Section 832 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act of 2001 required the
Comptroller General of the United States to convene a panel of experts to study the policies and procedures
governing the transfer of commercial activities from government personnel to a federal contractor
(Commercial Activities Panel Final Report 2002).
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initiative could weaken the civil service (Peckenpaugh 2002, 1). Donald Kettl, Director
of the Fels Institute of Government at the University of Pennsylvania, noted that the
requirement for federal workers to face regular competition challenged the idea of a
career federal service:

"The bedrock of the civil service has long been neutral competence and strong
expertise, grounded in a career service," said Kettl. "Staging regular
competitions…would undermine the commitment to a career service, especially
if the scope of services and the standards for competition shift over time and, in
the process, put more federal workers at risk” (Peckenpaugh 2003b).

In 2003, after pressure from the House and Senate against arbitrary numerical
targets in competitive sourcing, the OMB eliminated government-wide numerical goals
in favor of individual targets for the levels of competitive sourcing feasible at each
agency (Gruber 2003, 1).
In an effort by the Bush administration to streamline the job competition process
and make it easier for agencies to open 450,000 federal jobs to private sector competition,
it completed a full revision of Circular A-76 in May 2003. The new process attempted to
make competition easier on employees by setting tight deadlines for job competitions and
requiring competition winners, whether contractor or federal employees to meet
performance standards (Peckenpaugh 2003b, 1). The systematic nature of OMB’s
reforms attempted to make recurring A-76 competitions a way of life for federal workers
(Peckenpaugh 2003b, 1).
Yet lawmakers continued to try and slow down the administration’s competitive
sourcing initiative.

In June 2003, legislation was created to prevent new job

competitions in the Interior Department (Peckenpaugh 2003c, 1). Opponents of
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competitive sourcing initiative argued that employees would be kept away from their
normal jobs while the costs for supporting job competitions would be excessive. At the
2003 confirmation hearing for prospective OMB Director Joshua Bolten, Senator George
Voinovich, R-Ohio, argued that competitive sourcing was causing unease inside the
federal workforce. Senator’s Lautenberg, D-NJ, and Akaka, D-Hawaii, both criticized the
administration’s competitive sourcing initiative, arguing it could force agencies to put
inherently governmental work – that by law must be performed by federal employees –
up for competition with private firms (Peckenpaugh 2003d, 1,2). Opponents of
competitive sourcing continued their attack on Circular A-76, as the House passed
legislation in September 2003 to withhold funds that could be used to implement the
revised A-76 policy. Twenty-six Republicans broke ranks with the Bush administration
to support the measure due to skepticism around the true savings produced by
contractors, interest in protecting constituents and support for federal employee unions
(Biesecker 2003, 1; Peckenpaugh 2003a, 3).
New legislation and legislative changes, as exemplified above, continued to affect
the DoD competitive sourcing program. For example, Section 335 of Public Law 108136, (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004), November 24, 2003,
required DoD to delay implementation of the revised circular until 45 days after DoD
submitted a report to Congress on the effects of the revision (Kleinknecht et al 2005, 8).
Due in part to congressional resistance towards the G.W. Bush competitive sourcing
initiatives and delays in getting the updated Circular A-76 approved, competitive
sourcing across DoD activities dropped significantly between 2002 and 2005. Based on
bipartisan resistance to increased competitiveness in the DoD through A-76 competitive
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sourcing initiatives, it did not appear that political ideology was a significant factor in
explaining outsourcing activities.
Ideology does appear useful in explaining DoD outsourcing of new and continuing
activities through procurement actions (outside the scope of the A-76 process) by
examining the actions of President Bush and his administration during the U.S. campaign
in Iraq.

Department of Defense
The Pentagon had several proponents of neoconservative, free-market polices, such
as Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Zalmay Khalilzad
and Stephen Cambone, with many former corporate executives from large weapons
manufacturers, such as Under Secretary of Defense Pete Aldridge (Aerospace
Corporation), Army Secretary Thomas White (Enron), Navy Secretary Gordon England
(General Dynamics), and Air Force Secretary James Roche (Northrop Grumman) (Scahill
2007, xvii).
Secretary Rumsfeld’s DoD leadership advocated a revolution in military affairs
predicated on increased competition between government and private sector entities for
the improved performance of federal functions. For Rumsfeld, the idea of applying
market logic to the U.S. military was a project that dated back four decades (Klein 2007,
289). It began in the 1960s when he attended seminars at the University of Chicago and
developed a friendship with Milton Friedman who later lobbied President Reagan to
make Rumsfeld his running mate because of his commitment to deregulated markets and
economic ideals similar to his own (Klein 2007, 289).
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Rumsfeld’s actions, supported by the administration, produced significant increases
in outsourcing dollars while limiting the growth of DoD manpower in the midst of the
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Between 2000 and 2005, DoD outsourcing
expenditures for support services grew by 73.2 percent, while the percent of O&M spent
on support services grew by nearly four percent to 65.7 percent (Figure 1). During the
same period, military and DoD civilian manning and salary costs remained relatively
steady at $1.38 million, with a slight rise in salary costs in 2004 and 2005.
Rumsfeld emphasized in one of his first major addresses the wholesale shift in
running the Pentagon and supplanting the DoD bureaucracy with a new model based on
the private sector (Scahill 2007, xiv). He announced a major initiative to streamline the
use of the private sector in waging of America’s wars (Scahill 2007, xiv). The impact of
his policy was felt on the military force structure supporting the Afghanistan and Iraq
campaigns, where the integration of contractors into the fight was historic.
In war zone areas, the U.S. outsourced many war and reconstruction duties that by
2004–2005 there were almost as many contractors (120,000) as U.S. troops (135,000)
(Roberts 2007, 1). Contractors had never represented such a large portion of the U.S.
presence in a war zone nor accounted for so many security and military-like jobs (Roberts
2007, 2). The size of the contractor force was 10 times the estimated number of
contractors that deployed during the 1991 Persian Gulf War (Merle 2006, D01). Unlike
previous conventional wars where battle lines were defined, the fighting in Iraq and
Afghanistan did not have clear zones of conflict (Miller 2006, 76). Contractors were
integrated throughout the region and within conflict zones and faced a similar battle
environment as military members.
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Many of the contractor functions were critical to the deployed mission and were
embodied in the Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract. The
American military has been dependent upon Halliburton, Kellogg, Brown and Root
(KBR), and other contractors to provide services critical to bedding-down the force and
providing an environment for the military force to effectively operate and exist in the war
zone. It built dozens of military bases across Iraq, small cities housing thousands of
people, complete with many amenities found in small towns across the United States
(Miller 2006, 72). A good example is Camp Arifjan, a U.S. Army base about 90 minutes
southwest of Kuwait City. In early 2002 there was only a small collection of buildings
intended as a training base (Baum 2003, 4). On October 11, the day Congress gave
President Bush authority to wage war on Iraq, the Pentagon told KBR it had nine weeks
to turn Arifjan into a full-blown Army base serving 7,000 people (Baum 2003, 4).
Contractors were also central to providing ground movement for supplies and
equipment throughout the country. Other functions/activities such as security,
interrogation, prison security, infrastructure repair, intelligence analysis, military convoys
security and equipment repair that was once reserved for DoD personnel became the
domain of contractors (Merle 2006, D01; Roberts 2007, 1)
The effect of President Bush’s neoliberal ideology on the integration of contractors
into the U.S. war fighting effort, such that they were integral to it, was significant during
the 2001–2005 period. Also, a key part of the Bush administration’s plan for Iraq was
fashioning the country into a secular, pluralistic, market-driven nation (Chandrasekaran
2003, A01). It evoked neoliberal beliefs in which outsourcing and the business
community were major players.
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The hiring of senior advisors in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was
settled at the highest levels of the White House and Pentagon, with well-connected
Republicans calling on behalf of a friend or trusted colleague (Chandrasekaran 2006,
91). The hiring of the CPA staff was assembled with a White House liaison at the
Pentagon who took charge of personnel recruitment, and dispatched queries for resumes
to the offices of Republican congressmen, conservative think tanks, and GOP activists
(Chandrasekaran 2006, 91). Allegiance to President Bush’s vision highlighting the
prominent role of market actors in shaping post-war Iraq appeared to be a mandatory
requirement for employment.
Senior advisors to the president including Wolfowitz, Feith, Rumsfeld and Cheney
regarded economic change in Iraq as an integral part of the American mission to remake
the country as a free economy and free society went together (Chandrasekaran 2006,
115). An ambitious plan for economic transformation entitled “Moving the Iraqi
Economy from Recovery to Sustainable Growth” called for a market-orientated private
sector economic recovery to be achieved by selling off state-owned enterprises through a
broad-based mass privatization program run by contractors (Chandrasekaran 2006, 115–
116). Consultation with Iraqi leaders or an interim Iraqi government was notably absent
from the plan.
Paul Bremer, selected to run Iraq’s CPA in May 2003, envisioned a free-market
Iraq that was centered on the belief that markets allocate resources more efficiently than
politicians. In June 2004 at a special meeting of the World Economic Forum in Jordan,
he outlined the administration’s vision for a free-market Iraq that aimed at shifting
resources from state industries to the private sector and relocating people and resources
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from inefficient state enterprises to supposedly more productive private firms (Weisman
2003, 1). In Iraq, no governmental functions were considered core (Klein 2007, 348).
All state activities were considered opportunities for the private sector. For example,
Bearing Point, an offshoot of the accounting and consulting firm KPMG, was paid $240
million to create a Western-style market economy with privatization as an integral
element (Klein 2007, 348).
In April 2003, Peter McPherson, president of Michigan State University, was
selected as the CPA economic policy director whose job was to bring capitalism to Iraq
(Chandrasekaran 2006, 114–115). A self-described conservative with a strong faith in
the power of the free market who had never before worked in the Middle East or in a
post-conflict environment, McPherson believed the best way to promote economic
development was through a vibrant private sector (Chandrasekaran 2006, 115). His vision
for economic reform embraced Washington’s plan as he favored recruitment of
multinational firms to help develop a robust private sector by reducing government
employment and the role of government industry through privatization, eliminating
subsidies, lower taxes, promoting foreign investment and enacting pro-business laws
(Chandrasekaran 2006, 116–117).
However, McPherson ran into a legal roadblock. Article 43 of the second section of
the Hague Convention of 1899, the first set of international treaties that attempted to
create laws of warfare, required an occupying power to respect all laws of the occupied
country, except when necessary to promote public order and safety (Chandrasekaran
2006, 117). A more practical challenge was that the CPA economic team was composed
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of three Americans who didn’t have the power to privatize or implement change, since
they did not control any assets (Chandrasekaran 2006, 118–119).
Despite the roadblocks to economic development, senior U.S. leadership continued
to press for privatization. In August 2003, the administration hired Thomas Foley an
investment banker and major Republican Party donor, who was also President H.W.
Bush’s classmate at Harvard Business School, to lead the CPA’s Office of Private Sector
Development. His objective was to privatize all of Iraq’s state-owned enterprises within
thirty days (Chandrasekaran 2006, 126,225). Foley was unsuccessful in this bid. He faced
resistance from the CPA’s legal department, Iraq’s Ministry of Industry and Governing
Council, potential Wall Street investors and the forthcoming announcement of Iraqi
sovereignty in June 2004 (Chandrasekaran 2006, 225). By December 2003, a senior U.S.
official noted that ideology had become subordinate to the schedule for Iraq sovereignty
and the administration had backed away from several of its initiatives to transform Iraq’s
economy (Chandrasekaran 2003, A01).

Assessing Political Ideology’s Impact on Outsourcing Activity
In assessing the affect of ideology on outsourcing and competitive sourcing
behavior within the DoD during the G.W. Bush administration, it appears that ideology
was significant in explaining some outsourcing activity. The Bush administration made
great strides to improve outsourcing by increasing opportunities for competitive sourcing
and by making the process more transparent and available to the private sector. Putting
the competitive sourcing program on the President’s management agenda, engaging in a
re-write of Circular A-76, and utilizing the FAIR Act inventories to target competitive
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opportunities for the private sector were all elements of the President’s commitment to
incorporate neoliberal economic principles into the management and development of the
DoD.
However, strong congressional pushback limited the growth and effectiveness of
the competitive sourcing program. Competitive sourcing results in the services were not
indicative of the strong commitment of the G.W. Bush administration, as indicated in its
presidential management agenda and other actions to increase activity.
Political ideology does appear useful in explaining outsourcing through the
procurement of services as exemplified in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. The DoD
force size had very little growth despite the fact that the United States was engaged in
direct conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, with a large expeditionary support infrastructure
ranging from Europe through the Middle East and Central Asia. It may be the first time
that the country has kept the force size relatively steady, without a significant increase,
during a period when the country was involved in two significant military conflicts
utilizing a majority of its force.
Instead of growing the force structure, the DoD, in conjunction with Secretary
Rumsfeld and the G.W. Bush administration, established contractors as the first option to
fill new requirements, increase capability, provide redundancy and replace military in
non-fighting positions. Private security firms flooded into Iraq to perform functions that
had previously been done by DoD personnel, such as logistics, security for top officials
and guarding bases (Klein 2007, 378). Contractors became integrated into the force
structure and part of the overall DoD team. Increased contractor involvement in DoD
missions was highlighted in the large procurement growth of DoD services, from $70.9
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billion to $130 billion between 2001 and 2005. The percent of O&M dollars spent on
procured services increased by 3.7 percent during this period.

ORGANIZATION FACTORS 2001–2005

During this period, the DoD budget increased as a result of U.S. military
engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq. Threats to core missions were minimal as
organization independence and autonomy were limited due to the global joint war
fighting effort that put increased demand and expectations on military organizations.
The military engagements required an increased capability, especially on the support side
of the mission.
The growth of outsourcing in technology and support activities was critical to the
success of organization missions while the integration of technology throughout DoD’s
infrastructure and weapon systems remained a key component to modernization efforts.
Contractors were given significant responsibilities for providing support activities at local
and deployed locations, including conflict areas, as operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
put increased demand on service organizations. Organizations outsourced many support
activities at fixed and deployed locations to support mission requirements due in part to
limited manning and increased dependency on technologically sophisticated weapons and
support systems.
As the budget increased, DoD military and civilian manning remained relatively
unchanged despite the country’s involvement in two significant military conflicts.
Besides the country’s Reserve and Guard force capability, contractors became the DoD’s
supplemental force due to the added mission requirements and increased technological
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integration in an environment without growth of the primary defense force. The DoD had
insufficient in-house expertise to support modified and new systems. It suffered a 40
percent reduction in manpower in the post-Cold War period despite an increased demand
on its capabilities, highlighted by numerous contingency deployments and missions.
Organizations eager to maintain core missions that were either refitted or expanded
through the integration of technology required private sector expertise, in many cases, to
operate and teach the systems. Procurement of manpower resources and expertise from
the private sector were necessary to assist in providing the full complement of support
and operational functions necessary for executing the peacetime and deployed mission.
The percent of O&M dollars spent on procured services grew during the 2001–2005
period by about 3.7 percent, with an annual average of 63.3 percent. Outsourcing
behavior increased across several activities, with specific emphasis in the growth of
technology and professional and management support services. This is aligned with
expectations from the organization framework as units had less manpower to perform
both peacetime and wartime requirements.
While outsourcing through procurement of services increased, competitive sourcing
activities began to decline during this period. Figures 6 and 7 highlight the decrease in
DoD A-76 competitions after 2001. Data from Figure 8 supports this drop-off, as
announced competitions decreased substantially. The decline in competitive sourcing
activity was in stark contrast to the growth in procurement of services as a result of the
war fighting effort.
Despite the limits placed on organization independence and autonomy from
supporting military war fighting efforts, and external demands from the G.W. Bush
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administration to increase competitive sourcing, organization factors appeared to support
the decline in activity. Competitive sourcing remained relatively decentralized within the
services, as they were local activities as opposed to many procurement services that
supported war fighting efforts or new missions. Organizations retained a degree of
autonomy in the extent to which these activities were competitively sourced, and they
became better at competing these activities against private sector competition. The
increased budget did not pressure organizational leaders to reduce personnel, nor was
there a viable concern for core missions as they were integral to the war fighting effort.
With the reduced size of many organizations and high operations tempo across the
DoD during this period, competitive sourcing activities conflicted with organizational
priorities. Competitive sourcing activities were both time and manpower intensive, as
noted earlier in the study. As manpower resources declined and missions increased,
competing for in-house positions took on a much smaller priority, as competitions won
by the private sector shrunk the size of the organization under the commanders direct
control. Commanders were already working with fewer in-house resources to accomplish
their missions. It appeared unlikely that organizational leadership would want to risk
losing more in-house personnel through competition during a period of war.
Commanders and military leaders did not share the same sense of urgency and
importance about competitive sourcing as the administration, since the conflicts in Iraq
and Afghanistan were all-consuming to the services.
The increased level of outsourcing, particularly procurement of support and
operational services, led to concerns over transparency, accountability and contract
surveillance/monitoring. The likelihood of complex transactions being managed by the
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market increased, resulting in a less successful effort to mitigate transaction hazards.
These concerns were highlighted by public reports of contract abuses during the U.S. war
fighting effort. Mismanagement and ineffective oversight and monitoring of private
sector contracts led to torture and prisoner abuse at the Abu Graib prison and the
uncontrollable use of lethal force in Iraq and Afghanistan by contractors. These concerns
and abuses presented problems for the DoD outsourcing effort. It undermined the U.S.
government’s ability to control and direct defense activities as the DoD’s power was
diffused into the private sector. It begins to reveal potential conflicts with core values
and interests shared by the American public, and with the conduct of national defense.
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CHAPTER NINE

CASE STUDY — INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) NETWORKS AND DoD
OUTSOURCING BEHAVIOR
This chapter will initially provide a background overview of the development of IT
and networks in the DoD from 1995 through 2005. It includes how each service
envisioned IT and networks, their decentralized growth, and actions by Congress and the
Executive to address their rise and management, to include outsourcing options. It will
then look at early network development across each service, briefly addressing inherently
governmental functions and the distinction between core and non-core activities, how
they are determined, and their relationship with outsourcing. It highlights how networks
developed as unique and independent systems across the services without a common
architecture. The chapter will then examine the Navy’s in-house efforts towards network
management, the Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) outsourcing project, and the Air
Force and Army Network management approach. My primary focus will be on the NMCI
project.
Unlike studies examining IT outsourcing in the private sector, relatively little exists
in understanding and explaining the nature of IT network outsourcing within the DoD.
Billions of dollars are spent annually on IT outsourcing in the DoD, with minimal formal
or academic study to discuss the phenomenon. Since the early 1990s, the DoD has come
to rely on a complex array of computer-dependent and information technology resources
to protect the security of the United States. The importance of IT in the DoD cannot be
overstated. Service networks have evolved into a critical war fighting capability,
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providing the physical infrastructure that interconnects DoD agencies across the globe
through an intranet.70 Understanding why each service may or may not seek to outsource
network capability is useful in helping us to predict the relevant factors that lead military
organizations to depend upon the private sector to perform significant military functions,
such as IT, for national defense.

BACKGROUND REVIEW OF NETWORK DEVELOPMENT

DoD Network Review
The rise of computer networking began in the mid-1990s as both a new medium for
communications across the DoD, and as a new dimension of warfare. The concept of
network-centric warfare took shape in the JCS. Joint Vision 2010 paper released in July
1996 by then-Chairman of the JCS, General John M. Shalikashvili (Brewin 1997, 1). The
document put networks, with their ability to disseminate information quickly, at the
center of military strategy during the next decade (Brewin 1997, 1). General Henry
Shelton, Chairman of the JCS from 1997–2001, focused on the need to transform
America’s armed forces so that they would be dominant across the full spectrum of
military operations in his Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020) (Shelton 2000, 1). An underlying
premise was that the IT network would develop into both a weapon system and a source
of interoperability and integration across the services to support daily missions in every
environment. However, this was not the case when networks were first developed, as
70

An intranet is a private network within an organization using Internet protocols. Corporate intranets
facilitate communication and access to information for employees. They provide a single, secure, reliable
access to a company’s private information, and improve a company’s ability to manage its information.
Intranets can result in higher productivity because of better access to quality information
Spoolstra, Jean C. 1999. Designing A Corporate Intranet: Georgia Southern University. Both the private
sector and DoD rely on IT services such as intranets daily.
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they sprung from local organizations, without a central plan to facilitate organizational
activities.
Rooted in this JCS vision was the concept of information superiority. Information
superiority is defined by U.S. Joint Publication 3-13 as "the capability to collect, process,
and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an
adversary's ability to do the same” (Thomas 2000, 13–14). JV2020 suggested that
continued development and proliferation of information technologies would substantially
change the conduct of military operations, making the information environment a key
enabler of the operational abilities of the U.S. military (Shelton 2000, 3). Retired Air
Force Chief of Staff General Ronald R. Fogelman characterized the increased importance
of information technology and its influence on military forces as a fifth dimension of
warfare, alongside land, air, sea and space (Fogelman 1995).
The growth of IT service contracts in the federal government increased from $3.7
billion in fiscal year 1990 to $13.4 billion in fiscal year 2000 (GAO 2002a, 6). The DoD
was the largest purchaser of IT services such as desktop support, network operations and
software development services throughout the 1990s, obligating more than $6.2 billion
on IT services in 2001 (GAO 2003b, 1). While information superiority was an important
DoD goal, there were fundamental challenges, including the lack of a physical IT
infrastructure interconnecting DoD organizations.
The IT infrastructure within the DoD was not able to support the full
implementation of the systems envisioned in JV2020. The services did not have a
strategy or coherent plan for developing their IT network infrastructures during the midto-late 1990s (Gilligan 2008; Porter 2008). As noted by Dan Porter, the Navy’s Chief
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Information Officer (CIO) from 1998–2002, IT networks and capabilities developed like
weeds across the Navy (Porter 2008). Much the same could be said for the other services
as local networks and IT capabilities sprang from local organizations at the lowest levels.
Knowledge developed in one system or network was relatively compartmentalized.
Whether knowledge was developed in a Navy, Air Force or Army network, it was not
necessarily available or compatible with other DoD systems.
The DoD IT network infrastructure consisted of thousands of independent stovepipe
(legacy) systems and disparate information networks that were difficult to integrate
because they were created at local organizations independent of a central architecture or
service guidance. 71 Service parochialism, lack of standardization and the independent
evolution of systems were common across service organizations as networks evolved
within the DoD. As a result, each service had a rapid growth of local organization IT
networks with various degrees of compatibility and configuration standards contributing
to the difficulty of DoD organizations to share information. Creating standardization and
compatibility across DoD networks was necessary to fulfill the JV2020 vision. It
ultimately required network infrastructures to provide seamless communications
throughout the DoD in both peacetime and wartime environments. This capability was a
first step towards the goal of information superiority.
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A legacy system is a term used to highlight a specific-type computer application. Military organizations
have used a variety of these unique computer applications that in many cases do not interface with other
applications.
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CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE

Congress and the Executive established significant IT legislation during the 1990s
to help direct federal agencies in conducting procurement of IT resources and services
similar to the practices of leading commercial organizations. Concerned that government
agencies were not responding to the growth of IT in an appropriate manner, Congress
approved the Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA) of 1996. It shaped the DoD’s approach to IT
acquisition and management, and forced federal agencies to minimize the risk associated
with major IT acquisition. It required each agency to establish a chief information officer
position having the authority, responsibility and accountability for the agency’s
information resources and management activities. The CCA required agencies to
acquire IT systems in stages while carefully gauging their cost, timeliness and support for
the agencies primary mission, and to determine, prior to making an investment in a new
information system, whether the function should be performed by the private sector
(Ormerod 2001, 14; Verton 1999c, 1).72
Despite the procurement reforms requiring agencies to weigh the benefits and costs
of IT projects, the DoD did not effectively manage their IT budgets. Systems were not
properly budgeted, explained John Hamre, DoD comptroller in 1997 (Brewin 1998b).
Many systems, along with contracted support elements, were purchased without a
supporting budget to maintain them over the long term, as little oversight existed. Many
of these IT contracts were under the financial threshold requiring senior agency and
congressional review. The House National Security Committee questioned the
Pentagon’s overall management of DoD IT and command, control, communications and
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The 1996 Clinger-Cohen Act is a combination of the Information Technology Management Reform Act
(ITMRA) and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act.
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computer (C4) programs in its 1999 report on the Defense Authorization Bill (Brewin
1998b, 2). The committees remained unconvinced that the department made the
necessary improvements to manage its $26 billion C4 program, considering the
increasing role of IT in the battlefield (Brewin 1998b, 2). The DoD Inspector General
rated IT oversight as one of DoD’s top 10 management problems (Verton 1999b, 2).

Pressure to Outsource
Coinciding with DoD’s budget and IT oversight problems, each service faced
increasing pressure from the DoD, Congress and the Executive to use the private sector
(outsourcing) for functions considered commercial and not core to the war fighting effort.
Beginning in 1995, competitive sourcing took on increased activity within each of the
services as Congress transitioned to a Republican majority and legislation limiting
competitive sourcing activity (Nichols Act – discussed in Chapter’s 5 and 6) was not
renewed. The 1997 Defense QDR called for reductions in infrastructure, support
functions and personnel through outsourcing and privatization and suggested the DoD
largely remove itself from the IT line of work based on precedents in private industry and
other parts of government. In 1998, Congress passed the FAIR Act, seeking to have each
agency identify their activities as either commercial or inherently governmental.
Congress also enacted statue10 U.S. Code, Section 2462, requiring the Defense
Department to contract out nongovernmental/commercial functions that could be done
more economically by the private sector (Petrillo 1999, 1).
In 2001, the Bush Administration put outsourcing on its management agenda,
looking for increased efforts by agencies to outsource through expanded competition
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under A-76. President Bush’s 2002 budget proposal also directed agencies to open for
competition at least half of the positions listed in their FAIR inventories over the next 10
years, while the OMB ordered agencies to compete or outsource at least five percent of
their FAIR Act jobs in FY 2002 (Walker 2001, 1). Also, in the 2002 Defense
Appropriations Bill, Congress instructed the Secretary of the Air Force to conduct a study
comparing different solutions to managing an IT network and provide lawmakers with
recommendations, including any lessons learned from NMCI (HOR 2001a, 159).
The pressure to outsource activities within the federal government by the QDR, and
the Clinton and G.W. Bush administrations forced the services to differentiate between
activities open to competition and those considered inherently governmental, or core to
the mission. Comptroller General David Walker noted that one of the most difficult
aspects of outsourcing decisions was how to determine what functions remain in-house in
order to provide effective government and, in the case of the DoD, effective defense and
security (Peckenpaugh 2001b).

Inherently Governmental/Core Activities
An inherently governmental activity is a function that is so intimately related to the
public interest as to require performance by federal government employees. Its definition
has been broad enough to be interpreted differently throughout DoD organizations. It
facilitates the efforts of local organization leaders to choose their desired activities for
outsourcing consideration. Guidance on defining inherently governmental activities was
included in the Federal Acquisition Regulation, Office of Federal Procurement Policy
Letter 92-1 and the 1998 FAIR Act. The Comptroller General cited national defense and
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law enforcement as examples of inherently governmental activities where soldiers
perform a core function–fighting wars–that is necessary to national defense activities
(Peckenpaugh 2001b). Functions directly engaged in performing an inherently
governmental activity were considered core, while functions supporting inherently
governmental functions were non-core and eligible for outsourcing (Peckenpaugh
2001b).

Core vs. Non-Core Activities
DoD’s definition of core was based on business concepts adapted to the military
domain. The definition emerged from DoD’s Senior Executive Council which adapted
the definition from C.K Prahalad and Gary Hamel’s article, “The Core Competence of
the Corporation,” in the May–June 1990 issue of the Harvard Business Review (GAO
2003a, 11). The Senior Executive Council defined core as “a complex harmonization of
individual technologies and production (employment, delivery) skills that create unique
military capabilities valued by the force employing general (commander in chief)” (GAO
2003a, 10). The Senior Executive Council stressed the importance of senior leadership
judgment in identifying core competencies (GAO 2003a, 11).
Despite the definitions provided by the federal government and DoD, inherently
governmental and core functions were interpreted differently across each service. Within
each service they were broadly defined and subjective, allowing for a significant amount
of interpretation and flexibility when applying these definitions to the positions and
functions that embodied service activities (Weigelt 2008). This was the norm in the
DoD and arguable across the federal government for several decades. Dan Porter, former
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CIO of the Navy, provided an example of federal agencies being subjective in identifying
core activities across the DoD. He noted how early in his career, the provision of badge
services (responsible for providing badges/passes for entry into facilities) within the
Navy was considered an inherently governmental activity. Yet, during the same period at
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), these activities were
outsourced (Porter 2008).
Since the development of the FAIR Act and congressional interest in delineating
inherently governmental from commercial activities in the federal government, each
service was responsible for identifying their core functions. Through 2003, progress had
been varied and limited across each service (GAO 2003a, 2). By 2003, the Army and Air
Force had made the most progress in identifying core and non-core functions, while the
Navy and Marine Corps were at the early stages of determining core functions (GAO
2003a, 3).
There was no oversight authority to compare similar activities across the DoD and
challenge the core nature of activities categorized in each service. Thus, the possibility of
two similar functions being characterized as both core and non-core by different services
existed, based on service independence in defining the nature of the function in relation
to its mission. Computer network management and operations was one of those functions
treated as a core capability by the Air Force and Army and as a non-core capability by the
Navy and Marines.
In the Air Force and Army, the network was considered an integral part (core
function) of the service mission. Air Force and Army personnel deployed to forward
bases in support of wartime activities while a growing amount of wartime operational
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support was being provided from CONUS locations as well. During Operation Enduring
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the primary Air Force network supporting deployed
organizations in the Mid-East was operating from a state-side location (Gilligan 2008).
Installation networks provided an integral communications medium to support Air Force
and Army wartime activities. Whereas in the Navy, the land-based network was
considered a garrison, support resource (non-core). Its core functions were associated
with its expeditionary, forward-deployed activities embodied in its fleet (Barnett 2007,
28-30).
Defining IT networks as a utility or weapon system was directly linked to whether
the activity was considered a core or non-core activity. Utility systems (non-core) refer
to a distribution system and infrastructure, such as an IT network, that connects an
installation with the commodity supplier (Renshaw 2002, 2). The purpose of
categorizing a commodity as a utility and outsourcing the entity was to allow defense
components to focus on core defense missions and functions by relieving them of
management activities that could be done more efficiently and effectively by others
(Renshaw 2002, 2). The Navy, independent of the DoD and Congress, decided that their
shore-based IT would be considered a commodity based on its support mission. It
exemplified how some leading organizations in the private sector treated IT, while being
a benchmark for the military services and the ease of establishing utility contracts in the
DoD without congressional oversight.
In comparison, IT networks defined as weapon systems were considered core
activities and integral to the mission. Outsourcing was limited and in-house resources
maintained ownership while controlling the operations and management of the network.
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As noted above, the distinction was controlled at each service, where core and non-core
activities were broadly defined and usually determined subjectively. The cost to
outsource an IT network for a military service over a period of several years was
estimated to be in the billions of dollars, and would require congressional oversight and
approval.

EARLY NETWORK DEVELOPMENT IN THE SERVICES

As noted above, with the growth of IT during the 1990s, each of the services found
themselves operating within a fragmented IT environment, where IT infrastructure within
each service resembled a patchwork architecture based on local area networks created at
the lowest levels of the organization. It was not uncommon for IT to develop in this
manner, as service organizations had traditionally operated within a relatively
decentralized command structure. The DoD did not centrally manage the development of
IT-based capabilities within the department, allowing each of the services to determine
how to implement IT into their daily processes and missions. Based on service
parochialism, each took a separate approach in developing their IT infrastructures.
Initially, upon the inception of IT capabilities in the DoD and the emerging IT
revolution, the decentralized nature of how IT was being managed and procured at the
local organization level did not contribute to the full integration and sharing of
information within each service or across a joint DoD effort (Wait 2002b, 3). It proved
problematic in accomplishing the long-range goal of a homogeneous network and
fulfillment of the JCS vision. A homogeneous network across the DoD required a
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standardized network infrastructure to integrate organizations and support operations
within and across each of the services.

Navy
The Navy’s decentralized approach to IT infrastructure was based on local
organizations seeking IT to support their daily missions. Local organizations developed
their own capabilities and ultimately created an infrastructure of diverse networks and
computer software programs across the Navy. In the late 1990s, the Navy had 28 separate
commands that budgeted and managed their own IT systems, where each command had
an IT support staff (Jordan 2007, 2). The Navy’s IT network infrastructure was based on
decisions at local bases and commands as compared to a DoD or Navy-led enterprise
design. The Navy’s enterprise network was constructed through a patchwork of legacy
systems created to meet unique functional requirements with a relatively narrow scope,
without integration or interoperability interests (Onley and Wait 2005b, 3). The
Department of the Navy (DoN) had little to no central control, accountability or visibility
within the departments multiple networks (Porter 2008).
The Navy accumulated legacy applications at a staggering rate. Each organization
wanted their own computer infrastructure and applications based upon the subjective
interests of unit leadership. This led to an IT environment marked by an uneven
distribution of IT resources across organizations. Some commands would see the
benefits of IT and had sophisticated networks while others were starved for technology
(Porter 2008). For example, the Navy’s Sea Systems Command and Air Systems
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Command saw the importance of IT for their engineering requirements and created
sophisticated networks and capabilities, while fleet commands spent less on IT. IT
decision making at the lowest levels led to a disparity in capability, with no minimum
standard requirement across Navy organizations (Porter 2008). Organizations developed
and maintained their IT networks subjectively, with computer knowledgeable employees
handpicked by leadership. There was an unequal and insufficient amount of technical
manpower dedicated to daily IT support and development across Navy organizations. An
IT manpower plan to support the growth of a homogenous and standardized network did
not exist. IT manpower expertise was limited. The Navy used seamen from a variety of
disciplines who were between sea tours to support their shore-based IT missions (Porter
2008; Wait 2002b, 3).
By the late 1990s, the Navy’s shore establishment had almost 1,000 diverse
networks operated and maintained by separate organizations. The legacy systems were
not designed, in most cases, to integrate with other legacy systems. This created e-mail
distribution problems, inadequate collaboration capabilities across naval and marine
organizations, and reach-back limitations for forward-deployed forces, affecting for
example, responsive logistical support (Jordan 2007, 2).
The Navy also lacked an objective mechanism to ensure compliance with computer
security or other network requirements because each command was both the provider and
the oversight authority for its own IT network (Onley and Wait 2005b, 3). The IT
environment that was defined by unique legacy systems developed across Navy
organizations, without a centralized plan or common architecture, and led to increased
opportunities for security breaches and malicious intruders seeking to exploit Navy
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networks and their users. In 2001, the Navy experienced as many as 16,000 attempts to
access their networks, of which 400 gained entry and 40 traveled the networks (Munns
2003).
In summary, during the mid-to-late 1990s, the Navy did not have much control over
the development of its shore-base network. The service had an uneven growth of
networks developed without a standard set of service guidelines at local organizations.
Security parameters were designed locally, resulting in an increase level of network
breaches and intrusions. Navy leadership lacked visibility into the amount being spent at
each organization for their network management and security. The ability to transition
their in-house infrastructure to a secure, homogeneous network, accessible across all
Navy organizations and using in-house resources appeared extremely remote, if not
impossible (Porter 2008).

Air Force
The Air Force and Army faced similar issues as the Navy, in the 1990s, with the
loss of overall control of their network infrastructure development due to the growth of
heterogeneous networks, across each service and managed at local installations. The
results produced a wide variety of legacy systems and software procurements, creating
disparate networks with large integration and interoperability challenges. In 1998, senior
Air Force IT officials detailed the service’s shortcomings in developing networks needed
for the Air Force’s mission in the future.
Lt. General William Donahue, the Air Force director of communications, noted that
the Air Force was doing more damage to itself than hackers through a lack of standards
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and professionalism in its network development (Brewin and Verton 1998, 1). John
Gilligan, the Air Force Chief Information Officer from 2001 to 2005, noted the Air
Force’s problem with the large number of independent technical communities developing
their own unique IT systems and networks within the service. Many bases had multiple
wide-area and local-area networks supporting connectivity requirements for specific,
independent organizations (Gilligan, 2008). Application and infrastructure programs
were not well-integrated nor was there a mechanism to integrate these programs (Brewin
and Verton 1998, 2).

Army
The Army moved at a slow pace in accepting the network-centric approach to
warfare (Slabodkin 1998, 1). Through 2001, the Army IT function was decentralized,
with each of its major commands having ownership and authority to develop an IT
infrastructure that met their own local organizational requirements. IT was funded
separately through each command, similar to the Air Force and Navy organization
structures, while outsourcing actions were based on local organization interests. Though
Army leadership espoused the importance of IT for its future mission effectiveness, the
Army had not yet embraced the role network technology would play in their traditional
war fighting missions.
The Army was not spared from similar problems faced by the Navy and Air Force,
such as locally configured networks and hundreds of legacy applications without a
standard architecture. Kevin Carroll, the program executive officer of the Army’s
Enterprise Information Systems noted that controlling applications and creating an
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enterprise software solution was an Army priority, as it had 925 logistics systems and 330
personnel systems across the service (Wakeman 2002, 1).

OUTSOURCING THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS NETWORK

In 1999, the Navy decided to consider private contractors to develop and manage its
shore-based network infrastructure and shift from being an in-house engineered and
managed system to a procured service. As noted by Dan Porter, the Navy Chief
Information Officer (CIO) during this period, outsourcing was not an automatic choice
but rather one reached through a meticulous process where senior leaders from across the
Navy discussed IT, network infrastructure objectives and how best to operationalize their
objectives (Porter 2008). In-house efforts for network management of shore based
missions were not, however, insignificant.

In-House Efforts at Network Management in the Department of the Navy
Navy - Prior to concluding that private actors were the primary choice to develop
and operate a service wide network, the Navy had developed an in-house network
infrastructure plan, while the Marine Corps had already developed a service-wide
network integrating its organizations both at shore-based and deployed locations. The
Navy led all services in the move to networks through its Information Technology for the
21st Century (IT-21) project (Brewin 1997, 1–2). Conceived by Admiral Archie Clemins,
then Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, IT-21 defined a standard networked
computing environment based on commercial technology for its ashore and afloat units
(Brewin 1997, 2). IT-21 focused on equipping its Atlantic and Pacific fleets’ facilities on
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ships and ashore with network capabilities, while its shore-based infrastructure would be
supported under a separate but concurrent project (Slabodkin 1997).
Rear Admiral John A. Gauss, Commander of the Space and Naval Warfare Systems
Command (SPAWAR), was charged with development of the Navy’s intranet when
taking command in March 1998 (Brewin 1998a, 2; Brewin 1999, 1). He wanted the Navy
to own its voice, video and data networks (Murray 2000b, 3). His network architecture
was based on a series of local area networks linked into larger metropolitan-area network
where the network was considered a utility (Brewin 1998c, 1). The network procurement
was initially known as the Navy-Wide Intranet, and Gauss wanted his command to
charge the rest of the department to use the network through a fee-for-service
arrangement (Murray 2000b, 3).
Both Rear Admiral Gauss and Admiral Clemens initially expected the Navy to
build and own its intranet, based on its IT-21 and shore-based modernization program to
encompass all of the Navy missions through the Navy’s SPAWAR (Murray 1999a, 1).
While Admiral Clemens did not initially envision an NMCI-like contract, over time, as
senior Navy leaders discussed their options to develop and sustain a secure and
homogenous network architecture across the Navy enterprise, outsourcing the IT service
became the clear choice (Porter 2008). Navy budget and manpower limitations combined
with an organization and funding structure that gave lower organizations a primary role
in IT decision making, and questioned the ability of a successful in-house approach for
providing and sustaining the desired DoN network goals of a secure and homogeneous
enterprise-wide network (Murray 1999a, 2; Porter 2008).
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Marine Corps - In February 1999, prior to the Navy decision to incorporate the
Marine Corps into a new network project, the Marine Corps kicked off an 18-month $226
million project to develop worldwide, high-speed networks and a new approach to
delivering and managing network services through its Marine Corps Enterprise Network
(MCEN) (Verton 1999d, 1). The MCEN was a global plan to upgrade base
telecommunications, network infrastructure and a new regional services concept that
would establish eight networked self-contained intranets (Verton 1999d, 1). Debra
Filippi, deputy chief information officer for the Marine Corps during this period, noted
that the service developed its strategy in harmony with the Navy by embracing the
Navy’s IT-21 standards, which provided a common computing environment based on
commercial products for Navy systems on ships and on shore (Brewin 1998d, 1). By
2001, the Marine Corps was well ahead of the Navy in developing a standardized
network across their internal organizations. The MCEN was operational and the Marines
had merged their garrison and tactical command, control, communications, computers
and intelligence systems to integrate communications across their support and operational
units (Murray 2000b, 4).

The Navy’s Pre-NMCI IT Environment
Prior to Dan Porter becoming the Navy CIO, the Navy began a process to design an
integrated IT network across the Navy enterprise as if it was designing it from start-up
with seventy of its smartest engineers and technologists (Porter 2008). Upon becoming
the Navy CIO, Dan Porter noted how the working group’s vision and design for a
homogenous Navy IT network, accounting for the growth of both network and Internet
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technology, had created excitement and interest with the Secretary of the Navy and other
senior leaders (Porter 2008). Though the Navy’s future IT network had a vision and
design, it did not have an operational implementation plan.
The Navy established a working group of 75 to 150 senior executive civilians and
flag (general) officers to look at operationalizing and implementing this enterprise-wide
network at the earliest possible date (Porter 2008). The group was led by Admiral Archie
Clemens, the Pacific Fleet Commander, who saw the importance of IT to the Department
of the Navy and was the key driver in establishing the Navy’s IT-21 program for
outfitting the Navy’s fleet with technology. He was joined by other key Navy leaders to
include the CIO Dan Porter, Assistant Secretary for Research, Development and
Acquisition H. Lee Buchanan III, and the Assistant Secretary for Financial Management
Charles Nemfakos to create an operational plan (Porter 2008). Over the course of one
year, the group met periodically, examining issues such as how to get the infrastructure
established, who should do it, and how to manage manpower and costs (Porter, 2008).
From a manpower perspective, the Navy had a workforce that performed IT
functions, but senior leaders were concerned they did not have the right balance of
expertise to develop and sustain their envisioned network. The cost constraints appeared
to be the central factor in the leadership decision to outsource their network. The cost of
establishing the envisioned enterprise network appeared to be approximately $1–2
billion. The Navy decision to outsource the network was less about the private sector
being able to do the job cheaper, but more closely aligned to a lack of funding. The Navy
had not programmed for an enterprise network, leaving organizations to use operations
and maintenance and base operating funds to pay for their IT capability (Porter 2008).
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Also, given how the Navy’s patchwork, legacy-based network infrastructure was
developed and managed in a decentralized environment, Navy leaders did not think they
could establish their new network solution through an in-house implementation (Porter
2008). As noted above, there was an uneven implementation of network architecture
across Navy organizations with little probability of changing to an in-house
implementation, no matter how articulate the new network plan was conveyed. Funding
for the network was through local dollars, where leaders subjectively weighed network
requirements against their functional mission, that was always going to be a higher
priority than the network (Porter 2008).
Navy leadership began to see outsourcing as a more realistic option, especially
considering their interest in having the network created immediately under one design,
with one provider accountable for maximum performance at the desktop across the Navy
enterprise. Using a contract mechanism that treated IT as a utility, the Navy would buy
IT as a service, similar to energy and water. In 1997, the DoD launched its utility
privatization initiative (DRID No. 9) (Renshaw 2002, 1).
Utility privatization is the sale of government-owned on-base utility distribution
systems to a private entity that will operate the systems and provide utility services to the
base’s buildings and activities (Renshaw 2002, 2). The contractor buys the systems and
is responsible for their operation and maintenance(Renshaw 2002, 2). Using this
approach, the Navy didn’t need up-front funding to build a network, as it would be
bought and provided for by a contractor who would lease their IT infrastructure service to
the Navy (Porter 2008). Though this contractual approach for buying utilities had never
before been utilized in the government for purchasing IT, Navy leadership believed there
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was no reason to consider IT any different than existing utilities used daily for conducting
business.
In the private sector, interest in IT outsourcing largely resulted from a shift in
business strategy in which companies abandoned diversification strategies to focus on
core competencies (Lacity, Willcocks, and Feeny 1996, 13). The Information Systems
(IS) function was considered by IT directors, such as Henry Pfendt at Kodak and Elliot
McNeil at Southland, as a commodity service that was best managed by a large supplier
(Laity and Hirschheim 1993, 73). Many leaders in the commercial IS arena began to view
technology as a non-core commodity or utility as compared to a system offering a
business advantage. In the private sector, efforts at harnessing IS as a competitive
weapon shifted to providing IS services at the lowest possible cost (Laity and Hirschheim
1993, 74). Utility services were more efficiently acquired through specialized vendors
who could achieve economies of scale, allowing executives to focus on nurturing their
company’s core competencies (Laity and Hirschheim 1993, 74).

The NMCI Project
Navy leadership did not consider its shore networks as a core part of the their war
fighting mission, but as a utility, similar to the private sector categorization of IT
networks, giving the department the ability to compare and leverage capabilities with
private sector IT experts (Munns 2003).73 The Navy decision to consider outsourcing its

73

The Naval shore establishment includes facilities and activities for repairing machinery, electronics,
ships, and aircraft; providing communications capabilities, training, intelligence, meteorological support
and medical support; storing repair parts, fuel, and munitions. It consists of the Naval Sea Systems
Command (which includes shipyards), Naval Air systems Command (which includes aviation depots),
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, Navy Personnel Command, Naval Education and Training
Command, and the Office of Naval Intelligence (GAO 2006a, 7).
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network infrastructure operations, central to facilitating communication across all
organizations of the service, was groundbreaking, as nothing of this magnitude or
significance had ever been initiated within the DoD. Warren Suss, a telecommunication
consultant, described the structure of the Naval Intranet as an enormous change for the
Navy. The massive scale of the project would present potential bidders with challenges
they have rarely encountered before in the federal arena (Brewin and Verton 1999).
The NMCI system aimed to encompass the Navy’s Information Technology for the
21st Century Project and the Marine Corps Enterprise Network to achieve an end-to-end
capability across the department for both shore-based and afloat units (Brewin and
Verton 1999). The NMCI system would consist of a single, secure, enterprise-wide
network to support the Naval and Marine Corps shore establishments and tie them to the
forces at sea by interfacing with the at-sea network. The initial plan was to link 360,000
onshore desktops into one seamless and secure intranet, sharing voice, video and data
systems (Jordan 2007, 1). The NMCI would replace more than 1,000 diverse legacy
networks of the Navy and Marines across 28 separate commands, and eliminate local
control of networks.
The Navy initiated the NMCI project in 1999 and the contract was awarded to EDS
on October 6, 2000, valued at $9.9 billion, including a seven year base and three year
option that was exercised in March 2006 (Jordan 2007, 3; Perera 2009, 1). It was one of
the largest desktop outsourcing, seat, contracts ever carried out, and the largest federal IT
contract ever awarded (Jordan 2007, 3). With NMCI, the Navy gave EDS a mandate to
supply IT services to 700,000 onshore users, mostly in the United States (Perera 2009, 1).

GAO. 2006b. Information Technology: DoD Needs to Ensure That Navy Marine Corps Intranet Program is
Meeting Goals and Satisfying Customers: GAO.
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EDS was responsible for managing and operating the system, which included providing
all IT hardware and software, operations, training, maintenance, and systems upgrades,
while the Navy was charged a fixed monthly price per desktop system (seat) throughout
the life of the contract, consistent with EDS meeting specified service levels (Jordan
2007, 3).

THE AIR FORCE AND ARMY NETWORK MANAGEMENT APPROACH

Air Force
The development and management of IT in the Air Force paralleled how the Air
Force organization structure evolved, where the primary focus of responsibility was
centered at the HQ Air Force level, as opposed to the Navy where lower level
organizations were responsible for their IT capability and service (Gilligan 2008).
Initially, through the 1980s and early 1990s the Air Force wing level of organization
(lower level) had much autonomy and was the center of power for outsourcing and A-76
competitive sourcing actions (Gilligan 2008). As the nature of how the Air Force
executed its war fighting mission changed with the introduction of the Air Expeditionary
Force concept for deploying forces, the focus on the wing as the primary source of power
shifted to the base, then to the command, and finally to the HQ Air Force level, due to the
priority placed on standardizing and rotating war fighting units and resources, to include
IT, in the war zone and across the Air Force enterprise. IT evolved into an essential plugand-play capability, where the war fighter, regardless of unit, could bring their computers
to a deployed environment and have instant network capability (Gilligan 2008).
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Air Force leaders recognized that their IT network would be a central element in the
service’s evolving war fighting mission and defined it as a core capability. The
characterization of the network by Air Force leaders provided a fundamental difference in
the nature and extent of network outsourcing, as compared to the Navy. The Navy
characterized its shore-based network as a utility, where it attempted to buy IT services in
the same way it bought energy products. The Air Force characterized its network as a
weapon system, core to its mission. The Air Force CIO, Mr. John Gilligan noted that in
defining IT as a weapon system, Air Force leaders were trying to set an expectation of
rigger/discipline for managing IT, as with a weapon system, and that the network was
part of the war fighting effort, as well (Gilligan 2008).
The Air Force justified the core nature of their network based on their mission,
which called for personnel to use a common network for both deployed and home base
operations. In order to allow deployed service personnel to connect to other military
agencies and organizations in support of the wartime mission and their home base
network, the Air Force saw the need to treat their servers as a weapon systems and certify
and manage them centrally while retaining blue-suit or uniformed (in-house) positions in
communications and network operations (Murray 2002, 1; Temin 2002a).
The distinction between the two networks is significant, as the Navy network was
characterized as a commercial entity having the opportunity for IT competitive sourcing.
As noted earlier, the Navy’s essence was fundamentally captured in an expeditionary,
forward-deployed culture that was central to defining its wartime missions, as opposed to
shore-based activities central to the NMCI. The Air Force network was as an inherently
governmental function with limited outsourcing potential. By controlling the
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development of its network infrastructure, Air Force leadership maintained a multibillion-dollar IT budget and skilled personnel with the technical capability to build and
maintain its network infrastructure worldwide.
Air Force officials noted that they were unlikely to outsource many of the blue-suit
and uniformed positions in communications and network operations because of how
critical they were to war fighting (Temin 2002a). While Navy communications
personnel, deployed at sea, were critical to the war fighting mission, many shore-based
communication facilities were manned, in part, by non-IT type sailors who were between
sea rotations, due to the indirect role of shore based missions to the Navy war fighting
effort (Porter 2008).
Senior leaders across the Air Force shared a similar message in describing the vital
nature of networks in supporting the Air Force mission. In 2000, USAF Lt. General
Harry Raduege Jr., director of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), who
managed the National Communications System, suggested that IT networks were
weapons providing command and control and information, an intrinsic element to
winning wars (Walker 2000a, 1). USAF Brig. General Bernie Skoch, principle director
of DoD network services for DISA under General Raduege, underscored the importance
of networks as the lifeblood of the military, similar to supply lines, air bridges and
shipping lanes (Walker 2000a, 5).
An NMCI type network infrastructure and service was not appealing to Air Force
leaders. In December 2000, General Patrick Gamble, Commander of Pacific Air Forces
noted that despite being a topic of interest among fellow four-star generals, the Air Force
rejected a service-wide procurement of desktop outsourcing (seat management) because it
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could compromise combat capabilities (Murray and Seffers 2001, 1). Colonel William
Cooper, the Air Force director of missions, noted that the Air Force had not come close to
considering an NMCI approach since the Air Force relies too much on fixed stations, as a
whole, to perform its mission (Murray and Seffers 2001, 1). In 2001, Colonel John W.
Maluda, director of communication and information for U.S. Air Forces in Europe,
identified IT as being at the heart of information superiority and reiterated the Air Force
position of managing its IT infrastructure as a weapon (Freeman and Suddarth 2004,
214). The Air Force established and controlled its service-wide network using a
combination of in-house and contracted resources.
The Air Force was receptive to some IT outsourcing so it could use its uniformed
and government civilian IT personnel in network-centric war fighting positions, both in
the U.S. and abroad. However, its primary objective when initiating a consolidated
network approach in 2000 was to retain control of its in-house network capability and
related IT personnel experience.

Army
Network and information technology had their roots in the Army at the local level
supporting primary missions with no central governance authority. During the mid-tolate 1990s, IT outsourcing became more prominent throughout the Army based in part on
local units being decision-makers for A-76 activities and IT not being considered part of
the Army’s traditional conventional wartime activities. Organizations increased their A76 activity and subjectively considered activities such as IT and other support functions
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for competitive sourcing and contracting. IT activities did not compare equally with
operational activities such as infantry, armor and artillery.
James Buckner, Materiel Command’s Chief Information Officer, noted that many
organizations in his command had begun plans to outsource PC operations as the
command was deciding on an additional 57,000 desktop PCs to outsource (Murray
2000a, 1). Coinciding with plans to outsource PC operations were A-76 reviews at 62
Materiel Command locations to determine whether 2,000 civilian jobs in the information
management area could be outsourced leading to addition desktop PC contracting
decisions (Murray 2000a, 1).
In 2001, as technology became a key enabler in the Army war fighting effort, senior
Army leaders set upon a strategy to centralize their IT management and create a
governance structure for its network, similar to the approach taken by the Air Force
(Onley 2001a, 1). The Army’s Chief Information Officer (CIO), Lt. General Peter
Cuviello, noted how the Army was getting all of its leaders to understand that there was
only one enterprise responsible for Army IT (Onley 2002b, 1). The Army centralized its
systems management at about two dozen major commands under the CIO’s office (Onley
2001b, 1). The Army’s IT transformation was driven in part by Navy’s NMCI, as leaders
recognized the need for modernization and an enterprise approach to IT from the top to
the bottom of the Army organization (Onley 2001a, 2).
Unlike the Navy, where the EDS contractor developed and standardized the NMCI
infrastructure, the Army, like the Air Force managed its IT transformation in-house,
beginning with a consolidation of its systems into a single service-wide enterprise. The
Army did not see the benefit of creating and outsourcing an NMCI-type system. In 2002,
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when asked whether the Army would follow a similar path as the Navy, Carroll noted
that they were not ready to outsource their entire infrastructure (Wakeman 2002, 1).
Carroll suggested that a combination of fear of being tied to one prime contract, losing
the benefits of competition, and the Army’s belief that IT was a core function to support
its missions were factors that made the Army hesitant to follow the NMCI model
(Wakeman 2002, 1). The evolving development of IT and networks and increasing
significance and integration in mission execution was central to networks being
considered a core capability. Similar to the Air Force, the Army installation network was
integral to global activities and its wartime missions.
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CHAPTER TEN

ANALYSIS OF SERVICE IT NETWORK MANAGEMENT
The disparity between the Navy, Air Force and Army in establishing their network
infrastructures is considerable despite the commonality of the network and the need for
each service to have interoperability in support of war fighting missions, per the JCS
vision. As discussed in Chapter Nine, IT implementation was initially decentralized to
local organizations that created several competing network architectures with disparate
software and security problems. Yet, service leaders recognized the need for a
homogeneous network in their respective organizations and took different paths towards
that objective.
This chapter evaluates the effectiveness of each of the three frameworks in
explaining the outsourcing behavior of each service towards their network infrastructure
management and development. Understanding why the Navy chose to launch the largest
network outsourcing effort in DoD history compared to the Air Force and Army approach
of maintaining control of their network capabilities offers further insight into explaining
the DoD outsourcing phenomenon over the past few decades, and why contractors have
been incorporated into service missions and its impact on public interests. While this
chapter evaluates the methods that services used to provide IT network capabilities, the
overall findings point to the importance of organization factors in explaining outsourcing
behavior and actions. In each service, outsourcing decisions were based on factors that
included whether the network was a core capability and integral to an organization’s
primary mission, budget, budget authority, and the extent of in-house expertise.
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STRATEGIC EFFICIENCY

In this section, strategic efficiency will be evaluated to determine its significance in
explaining NMCI outsourcing by testing the hypothesis that DoD leaders are motivated to
maximize mission effectiveness by getting the greatest value possible from military, DoD
civilian or private contractors at the most competitive cost. I’ll provide empirical
evidence to support or refute the hypothesis. Within the private sector, in the early part of
the IT boom in the late 1980s and early 1990s, many practitioners, academics, and
consultants advised executives to outsource information systems (IS) services where
expected savings ranged from 10 to 50 percent off their IT expenditures (Laity and
Hirschheim 1993, 73). Noting the effects of IS outsourcing in the healthcare industry,
outsourcing vendors took over all information systems functions, similar to an outside
company managing a food service or laundry (Laity and Hirschheim 1993, 73).
At work in this framework is a cost advantage calculation constantly evaluating
where efficiencies can be found. They will attempt to get the greatest possible IT
benefits at a competitive cost. Outsourcing can be a viable DOD strategy when the cost
of having a contractor perform an activity is less than the cost of having an in-house
resource perform the same activity. Yet, its usefulness is also affected by the type of
transaction/outsourcing activity and whether its potential hazards can be mitigated within
the private sector. The initial assumption is that service leaders are rational and they seek
to reduce their costs and maximize the potential from both public and private resources to
accomplish their objectives. Yet, because of their bounded rationality, all complex
transactions are unavoidably incomplete and parties will need to adapt to unanticipated
disturbances that arise by reason of gaps, errors and omissions in the original contract
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(Williamson 2002, 174). As noted by Williamson, replicating public administration of
defense related activities by a private firm will not be successful (Williamson 1999, 332).
Implicit in a strategic efficiency explanation of outsourcing is that private actors can
perform public services equally good or better than public employees at a competitive
cost. We can expect to see the service leaders seeking private sector means to provide
the network services when the government cost of providing each desktop service
increases as compared to private sector costs performing a similar function. While an
organization may have marginal financial gain and newer resources from outsourcing a
particular capability or service, the gains are counterbalanced by any increased risk that
occurs as a result of contracting an activity. The theory predicts that the services will
outsource their network/intranet capabilities when they can save money and continue to
meet mission objectives. Inefficiencies resulting from assumed risk and transaction
costs hazards did not appear to be measured in the organizations competitive sourcing
decision making process.

Navy
In this framework we expect to see the Navy utilizing a rational process and cost
advantage calculation to quantify costs for its network capabilities, and determine
whether costs for outsourcing are comparatively better than providing the service inhouse. Strategic efficiency suggests that if the cost analysis of providing the NMCI
service through the private sector provides a lesser degree of savings than comparable inhouse resources, there is less likelihood of the private sector being chosen as compared to
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a greater degree of savings where the private sector is likely to be offered a contract for
service.
Strategic efficiency does not appear useful in explaining the Navy’s NMCI
outsourcing process effort for its shore based network, as cost efficiencies through
consolidation were not realized and the overall risk to the Navy was arguably greater than
the benefit. The complex nature of the transaction led to disturbances and inefficiencies
arising from gaps, errors and omissions in the analysis and ex post governance of the
contract. The Navy evaluated single and multi-vendor approaches through six months of
market research and determined a single point of contact (whether it be in-house
organization or vendor) for accountability and responsibility was critical to network
viability and cost-effective. Centralized control through a single point of contact was
achievable through in-house resources, as demonstrated in the Air Force. However, the
Navy environment proved more challenging and difficult. Due to the limited role of the
CIO to direct and enforce change and the cost burden to lower echelon organizations for
making network changes, it was unlikely that an in-house solution would be effective.
Units had great latitude in IT purchasing decisions, while enforcement of how units spent
their budgets was not practical or effective as demonstrated in earlier A-76 competitive
sourcing activities. In addition, The DoN had not programmed or allocated additional
financial resources to create an enterprise network (Porter, 2008).
Outsourcing the Navy and Marine Corps computer networks into a centrally
managed, single, secure, enterprise-wide service was not as cost efficient as some had
expected. Financially, while it appeared negligible that NMCI was a better dollar value
than an in-house solution, the overall cost to the Navy for their NMCI network
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architecture was greater. In a 2002 study conducted by Booz Allen Hamilton, the
average cost per desktop computer system before NMCI was $3,545 per year, while the
cost of an average NMCI desktop computer system was $4,179 per year (Dorobek
2002).74 While the NMCI cost was 18 percent more, the NMCI computer system cost
included capabilities not available in the pre-NMCI network environment, including
interoperability, regular technology refresh and compliance with security upgrades
standardized across the network (Dorobek 2002). When taking these costs into account
in the pre-NMCI environment, desktop computer system costs increased to $4,286, two
percent more than the NMCI computer system cost (Dorobek 2001). This appeared to be
an insignificant amount of savings to be a factor in choosing a private actor to implement
NMCI and outsource the network operations and support activities.
In addition, while the difference in cost for computer systems appeared negligible,
the NMCI customer support environment appeared more costly than the pre-NMCI
environment. In the NMCI environment, Navy network users were charged for customer
support (Porter 2008). EDS offered a menu of customer support options where
organizations paid for a particular level of support. These costs did not appear to be
factored into the computer system cost. In the pre-NMCI network environment, customer
support was integrated into the services provided by in-house personnel.
Funding for legacy computer systems from the pre-NMCI environment that were
required in combination with NMCI, due to technical difficulties with merging the
systems, was an additional cost not included in the NMCI contract or competitive
sourcing costs. These costs ran into the tens of millions of dollars. Other costs difficult
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Desktop computer system costs included all software, security, network management and customer
support.
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to quantify included project management risks. The DoD had minimal experience with
this type of desktop system outsourcing arrangement. It had never been tried or tested by
the DoD and the initiative did not fit into the standard DoD acquisition program oversight
format (Dorobek 2002, 2). Scheduled delays were likely and produced increased costs
that were not factored into cost-effectiveness comparisons.
Finally, in looking at DoD utility privatization, in general, privatization programs
generally increased military utility costs well above historical levels because the program
leverages private sector capital to achieve utility system improvements (GAO 2005a, 34).
To pay for these improvements over time, the GAO suggests that DoD’s funding
obligations are likely to increase, not decrease, by hundreds of millions of dollars, and
that operations and maintenance budgets will need to be adjusted as necessary (GAO
2005a, 34).
The 2002 GAO review of six agencies using desktop computer system
management approaches for their IT management (not including DoD) indicated that
agencies did not perform sufficient up front analyses of the baseline and projected costs
and benefits, similar to the pattern set by the Navy’s NMCI actions (GAO 2002a, 3).
This resulted in agencies being unable to determine whether they were achieving
expected costs and benefits.
The Navy had a limited approach to establishing a baseline of productivity for
internal services before making the final sourcing decision (GAO 2003b, 36). For its
baseline, it performed an analysis at sample representative locations and relied upon their
Year 2000 inventory without including an assessment of the DoN’s vast amount of
diverse legacy applications (GAO 2003b, 36). The Navy determined that it had
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substantially underestimated its legacy applications from an initial projection of a few
thousand to at least 100,000 (Jordan 2007, 6). This contributed to increased costs and an
extra year to the transition process expanding from 2.5 to 3.5 years (GAO 2003b, 36;
Jordan 2007, 6). The exclusion of tens of thousands of legacy systems from the DoN’s
decision making process was an indication of a more general pattern of missed technical
requirements when choosing to outsource and award the network contract (Jordan 2007,
2).
The Navy also accepted a level of risk in its NMCI decision that appeared much
greater than the potential benefits. 75 Initially, risk was increased with the Navy’s
inconsistencies in its competitive sourcing approach. Navy decision-makers never fully
understood the magnitude of the effort required to carry out implementation of NMCI
(Jordan 2007, 6). The GAO concluded in their 2000 report on NMCI that the Navy
developed and issued its request for proposals without developing a formal analysis of
program alternatives nor completing a business case analysis to determine an appropriate
acquisition strategy for the intranet (Li, Brock 2000, 2–3).
The Navy’s financial plan for funding the network leasing arrangements proved
shortsighted and incomplete. Congress was not pleased with the Navy’s decision to use
utility privatization for its IT network without getting congressional approval. Congress
also received conflicting, vague and unsupportable funding data on the NMCI program
that put the program at risk (HOR 2001b, 296). The cost of the system ranged from $6.9
billion to $16 billion over 10 years and the DoN’s plan to redirect operations and
maintenance funds from both the Navy and Marine Corps, already earmarked for other IT
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It’s argued that increased risk could translate to increased costs if problems or delays resulted from the
risk factors. Thus, the greater the amount of risk, the greater the potential cost for the service.
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systems, was unacceptable to Congress. It was not a stable funding source considering
the growth of legacy systems and the incomplete nature of identifying all requirements to
support the vast network with at least 350,000 users.
Program management added an additional layer of risk, as the Navy appeared most
interested in appeasing DoN organization leaders when establishing the NMCI
management. The Navy created multiple leadership roles split between seven entities
across the Navy and Marines that were in opposition to documented best practices from
the private sector, which stressed the utilization of a single program office and manager
able to direct actions across the entire agency (Rozier 2002). Due to the relatively short
life cycle of IT, the large and diverse leadership structure introduced an increased
element of risk when making timely decisions and actions regarding ongoing
configuration management and IT upgrades to meet contracts service level agreements
was problematic. IT was more efficient under a single leader and Congress directed the
Navy to establish an NMCI directors office in February 2002 (GAO 2003b, 41).
Finally, the scope of the NMCI system invited considerable risk for the Navy. The
transaction hazards were considerable and appeared to outweigh any efficiency that
would be gained from utilizing the private sector. The system was the backbone of their
shore-based communication infrastructure, supporting 700,000 users (Perera 2009, 1).
The Navy was relying heavily on the system for facilitating daily communications across
the service among both support and operational units. Accepting the option to privatize
the system did not leave room for failure. The Navy did not have many options if the
contractor failed to perform satisfactorily.
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It was unclear as to the type of bargaining position the Navy had if the contractor
failed to perform, considering the contractor owned the network and was the only game
in town. In relation to treating IT as a utility, there were no clear procedures for how
military installations would regain ownership of privatized utility systems should that
ever become necessary (Renshaw 2002, 15). In the case of the NMCI, Navy activities
would be significantly degraded without network operations. Contractor default would
cause an unacceptable communications shortfall. The Navy would have to either pay a
significant financial bill to construct a new network architecture, attempt to purchase the
system back from the contractor, or institute legal actions to reacquire the system.
Dan Porter, CIO of the Navy, noted that the Navy Secretary, along with many Navy
leaders, were not focused on the most cost-effective way to produce and support NMCI.
They wanted a consolidated and secure network immediately. The main objective was to
do it right by using the best available resources to standardize operations across an
enterprise network as quickly as possible (Porter 2008).
In comparison to the private sector, efficiencies gained from outsourcing networks
appeared to be diminishing. In a 1997 survey by Deloitte and Touché of 1,500 CIOs in
the United States and Canada, 31 percent believed that their outsourcing generated
significant cost savings, while 69 percent where disappointed in their outsourcing results
because expected savings did not materialize when long-term contracts did not take into
account new organization requirements (Washington 1999, 197). Private sector case
studies and analysis demonstrated how IT executives began to realize that IT was not
homogeneous and could not be easily handed over to a vendor. IT usually compromised
a wide variety of activities and in many cases was felt across the processes of the entire
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organization, integrating product design, logistics, sales and customer service (Lacity,
Willcocks, and Feeny 1996, 16).76 Outsourcing IT was difficult because it wasn’t a
discreet entity and vendors did not always understand the implications that IT had on
other business processes (Lacity, Willcocks, and Feeny 1996, 16).

Air Force
The effectiveness of strategic efficiency in explaining the Air Force approach to IT
network outsourcing is examined by determining whether cost value influenced Air Force
decisions to retain or outsource its network capability. From a strategic efficiency
perspective, the biggest driver toward outsourcing DoD networks was the potential to
reduce labor cost while obtaining the expertise needed to maintain the systems. However
General Donahue, who directed Air Force communications during this period, argued
against potential efficiencies from the private sector.
In an effort to retain the in-house IT network capability contrary to the assumption
that government IT operations were more expensive and inefficient, General Donahue
challenged DoD officials to reconsider the decision to outsource and privatize IT
functions. He stressed the view that government employees were very effective at their
jobs and cost savings were not guaranteed with the private sector (Freeman and Suddarth
2004, 210–211). He argued that the private sector was actively recruiting military IT
professionals (Freeman and Suddarth 2004, 214). While there could be cost savings in
some areas of outsourcing IT, he noted there was no guarantee that private sector firms
76

Based on results of case studies by Mary C. Lacity, Leslie P. Willcocks and David F. Feeny, “The Value
of Selective IT Sourcing” Sloan Management Review, Spring 1996; and multiple-case analysis of fourteen
Fortune 500 service and manufacturing companies that faced outsourcing decisions in Mary C. Lacity and
Rudy Hirschheim, “The Information Systems Outsourcing Bandwagon” Sloan Management Review, Fall
1993.
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would offer greater IT expertise or do a better job (Freeman and Suddarth 2004, 214).
He suggested that the Air Force had no intention on simply outsourcing jobs on a onefor-one basis to replace a $50,000-a-year enlisted man with a $150,000-a-year contractor
(Brewin and Verton 1998, 2).
Donahue questioned why the DoD would pay contractors to provide the same
service for up to $150K per year when DoD paid $35K to $60K a year for its IT positions
(Freeman and Suddarth 2004, 210). Donahue’s figures did not factor in other costs
associated with government salaries. Yet, a 1997 RAND study of five DoD activities that
had been outsourced on actual costs of implementation versus expected cost cited during
the competition found that cost-savings, if attained, may not be as significant as expected
due to discrepancies in the competitive process having an adverse affect on the
government in-house bid (Freeman and Suddarth 2004, 210-211).77
Confirming the findings in the RAND study, Colonel David Schreck, former
Deputy Director of Communications and Information at the Air Force Space Command,
noted in 2002, “After several years following A-76 competitions and a blue-suit
reduction of 65 percent, savings are up to a third less than promised by vendors” (Temin
2002a). Results from previous outsourcing efforts of critical components through A-76
studies produced mixed results.
Considering the nature of the capability and its importance in providing a platform
for communication across the Air Force, the potential hazards and inefficiencies from
77

These factors included: 1. Civil service personnel transferred to a lower position due to A-76 actions do
not take a cut in pay. These costs are not included when evaluating the costs of contracting or when
calculating the savings generated by outsourcing 2. Contract costs increase over time as with the expansion
of the scope of work to be performed 3. Installations lacked personnel with experience in developing
performance work statements and in-house bids 4. During the competitive process, the contractor and the
government do not use the same labor schedules. The contractor uses the lowest local Department of Labor
(DoL) rates; the government is bound by the Federal Wage System that tends to exceed DoL rates
(Freeman and Suddarth 2004, 211).
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outsourcing IT were mitigated by retaining control of the network within the Air Force.
Strategic efficiency was useful in explaining some Air Force actions in relation to using
outsourcing to support aspects of its network operations. In 2003, the Air Force
established the Information Technology Commodity Council composed of IT leaders
from throughout the service. Their objective was to provide an enterprise approach to
managing Air Force IT objectives through common standards for system architecture and
IT purchasing (Tiboni 2003, 1). They were the primary source for determining where the
service spent IT money and the justification for purchases (Tiboni 2003, 1).
The Council helped to dismantle inefficiencies, throughout the service, stemming
from independent IT groups that had created local networks without a standard system
architecture resulting in interoperability, integration and security problems. In addition,
the Air Force established Network-Centric Solutions (Netcents) in 2004, a
comprehensive contract with four large vendors and four small businesses used to
purchase equipment and services for standardization and configuration management of
their IT communications infrastructure (GCN 2005, 5; Thormeyer 2006, 1). Netcents
offered the Council the ability to leverage its buying power on IT products and services.
The Council helped to increase the IT purchasing power of Air Force organizations by
more than 20 percent (Gaylord 2004). From the inception of the Council through 2005,
the Council saved the Air Force more than $34 million (Berube 2005). Outside of the
Council’s ability, in conjunction with Netcents, to leverage IT purchases for the Air
Force, strategic efficiency was limited in its ability to provide a useful framework to
explain the actions of the Air Force to retain in-house resource control and management
of its network capability.
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Army
The effectiveness of strategic efficiency in explaining the Army’s approach to
outsourcing its IT network is evaluated by examining the extent to which cost was a
factor in their decision making. The Army and Air Force had similar approaches to
managing their IT networks. In general, cost savings from contractors in past A-76
studies did not prove to be the financial windfall that Army officials expected. Prior
Army A-76 and outsourcing efforts produced mixed results that did not provide evidence
of clear cost savings or improved performance by using contractors (Allen 2001, 14).
Though the Army Enterprise Infostructure Transformation Program (AEIT) and
Army Small Computer Program (ASCP) were aimed at reducing costs of acquiring IT
solutions, cost savings did not appear to be a driver in the Army’s slow approach to
addressing and consolidating its heterogeneous network environment. The Army
maintained control of its network operations and consolidation efforts in-house through
the Network Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM). NETCOM was not
established to save money but to get soldiers back into units with active missions by
creating an enterprise approach to managing the network as opposed to diverse networks
(Caterinicchia 2002b, 2). Its decision to use contractors in network support positions was
primarily based on its lack of sophisticated technology and technical expertise as
compared to seeking cost savings.
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Summary of Findings
Navy - Strategic efficiency does not offer a useful explanation for Navy outsourcing
effort. Cost savings were not realized between pre-NMCI and NMCI desktop systems.
NMCI desktop systems were arguably more expensive due to the additional cost of
customer service. Costs related to pre-NMCI legacy systems and interfacing with NMCI
were not included in projected expenditures. There were also many areas of risk that
undermined conditions for a successful procurement, primarily a result of the Navy’s
attempt to complete the outsourcing process without meeting all procurement
requirements.
Finally, the Navy accepted a significant level of risk that appeared greater than
potential benefits for its privatized network. The transaction costs associated with
outsourcing NMCI were complex and significant. The market as a governance structure
to mitigate potential transaction hazards appeared questionable as the GAO found the
DoD monitoring and contract surveillance processes unsatisfactory. Accepting the
option to privatize the system did not leave room for failure, as the Navy did not have a
backup plan and its activities would be significantly degraded without network
operations. Without a backup and not owning the network infrastructure, the Navy had
little to no leverage with the contractor over the price to provide network operations and
services, especially after the initial lease arrangement expired.
Air Force - Strategic efficiency was not significant in the Air Force’s decision
making regarding whether or not to outsource their network infrastructure. The Air Force
maintained primary control of its network with in-house resources while utilizing
outsourcing for technical skill sets and areas of technical sophistication not available
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across the service. Strategic Efficiency offered a limited explanation for other Air Force
IT outsourcing decisions facilitated through the Air Force Commodity Council and
Netcents that gave leverage to Air Force purchasing power for both goods and services
providing greater value in return for their purchases.
Army - Similar to the Air Force, strategic efficiency was not a useful lens to explain
the Army’s outsourcing decision making for its network infrastructure. The Army
centralized its network operations under NETCOM, maintaining operational control of its
network assets while utilizing outsourcing for skill sets and technological sophistication
that were not available in the service. Strategic efficiency offered a limited explanation
for other Army IT outsourcing efforts facilitated through their AEIT and ASCP programs
that helped provide reduced costs when procuring IT goods and services.

POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

This section seeks to determine the extent to which political ideology was a factor
in explaining outsourcing decisions of network IT services. For each service, I’ll evaluate
the hypothesis that outsourcing of service network systems is a consequence of a
politically conservative Congress and President and provide empirical evidence to
support or refute the hypothesis. Based on the nature of the Executive and Congress from
the late 1990s through 2005, political ideology appears to be a useful explanation for
outsourcing activity.
The political environment surrounding the network infrastructure development in
each of the services consisted of a Republican Congress that was relatively friendly to
outsourcing. Examples include legislation (Clinger-Cohen Act and FAIR Act) that
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facilitated outsourcing efforts and the growth of competitive sourcing (A-76) activities in
the late 1990s, similar to the period of the Reagan administration.
The actions of the Clinton and G.W. Bush administrations appear to have
supported the neoliberal efforts. These actions included the Clinton administration’s
efforts at increased government efficiency through a reduction in government and an
increase of the private sector role throughout the federal government with its reinvention
efforts and the focus on competitive sourcing; and the A-76 program as a top priority in
the G.W. Bush Presidential Management Agenda. The outsourcing of government
services grew faster than outsourcing in any commercial segment between 1990 and 2000
(Wait 2002a, 1).

Navy
This section seeks to examine whether political ideology was significant in
explaining the outsourcing of the NMCI system based on the actions of senior civilian
leaders, appointed by President Clinton, and those of Congress and the Executive. My
findings suggest that while a relatively supportive environment towards outsourcing
existed in Congress and the Executive, there is no indication that a neoliberal agenda
influenced the Navy in its decision making. Rather, Congress was not informed of the
Navy decision to launch the largest IT service contract in government history until after
the Navy made its decision and chose a contractor (Porter 2008). While senior civilian
leadership, Secretary of the Navy and Assistance Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development and Acquisition, appointed by President Clinton, were significant actors in
the Navy process to establish and sustain the Navy’s desired network architecture, there
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was no indication that neoliberal beliefs significantly shaped their actions or the network
outsourcing decision (Porter 2008).

Navy Civilian Leaders
In 1998–1999, 75–150 Navy senior executive civilians and flag officers established
a working group to determine how to implement and sustain their envisioned network
architecture for their shore based organizations (Porter 2008). Key leaders in the group
included Admiral Archie Clemens, Pacific Fleet Commander, H. Lee Buchanan, the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, Charles
Nemfakos, the Navy's Senior Budget Director and Financial Manager, and Dan Porter,
the Navy Chief Information Officer. The group had flexibility in determining whether
military, federal or civilian contract workers were the best choice for developing,
building and operating its shore-based network, since it was not considered a core part of
the Navy’s primary mission (Munns 2003, 1). In comparison, networks on ships had
been considered core due to their integral role in the mission of the deployed vessel. Core
Navy functions were those integral to the Navy’s expeditionary (forward-deployed)
mission.
In examining whether political ideology was a factor in the Navy’s decision making
process, I’ll examine the actions of two key political appointees involved in the
outsourcing decision, Under Secretary H. Lee Buchanan and Secretary of the Navy
Richard Danzig to evaluate whether neoliberal ideas influenced the final decision to
outsource the Navy and Marine Corps shore IT network.
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Secretary Buchanan
The Honorable H. Lee Buchanan was selected by President Clinton to become the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition in October
1998 and served through January 2001. He was considered one of the founding fathers of
the NMCI (Anderson 2004, 5). Buchanan’s background was primarily in government
R&D, focusing on keeping the military on the leading edge of technological capability
(LeBoeuf 2000, 9). Buchanan’s appointment as Navy Acquisition Executive was a direct
result of DoD’s effort to increase the pace of acquisition reform (LeBoeuf 2000, 9).
Buchanan served as an officer in the Navy in the 1970s where he became
disillusioned with the Navy’s substandard DoD communication systems (Murray 2001,
1). Aligned with neoliberal beliefs that private sector actors offered quality, cost and
manning advantages to the government, Buchanan became an advocate for using private
industry experts to provide both equipment and services to support Navy objectives.
Buchanan’s main strategic concern was the desire for increased competition and
acquiring the benefits of competition (lowering costs and creating new ideas for doing
business) in procurement and acquisition (Buchanan 2000, 4). Buchanan sought to infuse
the techniques of commercial business management into Navy acquisition (LeBoeuf
2000, 3). He argued that technological superiority was the Navy’s long-term strategy for
success. Yet for too long the Navy relied on their own in-house production for their most
critical technologies failing to construct an efficient process for turning results into war
fighting capability (LeBoeuf 2000, 6).
Secretary Buchanan’s belief was that the military was no longer in the forefront of
development and implementation of IT, as the commercial sector had outpaced military
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developments in both microelectronics and IT (LeBoeuf 2000, 9–10). In a 2000
interview, Secretary Buchanan noted, “There are technologies such as microelectronics
and most information technologies that are too important, and the Navy can’t risk
developing them in-house because it would take too long and ultimately take the wrong
direction” (LeBoeuf 2000, 11). He argued that these technologies were moving too fast
for the Navy to expect to remain competitive with the private sector as the time scale for
technological evolution (18–24 months) for computers and microelectronics was much
shorter than other pertinent time scales such as 10–15 years for acquisition of DoD
systems and 40–50 years for a ship’s life (LeBoeuf 2000, 6). He suggested that the Navy
needed to follow the example of the commercial industries’, where constant refreshing of
technology, routine upgrades, and changing configurations were the norm and not the
exception (LeBoeuf 2000, 6).
Secretary Buchanan supported the Navy’s acquisition of cutting-edge technologies
from the commercial sector in areas such as advanced information management systems
where the commercial customer had become the driver for computer technology. An
efficient process of bringing technology into the DoN from the private sector provided
the Navy with the capabilities to maintain technological superiority. It also required an
increased dependence on private sector actors to support, maintain and even operate some
of these advanced systems.
Buchanan argued that “the Navy had to get beyond its preoccupation with sunk
costs, money already spent on systems, which the Navy used all too often to justify
additional funding for systems with outdated technology” (Murray 2001, 1). In a 1999
meeting, Ronald Turner, the Navy’s Deputy CIO for Plans, Policy, Performance,
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Infrastructure, Systems and Technology, noted that Buchanan argued that the Navy had
to figure out a way to capitalize on the huge investments industry was making (Murray
2001, 1). “If we built or bought the things we would need to implement (NMCI), we’d
forever be in the technology upgrade mode in order to keep abreast of the changes that
industry made to hardware, software and communications technologies” (Murray 2001,
1). Dan Porter, the Navy’s CIO noted that about $1.5 billion was spent annually on
maintaining the Navy’s nearly 200 different local area networks without producing
increased security or easier network access across the Navy enterprise (Porter 2008).
Secretary Buchanan was the first to conceptualize an enterprise-wide portal
combining voice, video and data for the Navy and Marine Corps, and developed the
original contract for NMCI (Onley 2006, 2). Aligned with established IT leaders at
private sector firms like Kodak and Southland, among others, he led support for the
radical strategy to build a mammoth intranet by acquiring systems and networks as a
service from a vendor, similar to a commodity, rather than build similar systems (Murray
2001, 1). He noted that executive leadership had already discussed outsourcing IT
services as the only way the DoN could reduce costs, get a handle on its IT spending and
provide a secure enterprise network (Anderson 2004, 6).
Ron Turner, Deputy CIO for the Navy, believed there was no organization or entity
within the Navy that was able to provide an end-to-end network across the department
(Lunney 2007, 2). Arguing that the Navy needed to remain focused on its core missions,
he noted that, “laying cables was not the Navy business; it’s a function to doing our
business” (Lunney 2007, 2). As noted by the Navy’s CIO Dan Porter, SPAWAR would
have been the lead organization to implement an in-house network architecture.
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However, due to the significant role local Navy organizations had in IT decision making
and funding, it was not deemed realistic to expect local organizations to act in a
standardized manner to create an in-house network solution considering the diversity of
their primary/core missions that remained their first priority (Porter 2008).

Secretary Danzig
Secretary Richard Danzig served in both the Carter and Clinton administrations, as
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense from 1977–1981, Assistant Secretary of the Navy
from 1993–1998, and as Secretary of the Navy from 14 November 1998 through 20
January 2001 (Peckenpaugh 2001c, 1-3). He was an ardent advocate of IT and its
usefulness for the future of the Navy mission (Danzig 2000, 10). With the groundwork
provided by the Navy’s research team envisioning a Navy IT network, along with key
leaders as Admiral Archie Clemens, Secretary Buchanan and Navy CIO Dan Porter,
Secretary Danzig became personally engaged in supporting the creation of the enterprise
network (Porter 2008).
NMCI was clearly ambitious, being the largest IT service proposal ever within the
federal government. In supporting the NMCI project, Secretary Danzig compared the
network to a commodity, noting that, “we need to stop trying to create it an (intranet)
ourselves and move to buying it like we do our electricity” (Orr 2000). As a commodity,
large suppliers in the private sector who specialized in IT services were considered a
better choice in providing resources and expertise to operate and manage intranet services
than trying to provide the service in-house. Private sector IT providers offered better
infrastructure security, centralized management, interoperability, more frequent
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technology refreshes and financial savings through central procurement, network
management and system administration (Orr 2000).
Once Navy leadership decided to outsource their network services, Secretary
Danzig orchestrated a behind-the-scenes lobbying campaign to win over each of the
constituencies with a stake in the project (Peckenpaugh 2001c, 5). Understanding the
Clinton interest in supporting federal unions, Danzig allayed union concerns after they
initially mobilized against the deal for fear of losing jobs. Illustrating a successful
agency-union agreement, he authorized a compromise to let any potentially displaced
workers transfer within the Navy or become employees of the contractor designing
NMCI, Electronic Data Systems Corporation (Peckenpaugh 2001c, 5). The contractor
agreed to pay a three percent signing bonus and 15 percent increase in base pay to any
Navy personnel joining the company along with three years of guaranteed employment
(Mayo 2001). The NMCI contractor received financial incentives to hire Navy civilian
workers who performed activities that the vendor will use in the project (GCN 2000).
The former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay Johnson noted how Danzig led the
charge for NMCI both inside and outside the Pentagon (Peckenpaugh 2001c, 5).
Despite some differences among senior uniformed leaders within the DoN on how
the Navy and Marine Corps shore based computer infrastructure should be established
and operated, they chose against Admiral Gauss’ initial proposition of owning the
network and decided to entrust their IT enterprise plan to the private sector. They named
Joseph Cipriano, a career government civilian, the program’s executive officer. In the
spring of 1999, in what the Navy called a “sweeping shift in its infrastructure and
management,” Navy officials changed the name of the project from the Navy-wide
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Intranet to Navy Marine Corps Intranet to better reflect the inclusion of the Marine Corps
(Murray 2000b, 1). On October 6, 2000, the Navy awarded EDS a $6.9 billion, eight-year
contract, one of the largest IT contracts in the history of the federal government, to
manage the service’s shore-based computing enterprise (Brewin and Verton 1999;
Murray 2000b, 1–2).
As noted earlier, Congress and the Executive expressed interest in outsourcing
commercially available activities in the DoD to support modernization efforts. Top navy
officials, however, avoided the use of the word outsourcing in making its announcement,
for fear of political opposition. Considering the size and nature of the outsourcing effort,
opposition would likely be centered in the government civilian sector with unions and
Congress concerned with potential job losses. Instead, Navy leadership highlighted the
shift from building and owning its IT infrastructure to buying a service and leasing
infrastructure (Brewin and Verton 1999). However, Congress, unions and those close to
the process could see that the Navy was involved in an outsourcing effort. Union
opposition never materialized due in part to the effort of senior civilians in the DoN to
allay union concerns and arrange job opportunities within government and through the
contractor.
The contract sold the Navy’s existing intranet infrastructure to EDS, who took
ownership and operating responsibility, while Navy technology workers were assigned
other high-tech duties aligned with the Navy’s primary missions (Orr 2000). In making
its decision, Naval senior leadership, led by Secretary Danzig, decided that the private
sector was their best choice to leverage the expertise and technology necessary to
engineer, construct and manage its vast network.

248
Challenges to Political Ideology
While the actions of both Under Secretary Buchanan and Secretary Danzig appear
to offer a neoliberal influence on the resulting NMCI outsourcing actions, other factors
appears to negate the impact of a neoliberal agenda as the explanatory factor for the
NMCI project. Secretary Danzig’s speech at the Navy War College graduation ceremony
in June 2000 exemplifies his beliefs conflicting with decision making based on
ideological principles. Secretary Danzig appeared to be motivated by critical, unbiased
thinking in planning and problem solving, as opposed to basing actions on ideological
beliefs.
In his speech, Secretary Danzig challenged the future leaders of the Navy to
question their beliefs and assumptions. He emphasized the importance for leaders to
recognize how deeply held values and strengths shape their thinking and decision
making, and that they need to find the weaknesses inherent in those strengths (Danzig
2000, 11).
He suggested that the strengths of the Navy professional were commitments to
professional identify, an ideology or commitment to values of the market, democracy and
the nation-state, and a day-to-day focus on getting the mission accomplished. The
Secretary challenged the graduating class to use their strengths as a starting point to
consider how they thought about issues and strategy, and to debate and look more closely
at their strengths (Danzig 2000, 5,13). The overall context of his message was to not
assume that if A (markets, democracy, etc.) were good, that B (efficiency, cost-savings,
peace, etc.) and other good things would necessarily follow. His message to future
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Naval leaders was the antithesis of decision-making based on purely ideologically
reasons.
The impact of senior Navy uniformed leaders was significant in the NMCI decision
making process as well. As noted by the Navy CIO Dan Porter, Admiral Archie
Clemens played a leading role in advancing the Navy’s IT enterprise vision. Navy CIO
Dan Porter noted that, “action-orientated four star admirals from the field, such as
Admiral Archie Clemens, had a voice with the Secretary and Congress who listened and
respected their inputs” (Porter 2008). Admiral Clemens emphasized the importance of
“doing it right,” i.e., implementing the enterprise IT network in a professional and
effective manner, where outsourcing had become the option of best choice (Porter 2008).
The Admiral’s actions in establishing IT-21 for the Navy Fleet, and his ultimate support
for the outsourcing arrangement only reinforced the importance of the land-based
network project to the Navy Secretary.
As opposed to neoliberalism’s call for the reduced size of government, Dan Porter
noted how Navy leadership did not view the NMCI project as an attempt to reduce
positions or cut the budget. An example of this was the Marine Corps concern that the
NMCI would result in troop reductions. The Marine Corps Commandant, General James
Jones, approached Secretary Danzig regarding the inclusion of the Marines into the
network and whether it was a sophisticated way to reduce his force structure (Porter
2008). The Secretary reassured the Commandant that reductions would not happen, as
Marines affected by the project would remain in the service in war fighting positions
(Porter 2008). Navy leadership wanted the capability provided by a robust, enterprise-
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wide IT network as soon as possible, and believed they could not accomplish this feat if it
was attempted by an in-house solution (Porter 2008).
As noted earlier by Navy CIO Dan Porter, 75–150 senior military, government
civilian and political leaders within the Navy worked as a group in deciding on how the
enterprise network would be created and managed. Establishing the primacy of a
neoliberal agenda in the decision making process of these diverse senior leaders was not
forthcoming and difficult to test. Rather, it was clear that while the Secretary and Chief
of Naval Operations (CNO) supported the project, there was concern with the extreme
risk involved to the Navy and the credibility of senior leaders (Porter 2008). This was
heightened by the lack of communication and coordination between members of
Congress and senior Navy civilian leaders (Secretary Danzig and Undersecretary
Buchanan) prior to and during the Navy decision deemphasizing the role of a neoliberal
agenda in the decision making process.
The initial unhappiness of Congress with the Navy’s stealth approach to NMCI was
not representative of a partisan neoliberal body. Following their outsourcing
announcement, the Navy spent a tremendous amount of time between 2000 and 2002
explaining their outsourcing decision and proposed network solution to Congress and
their staffs (Porter 2008). Congress imposed several requirements while taking
incremental steps and funding over the next few years as the Navy sought to prove its
solution was legitimate. The Navy and contractor EDS lost nearly a year in the network
development and implementation process due to these requirements, leading to a
financial loss for EDS, where its stock price plummeted, its chairman was ousted and
bankruptcy loomed (Gilligan 2008; Onley and Wait 2005b). The extent of requirements

251
imposed by Congress on the Navy and EDS, along with its partial funding approach and
threats to slash funding were not conducive of a neoliberal agenda as the primary factor
in shaping the Navy’s NMCI outsourcing effort.

Irregular Procurement Actions
The following section highlights irregular procurement actions that focused on
streamlining and advancing the NMCI acquisition process at an accelerated pace. The
actions reflected the interests of senior naval leaders to complete the procurement process
without congressional oversight and avoid potential setbacks if the contracting approach
was modified and new funding was required. As opposed to ideological motivations, the
procurement actions are more indicative of organization factors shaping outsourcing
activity. Navy actions represented a quick solution to an unsatisfactory IT environment,
where the Navy needed a reliable and secure network to accomplish daily operations.
Factors working against the Navy fielding an in-house IT infrastructure included budget
constraints that limited their options, limited IT expertise, and an organization structure
where lower echelon units were the power center for the Navy’s network configurations.
The Navy’s approach to launching the NMCI project was marked by a highly
irregular and accelerated effort that appeared to circumvent the established procurement
actions for outsourcing an activity. It publicly announced its decision to outsource its
intranet in the summer of 1999, awarded a contract in October 2000, and attempted to
provide a level of initial operational capability by December 2001. The aggressive,
service established goal, was not the result of specific mission needs (Li, Brock 2000, 3).
Yet organizations were becoming more dependent on network capabilities for daily
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communications across the Navy, and DoD-wide where increasing security breaches
threatened the integrity of the information, networks and supporting missions.
In order to avoid delays and congressional budget battles that could have threatened
the project, the Navy chose to skip standard procurement practices, including
congressional review, and requests for new funding for the project in its FY 2000 and
2001 budgets. The system was never tested to determine its viability over in-house
alternatives, the acquisition plan was incomplete and, as noted above, the Navy attempted
to bypass Congress for funding and approval.
Given these irregularities, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was created
between the DoN and OSD to complete unfinished procurement requirements and legal
requirements of the 2001 National Defense Authorization Act. It requested the DoN
provide incomplete data on the NMCI system (revised business case analysis, operational
testing and evaluation, compliance with DoD information assurance architecture and user
satisfaction data). Despite irregularities and the MOA request, the Navy signed a $6.9
billion contract with EDS in October 2000 that did not incorporate these requirements
(HOR 2001a, 158; Johnston 2000).

Bypassing Congress
To implement the network contract quickly without the necessary funding, Joseph
Cipriano, the NMCI project manager, in combination with Secretary Lee Buchanan
(Acquisitions) and Charles Nemfakos (Financial Management) created a multi-year
contract for services to procure NMCI under 10USC.2306G of the federal code,
suggesting that it was an ongoing expenditure for services (Orr 2001, 2). This contract
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vehicle permitted the head of the Navy to enter into multi-billion dollar contracts for
certain services without congressional review and authorization (Li, Brock 2000, 8).
Standard multi-year contracts for the acquisition of property greater than $500 million
required congressional authorization. However, Navy officials argued that the nearly $7
billion intranet contract represented an acquisition of services, not property, alleviating
them of the requirement for specific oversight and authorization (Li, Brock 2000, 8).

Non-Compliance with Federal Law
The Navy procurement approach for NMCI was marked by several other
shortcomings that failed to meet criteria of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, based on a
1999–2000 review conducted by the GAO at the request of the Chairman of the Military
Research and Development Subcommittee. GAO reports have been useful authoritative
critiques in studying and evaluating government actions and decisions, such as
outsourcing within the federal government. The GAO review of the NMCI project
highlighted incomplete compliance with the Clinger-Cohen Act. It required the Navy to
provide performance measures, return-on-investment data, alternative systems analysis,
an information assurance strategy, and an effectives process for managing the network
(Verton 1999c, 1).
The report also pointed to the Navy issuing its request for proposals (RFP) for the
NMCI system without completing a business case analysis and testing its approach. The
Navy’s proposed network relied on a set of untried performance measures and inadequate
compliance data to determine an appropriate acquisition strategy and desired level of
service (Li, Brock 2000, 2). The Navy was unable to demonstrate the viability of its
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approach and the superiority of its private-sector solution over other alternatives (Li,
Brock 2000, 2). Finally, the Navy’s ability to provide large cost savings was
questionable due to conflicting, vague and unsupportable funding data for the contracted
service, as compared to an in-house alternative (HOR 2001b, 296).

Reaction to NMCI from Congress and the Executive
The initial congressional reaction towards the NMCI project did not support a
neoliberal agenda to advance the role of the private sector in the federal government.
Their initial reaction was a combination of surprise and hostility, followed by gradual
support (HOR 2000b, 346). Congress gradually supported the Navy system, despite
inconsistencies in the procurement process, based on a slow one–to-two year incremental
approach to show proof of their concept. As discussed in this section, actions taken by
Congress were primarily focused around making the Navy prove it could establish and
manage its enterprise network infrastructure, which supported up to 700,000 personnel,
through a contractor. The Executive branch had little involvement in the day-to-day
contract implementation process, and with the approval of Congress supported funding
for the contracts continuation.
In Spring 2000, as expected, Congress reacted with concern and chastised the Navy
for not treating the NMCI like a major acquisition. As noted by Dan Porter, the Navy’s
CIO during this period, “Congress was miffed that the Navy did not see fit to brief them
on their network intentions and thought we were trying to pull a fast one” (Porter 2008).
Dan Porter notes how the Navy did not see it that way, but rather was moving at Mach
speed and wanted to operationalize their network vision in the present (Porter 2008).

255
Congress did not appreciate what looked like a Navy shortcut to acquire a significant
system and capability without going through the government’s financial gatekeeper
(Porter 2008).
Specifically, the Navy planned to spend billions of dollars on acquiring IT services
without congressional oversight, or approval and without the specific requirements
established by the 1996 Clinger-Cohen Act (Orr 2001, 1). Congress questioned how the
Navy was going to provide the new funding to pay for its multi-billion dollar project;
also, how the service would ensure the funding would not be misused or wasted since the
magnitude of the contract constituted a major acquisition. The Navy did not have a plan
for new funding or cost oversight. Rather, in combination with its creative contracting
approach discussed above, it assumed the NMCI cost would be consistent with
expenditures for its current IT structure.
Throughout a two year period while Congress demanded the Navy rectify its
shortcomings and treat NMCI as a major acquisition, it gradually supported the Navy’s
approach to outsource their vast shore-based intranet architecture based on an
incremental process marked with testing requirements to validate the network design.
Congressional actions during this period demonstrated strong oversight and it was clear
to Navy leadership that Congress would withhold funds if their requirements were not
satisfied accordingly (Porter 2008). The House Committee on Armed Services initially
reacted to the IT acquisition by prohibiting the Navy from using FY2001 funds for the
NMCI (and the payment of a long-term contract for comprehensive end-to-end
information services) until supporting documentation was provided to Congress including
specific funding requirements for the NMCI contract (HOR 2000b, 345–346). While the
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House Committee supported the Navy’s initiative, they questioned the Navy’s ability to
provide large cost savings due to conflicting and unsupportable funding data (HOR
2001b, 296).
The Senate Committee on Armed Services’ 2001 Defense Authorization Act Report
recommended that the Secretary of the Navy provide a report to Congress on NMCI
financing and its impact to the existing civilian workforce (Senate 2000, 326). They
supported the Navy’s effort to address their IT problems despite the many questions
regarding the effectiveness of the Navy’s NMCI contracting approach (Senate 2000,
326). The committee encouraged other military services to address their IT
infrastructures in an equally comprehensive manner (Senate 2000, 326). Both the House
and Senate requested the program be implemented in accordance with the Clinger-Cohen
Act so that the impact to federal employees be mitigated (HOR 2000a, 145; HOR 2000c,
828; Senate 2000, 325–326).
The 2001 Defense Authorization Act authorized a phased implementation for the
NMCI (HOR 2002, 298). It allowed for an initial fielding of 15 percent of the desktop
service units required in the contract, while the Navy was expected to complete testing
and evaluation and comply with IT guidelines established by the DoD (HOR 2001a, 158).
The House DoD Appropriations Bill Report for FY 2001 highlighted concerns associated
with the Navy’s actions and still supported their efforts to seek innovative solutions to
their existing IT challenges. The House Committee on Appropriations was willing to
consider the NMCI program outside the normal budget process due to its private sector
(innovative) approach to managing the network (HOR 2000a, 144). The Committee also
directed the Secretary of the Air Force to conduct a study and provide recommendations
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comparing different solutions to managing an IT network and how they could be
implemented, including lessons learned from the NMCI effort (HOR 2001a, 159).
Lawmaker support for the Navy NMCI acquisition remained strong in the 2002
Defense Authorization Act, which granted the Navy the authority to order 250,000 more
desktop service units, over half the program, before operational testing of the original 15
percent from the FY2001 authorization was complete (HOR 2002, 298). Additionally, in
October 2002, with congressional support, President Bush signed HR 5647 extending the
NMCI contract from five to seven years because delays in getting the infrastructure built
as a result of problems converting complex legacy systems (Onley 2002a). The extension
authorized an additional $1.96 billion for the contract giving EDS a longer period of time
to recoup its investment costs (HOR 2002, 298; Onley 2002a).
Through 2005, the NMCI system was plagued with several shortfalls including
ineffective integration between the Navy’s tactical ship-borne networks and deployed
DoN forces (an initial requirement of the network), limited communications between
some Navy and Marine communities and Air Force and Army networks, a lack of
integration strategy to incorporate legacy networks still prevalent throughout DoN
organizations, and questionable satisfaction of customers (Jordan 2007, 9–10). Despite
these issues, Congress and the Executive continued to provide funding for the NMCI
system and extended the contract through 2010, adding $3 billion to the contract value
(Thuermer 2008, 1).
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Air Force and Army
Ideology did not appear to be a factor in explaining the Air Force and Army
decision regarding its network management and development. Despite interest from
Congress and the Executive in increasing outsourcing of commercially relevant activities,
and pressure from the DoD to find savings through competitive sourcing activities, the
Air Force and Army chose to retain control of their network infrastructure in-house. In
comparison to the Navy, where senior leaders from across the DoN supported
outsourcing the Navy’s network solution, top leaders in the Air Force and Army did not
voice similar interests, nor did civilian leaders have a similar hands-on approach, as the
Navy, with regards to the network development process.
John Gilligan, CIO of the Air Force during this period, was active in shaping IT
management. As a lifetime government civilian and member of the Senior Executive
Service, he worked across several different administrations. He was not a political
appointee and there was nothing to identify or distinguish Gilligan’s ideological beliefs or
whether they affected the network related actions taken by the Air Force. In the Air
Force, the Air Force Secretary and other political appointments (assistant secretaries)
with potential impact on IT policy did not appear to weigh in on outsourcing of networks
or how Air Force leaders managed IT resources and potential outsourcing opportunities.
In the Army, there was no indication that the Secretary or other civilian leaders
within the service attempted to use their own beliefs and interests or those from members
of Congress or the Executive to affect the Army’s approach to establishing and operating
its IT infrastructure and the extent of outsourcing to support its requirements. Rather, the
Army chose Major General James Hylton to lead the newly created NETCOM, their
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primary organization for delivering information technology services and operating and
defending the Army’s network (Tiboli 2005, 1).

Summary of Findings
While neoliberal beliefs and ideas were popular in the Executive branch and
Congress during the second Clinton Administration and G.W. Bush Administration, they
did not appear to be causal factors in the NMCI outsourcing project or in the Air Force or
Army network actions. The Navy process for choosing an enterprise network solution
was driven by a working group of 75–150 senior leaders that started with the assumption
that the network would be provided and managed in-house by the Navy’s SPAWAR
organization (Porter 2008). As noted by Dan Porter, the priority was not to save money
or reduce manning positions, but to field an enterprise network.
Outsourcing NMCI was less a result of political ideology and more a reflection of
organization factors including Navy budgetary limitations and local organizations being
the power center for IT procurement and network development. The Navy’s lack of
coordination with a friendly neoliberal Congress, in combination with a highly innovative
and risk-prone funding approach that appeared to elude congressional review, suggested a
measure of organization expediency and a distrust of members of the House and Senate
in terms of expecting a favorable review and approval.
While a neoliberal-leaning Congress and Executive appeared helpful in the
passage and follow-on extensions of the Navy’s monumental IT service contract, it was
clear by the tone of Congress and the actions of the Navy that a neoliberal agenda was
not the key driver in explaining the initial outsourcing decision. As Navy civilian leaders
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failed to communicate with Congress in regards to the biggest IT outsourcing deal in the
history of the federal government, Congress appeared ready to withhold required dollars
for the network unless the Navy addressed several irregularities and instances of
incomplete data surrounding the network contract (Porter 2008). In addition, meeting
congressional requirements to ensure the network project was capable of supporting
Navy objectives and federal government requirements in the Clinger-Cohen Act factored
into funding and support for the network contract.
There was no indication within the Air Force or Army that political ideology
factored into the decision making of leaders in shaping their network development
actions. Both services retained control of network management and operations primarily
with in-house resources, despite efforts of the administration with the support of a
Republican Congress to increase competition and the role of the private sector in
performing government activities.

ORGANIZATION FACTORS

By examining the significance of the organization framework in explaining the
outsourcing of network infrastructures in each service, this section will evaluate the
hypothesis that organizations are more inclined to outsource activities not associated with
their primary mission, when budget reductions impact the primary mission, or new
activities with limited in-house expertise.
The Army, Navy and Air Force represent different service cultures and missions. The
expectation is to find each service demonstrating a unique approach to IT transformation
and the development of IT networks based, in-part, on their culture, mission and
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independence/autonomy. I also expect to find the organization framework useful in
explaining outsourcing behavior for the NMCI due to its non-core nature in relation to the
Navy’s limited budget; and to find limited outsourcing activity in the Air Force and Army,
due to the network’s integral role in its war-fighting mission.

Navy
Organization factors offer a useful explanation for the outsourcing of the NMCI,
considering the significant attention and commitment given this non-core function by Navy
leaders. The shore-based network was considered non-core and thus a candidate for
outsourcing, based on the nature of the Navy mission. As opposed to the Air Force and
Army, naval forces were not considered garrison but rather, expeditionary, forwarddeployed forces, fully mobile and ready for offensive actions at all times (Barnett 2007,
28). The Navy’s essence was fundamentally captured in the expeditionary, forwarddeployed culture embodying individual initiative and freedom of action (Barnett 2007, 28–
30). The Navy’s “Sea Power 21,” its strategic concept for the 21st century, emphasized
three fundamental areas central to the Navy’s operational effectiveness: Sea Strike, Sea
Shield, and Sea Basing capabilities (Clark 2002, 3).78 The shore-based network was not
integral to these expeditionary, sea-based missions.
Based on a combination of independent variables addressed below including Naval
budget constraints, local organization autonomy in budget execution and IT purchasing
power, senior leaders saw outsourcing as their only method of attaining the desired network
infrastructure without delay. The decision resulted in a rocky transition as local
78

Sea Strike is the ability to project precise and persistent offensive power from the sea; Sea Shield extends
defensive assurance throughout the world; and Sea Basing enhances operational independence and support
for the joint force (Clark, 2002, 3).
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organizations lost control of their network resources, while new standards and procedures
produced dissatisfied customers.
Within the Navy, lower echelon organizations were the center of power for IT and
network development. As noted by Navy CIO Dan Porter, lower echelon organizations
maintained budget execution control and responsibility for purchasing IT capability. They
purchased IT subjectively based on their mission and developed their own processes to
establish a rudimentary network capability at each organization. This was aligned with the
Navy’s cultural aspect of adaptability, characterized by individual initiative and freedom of
action(Barnett 2007, 29).
This environment resulted in uneven network distribution and a patchwork
development of IT and networks causing increased security breaches and diminishing the
overall effectiveness of the Navy. Network resources competed against operational
requirements for budget allocations. Organizational leaders had a direct effect on IT
resources since the Navy did not have a central source selection organization for procuring
IT equipment and services (Murray 1999b, 2; Porter 2008).
The vacuum in IT standardization led each major Navy program to compete against
the others for IT funding and fulfill their own local stovepipe requirements, that created IT
have and have-nots (Murray 1999b, 2; Wennergren 2003). Once an IT program was in the
budget, organizations were set up to be funded annually to support these programs for as
long as they could be justified (Wennergren 2003). Thus, organization leaders within each
command dominated the control of IT funds– $1.5 billion for the Navy in 1999. The
Navy’s budget and organization structure allowed leaders to establish their own IT
infrastructures and networks (more than 140) to meet functional mission requirements; it
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also had the effect of increasing the breadth, capability and influence of their organizations
(Murray 2001, 1). The result was an extensive assortment of different IT systems owing to
the lack of an enterprise network architecture and central IT procurement process (Porter
2008).
Senior Navy leaders faced both financial and organizational challenges in
establishing a Navy enterprise network that addressed security and connectivity
difficulties in their preexisting networks. Financially, the Navy did not budget for a new
$7 billion network, and budget autonomy rested at the local organization level where unit
purchases were based on each unit’s operational mission, as opposed to the overall needs
of the Navy. Navy senior leaders were not confident that they could orchestrate an inhouse solution given their constrained and inadequate budget, and the autonomous
purchasing environment with their organizations (Porter 2008). There was no way for
Navy leadership to ensure effective standardization and development of a homogeneous
network given this organization structure and constraint (Porter 2008). Unlike the Air
Force, where the CIO had leverage in centralizing and standardizing IT purchases and
network requirements with budget authority, this did not exist with the Navy CIO (Porter
2008).
The problems associated with depending on local organizations to provide the
required funding for the new network were highlighted, in part, by past experiences with
A-76 competitive sourcing practices within Navy organizations. In 1995, the Navy
bought into A-76 competitive sourcing practices and programmed $5 billion in budget
savings from expected A-76 competitions into its future budget (Porter 2008). As a
result of Navy organizations not participating at expected levels to reach their projected
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financial savings and produce the expected A-76 results, and Navy leadership not having
a process to hold organizations accountable to participating and producing their expected
savings, it did not produce its $5 billion budget savings (Porter 2008). It created overall
budget problems and led to dissatisfaction with the overall A-76 process. It also helped to
color the decision making of the Navy leadership team in regards to how the NMCI
would be created and sustained.
As noted by Halperin, organizations are vigilant about their absolute share of the
budget (Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter 2006, 57). Organizations with expensive
capabilities are concerned about budget decisions and the budgeting implications of
policy decisions (Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter 2006, 26). In May 2000, Navy
organization leaders became concerned that the DoN would reprogram part of their
budgets to support NMCI after Congress threatened to withhold money due to the Navy’s
attempt to bypass congressional approval and irregularities in their procurement
requirements. Senior admirals met with the Navy’s CIO Dan Porter, Vice Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral Donald Pilling, and other officials to discuss the Navy’s
reprogramming efforts and how to pay for its originally estimated $7 billion intranet
(Verton 2000b, 1).
Navy and Marine Corps commands required $2.1 billion yearly to support their
ongoing network system, higher than the $1.52 billion originally estimated. The Navy
could only account for $1 billion in available assets (Verton 2000b, 1). Exemplifying the
independent nature of organizational leaders, the Navy’s senior group of admirals was
not ready to divest their funds for a new IT initiative. Admiral Vern Clark, Commander
of the Atlantic Fleet, told the Navy Secretary that it was unacceptable to ask
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commanders to cut money from their operating forces to pay for NMCI (Verton 2000b,
2). The Navy found itself in a tenuous situation. Ultimately, the Navy needed the
support of Congress for funding to support NMCI.

Organization Resistance
The NMCI was not an easy sell to its users as it went against the culture of the
military organizations to turn over the reins of internal communications to an outside
industry (Onley 2001c, 1). Additionally, organizational budgets were depleted of
resources once used for IT, and a degree of independence and autonomy was removed
through external intervention. The Navy’s deputy CIO, Dave Wennergren, noted that his
biggest challenge was the cultural change within units. He spent much of his time with
personnel addressing the change, getting buy-in and process reengineering (Walker 2002,
3).
Dissatisfaction became apparent as organizations began to adjust to the private
sector actors developing and managing a new network system. Many organizations were
reluctant to relinquish control of their network capabilities due to their growing
dependence on them as a primary conduit to support their missions. Many users were
dissatisfied, arguing that is was too costly, that network performance had deteriorated,
and the migration of old applications to the new platforms did not run smoothly, as
acknowledged by top Navy officials (Onley 2003, 2; Onley 2001c, 1).

Part of the organizational dissatisfaction rested with their limited control and
flexibility in the system. Organizations were limited to a particular type of network
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capability and paid for support through the contractor, as compared to the support
provided by in-house Navy personnel prior to outsourcing at no additional charge. While
EDS developed, maintained and serviced the Navy shore-based network, the DoN
provided a menu of both levels of service capability and support options that EDS would
provide to organizations. Organizations chose from these service and support options and
agreed to pay the established price (Porter 2008). For example, there was a set cost for
the basic level of service and support required by all units. Increased levels of service
and support for organizations that wanted greater capabilities and quicker support for
service outages, software glitches and other problems came at a higher cost (Porter 2008).
DoN leaders established a minimum level of service and customer support in the
NMCI contract that all users had to procure, while security was standardized across the
entire network. The NMCI outsourcing contract gave Navy users the opportunity to
purchase upgrades to the basic level of service and support. Some users could have an
increased level of service capability and quicker customer support response times to
address problems and network outages than other users in different organizations. This,
to some degree, maintained the system of those having the maximum and minimum
amount of IT network support across the Navy. It dissatisfied some personnel who were
accustomed to a standard customer support protocol facilitating all users in the same
manner, when IT was managed in-house.
The IT network management was transformed from a local set of networks to a
common, enterprise-wide solution that affected business processes in all organizations
across the service. Users were no longer able to design their own desktop, use their own
logos, and install their own applications (Jordan 2007, 7). Personnel and organizations
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were required to conform to stringent rules, forego installing personal applications and be
dependent upon enterprise management to load, maintain, and upgrade certified
applications resulting in user dissatisfaction (Jordan 2007, 7–8). For example, the
network/IT help desk process changed from Navy users calling a collocated in-house IT
help desk and getting relatively immediate assistance to calling a regionalized contractor
operated help desk, not collocated, having a much longer service response time (up to a
few days) and a fee-for service charge (O'Boyle 2008). In addition, moving a computer
from one desk to another required contractor permission and had a service charge fee as
well (O'Boyle 2008).
Despite the potential benefits offered by a centrally managed network system,
organizational resistance to the outsourced intranet also resulted in a slower than
expected conversion and elimination of legacy systems across the department.
Organizations had become dependent upon specific software and network infrastructure
capabilities and were unwilling to relinquish control of those systems until an adequate
replacement and transfer could occur. As of 2005, many commands were still using
legacy networks and applications with no overall strategy to resolve technical interface
issues and facing contractual problems regarding who would pay for legacy applications
and the servers hosting these applications (Jordan 2007, 9–10).
The Marine Corps network faced increased degradation by the Navy outsourcing
effort despite initial support from their military leaders. Senior Marine Corps leaders
initially voiced public support and eager participation in the new system. Despite
language in the House version of the 2001 Defense authorization bill that would let the
Marines opt out of NMCI, Marine Corps leaders had no plans to leave the program and
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planned to begin using it in 2002 (Dorobek 2001, 1). Yet, as a component of the Navy,
and with senior DoN leadership committed to building the intranet, Marine Corps leaders
had little choice but to agree to participate (Onley and Wait 2005a).
There were concerns within the Marine Corps as to the NMCI’s ability to support
their requirements and activities. Navy Colonel Michael Albano, Commander of the
Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity, noted that the Marine Corps Enterprise
Network (MCEN) had provided excellent service to all Marine Corps units and it
remained unproven whether EDS could be as responsive to Marine Corps needs as inhouse resources (Murray 2000b, 4).
For example, the Marines were already using a secure central network control
center and standard network architecture with their MCEN, which the Navy lacked
(Murray 2000b, 4). In addition, the Marines had merged their garrison and tactical
command, control, communications, computers and intelligence systems in 1997 to
integrate their support and operational units. Outsourcing NMCI caused the Marine
Corps to backtrack in advancements they completed for integrating IT across their
missions. Since the Navy contract was only for the shore-based intranet, the Marines
needed to separate their garrison and tactical systems. Instead of offering additional
efficiencies and savings, NMCI presented the Marines with a new challenge of ensuring
they continued to provide seamless connectivity between both networks (Murray 2000b,
4-5). In addition, whether the Marine Corps would see a savings dividend remained
questionable, as NMCI had the potential to cost more than the MCEN and adversely
impact other Marine programs (Murray 2000b, 5).
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In 2004, senior military leaders began to publicly voice their frustration and
disappointment with the system. Lt. General Edward Hanlon, Commanding General of
the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, argued that the slow roll-out and
transition efforts for the system had been rocky and problematic, and criticized EDS for
not being prepared to implement the contract (Webb 2004, 1). Rear Admiral Anthony
Lengerich, a senior vice commander with the Naval Sea Systems Command, warned that
the services would lose their workforces if the Navy and EDS didn’t better manage the
transition to NMCI and produce the same efficiencies that the workforce had before the
integration (Onley and McLaughlin 2004, 1). Representative Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) a Navy
reserve officer, called NMCI “a very customer unfriendly system,” suggesting that
members were unwilling to discuss problems with NMCI that were widespread (Onley
2006, 2).

Air Force
Organization factors are useful in explaining the Air Force approach to outsourcing
and managing its network operations. The hypothesis denotes that new activities and those
outside the scope of an organization’s normal wartime specific mission are likely to be
privatized in periods of budgetary decline. While networking was a relatively new activity
and overall service budgets were decreasing, networks became integral to Air Force
missions and budgets increased for IT and network development. The network was
considered a weapon system where service leaders maintained control and an inherent
capability.
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Independent variables affecting Air Force decision-making included leadership’s
desire to keep control at the highest level of the Air Force, limited autonomy within
organizations, and the budget. Initially, networking was a relatively new activity
developing from within organizations as a communications resource and outside the scope
of the Air Force wartime mission. However, unlike the Navy, the Air Force embraced the
network as a core function, maintaining in-house control of the network infrastructure and
management. The Air Force was also more of a garrison force where the nature of their
mission called for personnel to use a common network for both deployed and home-base
operations.
As noted earlier, the Air Force managed its Middle East network operations from a
stateside location for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (Gilligan
2008). Outsourcing was however used to support varied aspects of network operations, per
the guidance of Air Force IT leadership, in areas lacking IT expertise and for sophisticated
and complex network functions.
Opposition towards outsourcing in support areas like IT showed up at the highest
levels of Air Force leadership. Outsourcing was discussed at the Air Force Corona
conferences (periodic meetings between senior Air Force service leaders – General
officers and equivalent federal civilians). For example, the former Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Manpower Reserve Affairs, Michael Dominguez, pushed for
outsourcing in the personnel specialty career fields (Gilligan 2008). However, addressing
potential outsourcing of established career fields and capabilities was difficult to accept
for senior Air Force leaders (Gilligan 2008). There was a reluctance in making a very big
change to the way of business with little insight into its long-term impact on the force and
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mission (Gilligan 2008). Even if they agreed that it was something the Air Force could
do, getting started and undertaking the change appeared as a significant challenge to the
standard operating procedures that some felt were better left alone (Gilligan 2008). Air
Force leaders were reluctant to give up control of traditional support capabilities such as
personnel, communications/IT and logistics.
The influence of senior Air Force IT leadership on organization IT activities with
the support of major command leaders led to the retention of network management inhouse, providing the foundation for developing the Air Force IT enterprise. As opposed
to the Navy where autonomy at lower echelon units was marked by their influence and
independence in budget related activities, the center of power in the Air Force
organizational structure during this period was at the Headquarter (HQ) level. This was
facilitated by the growing involvement of the Air Force in expeditionary type activities in
the 1990s. The implementation of the Air Force’s Air Expeditionary Force structure,
used for deploying forces in support of wartime operations after 2001, moved the HQ
level leadership into direct oversight of their organizations by planning and deploying
units for activities supporting conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Air Force Air Staff took a central role in directing IT and network
development. Unlike the Navy, the Air Force CIO was able to centrally budget and
procure IT resources that supported strategic planning and the development of an
enterprise network. As noted by Air Force CIO John Gilligan, he was able to direct the
centralization of network assets in building the Air Force enterprise network by using the
chain-of-command approach and giving the responsibility to major command leaders to
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have their subordinate organizations comply with the Air Force CIO’s network objectives
(Gilligan 2008).
Additionally, despite DoD budget constraints, growing network requirements
provided a new resource for funding as the Air Force received billions of dollars to
support their IT requirements. This was highlighted in 2005 when Senator Carl Levin (D,
MI), ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, noted that IT spending
was one of the fastest growing parts of the DoD budget (Tiboni 2005, 1). In 1996 the Air
Force IT budget was approximately $2.47 billion and grew to more than $6.3 billion in
2005 (DoD 1997, 7; GCN 2005, 5). The Air Force became the first service to request
more than $7 billion for IT spending in 2006 (Tiboni and Brewin 2005, 1). The
significant increase in funding for IT was an attractive feature in maintaining in-house
control and management of network operations and development. It provided flexibility
and greater choice for Air Force organizational IT leaders responsible for consolidating
organization networks and creating an enterprise approach to managing the network as a
weapon system.
Retention of skilled IT personnel was a key factor for Air Force leadership in
maintaining control of their IT network capability with in-house resources. In April
2003, Air Force CIO John Gilligan testified before the House Armed Services
Committee, noting the challenge of retaining IT personnel to support net-centric
operations (Freeman and Suddarth 2004, 208). Yet, competition from higher paying
private sector IT firms, along with the decreasing size of the military force structure led
to a shrinking of the IT force structure. In an effort to maintain the Air Force’s military
and civilian IT professionals for core war fighting IT missions, Air Force leadership
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began to evaluate commercial-like information technology functions for possible
outsourcing (Freeman and Suddarth 2004, 208).
John Gilligan noted that outsourcing efforts, where appropriate, could help to
overcome the 30,000-person shortfall the Air Force faced in its war fighting mission
(Tiboni and French 2003, 1). The objective was to redeploy critical IT skills in the war
fighting mission and outsource back-end IT operations, such as maintaining networks
through the consolidation of servers into farms at a central network control center at each
base (Murray 2002, 2–3; Tiboni and French 2003, 1). The Air Force used outsourcing as
a vehicle to fill voids in its capability and in areas where skilled personnel were either
limited or the skill-set was nonexistent.
In an effort to build a secure enterprise network, the Air Force had begun to
centrally manage and consolidate its network computer servers into large scale server
farms, rather than locally maintain them at Air Force locations (Brewin and Verton 1998,
3). As noted earlier, this was accomplished from the CIO’s office with implementation
directives to each of the major commands. The Air Force was able to avoid many of the
problems faced by the Navy because its network reorganization actions were done inhouse as military organizations took control over all necessary changes (Gilligan 2008).
Air Force efforts at consolidating their computer servers and networks and standardizing
desktop computers with consistent hardware configurations across the service produced
an estimated savings of $200 million annually. It allowed service officials to move
approximately a thousand personnel in the IT community from administrative back-end
IT functions to war fighting positions (Tiboni 2004b, 1).
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Air Force leaders could not avoid the DoD’s large scale outsourcing and
privatization effort that began in 1998, seeking $7.5 billion annually for modernization
efforts, as noted earlier (Suss 1998, 1). The Air Force decided to test small samples of
network outsourcing in organizations that did not deploy resources and affect core
mission activities (Murray and Seffers 2001, 1). For example, the Air Force concentrated
its outsourcing studies on noncombat commands running pilot desktop outsourcing (seat
management) programs (Brewin and Verton 1998, 2). An example of this approach came
in 1999 with a small pilot network at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. While the
Navy was at the beginning stages of competitively sourcing its entire shore-based
network, the Air Force awarded a small desktop outsourcing contract to Federal Data
Corporation to support 220 Special Operations Forces personnel serviced by a selfcontained network (Verton 1999a, 2). The contract provided a good test bed for the Air
Force to evaluate the support and management provided by the private sector.
In 2004, the Air Force began to consider outsourcing the management and support
of its digital imaging and printing equipment that were not Air Force core competencies.
From an organization perspective, outsourcing these functions was aligned with the
nature of the organization, as functions considered external or non-pertinent to its
primary mission consumed resources and personnel that could be used for primary
missions. Organizations were more interested in providing personnel and spending
resources for operations/activities supporting the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In support of retaining the network capability within the organization, Air Force
leadership continued to make efforts to prioritize networks as a fundamental element in
their current and future war fighting effort. This was emphasized in the 2004
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consolidation of three information technology offices ensuring the current and future IT
projects were integrated into the service’s war fighting operations (Tiboni 2004a, 1). The
Office of Networks and War fighting Integration provided the Air Force with the
structure to build an enterprise approach and ensure networks and IT policies coalesced
to support the war fighting effort.

Army
Evaluating the effectiveness of organization factors in explaining the Army
approach to outsourcing its IT infrastructure, the hypothesis being tested is that new
activities and those outside the scope of an organization’s normal wartime specific
takings are likely to be privatized in periods of budgetary decline. Many of the actions
taken by the Army regarding network management and infrastructure development
paralleled efforts taken by the Air Force in establishing their IT network infrastructure.
This section will evaluate Army actions in the 1990s, when networks were
decentralized, through 2004, when network management was consolidated under
NETCOM and recognized as a core war fighting capability. In 2001, the Army
identified its network as a core capability retaining control over the development of its
network infrastructure and the budget associated with it. The Army’s organizational
essence was primarily a garrison force that deployed to contingency and wartime
locations as needed. Its early network, which developed similarly to the Navy and Air
Force at the local unit level in a decentralized environment, became integral to their
operations as networks increased in capability and became a dependent resource for most
unit leaders. Deployed soldiers used the Army’s global network from worldwide
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locations to communicate and assist in daily operations. It was integral to its wartime and
peacetime missions. The Army, however, continued to use outsourcing as an avenue to
attract skilled IT personnel to fill voids in capability.
IT actions taken by the Army’s Materiel Command represent how organizations
across the Army addressed IT when local organizations developed their own networks. In
2000, James D. Buckner, CIO of the Army Materiel Command, understood the
importance of IT and the network, but saw it as a peripheral function to his organization’s
primary mission. Though networks were a conduit to accomplishing command
objectives, Army Materiel Command was spread across 40 states and 24 countries and
responsible for delivering all support and operational requirements to the soldier
(Buckner 2000).
Being responsible for requirements associated with managing a global network and
its peripherals took manpower and resources away from primary missions. The rapid
change of technology resulting in updating IT products every two to three years along
with ongoing maintenance and updates to the network infrastructure was a full-time
challenge for any organization. Buckner, like other Army organization CIOs, preferred a
desktop outsourcing contract giving ownership and responsibility of the network and its
peripherals to the contractor (Buckner 2000). The support for IT outsourcing can be
linked to the subordinate role of IT, and it not being the primary objective of his
organization’s traditional mission. As suggested in the private sector and in the Navy,
desktop outsourcing had become a convenient approach for organizations unwilling to
embrace the integral role of IT and networks in their primary mission.
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For example, Buckner’s subordinate command, the Army’s Simulation, Training
and Instrumentation Command (STRICOM) had completed a pilot desktop outsourcing
contract for the management of their thousand PCs (Murray 2000a, 1). Litton PRC
Incorporated managed the network and help desk, and took ownership of the computers
while also refurbishing and replacing all PCs while in-house IT personnel were utilized at
other organizations in core mission activities (Buckner 2000; Murray 2000a, 1).
In 2001, the Army began to recognize the importance of treating networks as core
capabilities integrated into their wartime missions. Key to the Army’s IT centralization
and efforts to treat networks as core and war fighting capability was the realignment of its
IT infrastructure management and control into the newly established NETCOM.
NETCOM, which had been Army Signal Command, had technical control over the
information management directors at all Army installations. The Army commitment to
standardizing and controlling its networks was demonstrated in an effort to standardize
software across the Army. NETCOM established a software-blocking policy to ensure
that Army organizations ran similar versions of all software (Temin 2002b). These
actions exemplified the Army interest in managing and controlling its infrastructure as an
enterprise and core capability.
Similar to the Air Force Netcents solutions to address IT requirements and
purchases, the Army IT transformation enlisted the assistance of the private sector for
guidance and IT acquisitions through multiple large requirements contracts and vendors
(Wait 2005, 1). While NETCOM assisted with helping to determine candidates for
outsourcing, it was also the focal point for all Army IT equipment and service purchases,
the Army established the Army Enterprise Infostructure Transformation (AEIT) program
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to reduce the costs of acquiring IT solutions through a selection of contractors to support
its IT needs (Caterinicchia 2002b, 1; McCarter 2003, 1–2). The Army also established the
Army Small Computer Program (ASCP) based on the success of the Air Force
Commodity Council to gain benefits through consolidating IT purchases (FCW 2005, 1).
The Army continued to use outsourcing as a vehicle to assist with filling capability
gaps in network tasks due, in part, to the reduction in qualified IT and digital
soldiers/specialists.79 As the DoD force was reduced by more than 30 percent in the
1990s, qualified IT manpower within the Army were sought by the private sector with
greater salaries than those received within the military, resulting in an attrition problem of
qualified personnel. Shortage of qualified personnel, in combination with increased
deployments, reduced the capability of the Army to support complex IT technologies
with in-house resources. It led Army officials to outsource technical areas of their
network mission that lacked sufficient in-house expertise.
Lack of abundant, technically proficient soldiers was evident at the Army’s Task
Force XXI exercise in 1997. It was the first digitized ground force exercise where the
tactical internet was the central feature and key element of the exercise at Fort Irwin, CA
(Hanna 1997, 1–2). Building the tactical internet required integrating the efforts of
contractor personnel and soldiers, and the Army needed to rely on contractors to train and
equip forces with state of the art technology (Hanna 1997, 4).
From Task Force XXI to the conflicts involving Army forces in the post-2000 era,
many of the Army’s deployed operations used contractors to augment and assist in the IT
network mission. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the tactical network was complex,

79

Digital soldiers are those members trained in IT skills to intuitively operate complex systems (Toomey
2003, 43).
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maintenance-intensive, and built around static, line-of-sight nodes that go off-line during
movement (Toomey 2003, 44). Maintenance of the network and sustainment of digital
systems continue to rest primarily with an expansive cadre of civilian contractors;
establishing the network and keeping it running is a highly specialized talent (Toomey
2003, 44).

Summary of Findings
Navy - The hypothesis that organizations are more inclined to outsource activities
not associated with their primary mission, when budget reductions impact organizations,
or new activities with limited in-house expertise, is useful in explaining the Navy
outsourcing effort. Lack of funding for the NMCI was one of the Navy’s major
impediments to creating an in-house solution. The DoN did not strategically budget or
program for an enterprise-type network and DoD budgets steadily decreased throughout
the 1990s. Without a programming plan or approved congressional budget line for
NMCI, Navy leaders were left with the options of either funding the project through
existing IT funding with an in-house solution, requesting immediate funding from
Congress, or developing a creative solution through outsourcing to provide the network
requirements. The Navy was left with outsourcing the network since its other options did
not meet its network objectives. The in-house solution faced a continuation of their
decentralized IT environment with network control at the local level and insufficient
funding. Requesting immediate funding from Congress would slow the delivery of the
network due to its size and acquisition requirements and there was no guarantee of
congressional approval.
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A second factor supporting the proposition was the nature of budget execution
dynamics across the Navy that resulted from an increased level of independence and
autonomy at the local organization level. Budget execution was centered at lower
echelon organizations that made it very difficult to accomplish an in-house solution.
These lower echelon organizations were the center of power for the Navy’s IT and
network development. They subjectively prioritized purchases based on their operational
missions. The Navy CIO did not have budget authority (Porter 2008). Shore-based IT
support was developed inconsistently across the Navy as each organization prioritized IT
differently and based it on local operational requirements. Some leaders prioritized IT
higher on their shopping list than others. Yet, with only one budget to support all
organization requirements, operational needs remained higher on the list than IT services.
As noted by Navy CIO Dan Porter, the Navy did not want to take budget execution
power away from lower echelon organization leaders. They were, in effect, like business
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), responsible for running their daily mission and
deciding on how their budget was spent (Porter 2008). As Porter noted, “Though they
may believe in the information revolution, they were in essence, business men who
needed to optimize resources at the local level to deliver their mission requirements”
(Porter 2008).

In addition, as noted earlier, the DoN was unsuccessful at holding

organizations accountable for producing A-76 competitive sourcing savings in the 1990s.
Attempting to hold units accountable for implementing a plan to revamp the network
infrastructure, using their own budget, without additional resources, was unlikely.
Finally, considering that NMCI was not central to the Navy essence (as suggested
by Navy leaders) Morton H. Halperin’s observation that an organization is often

281
indifferent to functions not seen as part of its essence or as necessary to protect its
essence was not consistent with the NMCI study (Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter 2006, 39).
NMCI was considered a non-core function and not integral to the Navy’s primary seabased mission, or expeditionary in nature, yet the Navy was not indifferent towards
NMCI. As discussed earlier in chapter seven, while outsourcing was not an automatic
choice initially, the decision to outsource was reached through a meticulous leadership
process consisting of 75–150 senior leaders from across the Navy from 1998 through
2000. The Secretary of the Navy assumed a very risky position by not having a fallback
plan if Congress disapproved the outsourcing effort or if the contractor could not produce
the intended results.
Considering this environment, the Navy engagement in the NMCI project highlights
the importance of some non-core activities in the overall mission of an organization and
its commitment to ensuring those functions are maintained and supported, regardless of
who performs the service. It could also indicate that the Navy shore-based IT was more
than just a non-core activity and Halperin’s observations remain true.

Air Force - Organization factors appear useful in explaining the Air Force approach
towards IT outsourcing and its decision to retain its network capability in-house.
Though IT network operations were a new capability, Air Force leadership defined the
network as a weapon system, integral to its wartime mission and retained control of the
network infrastructure. Lt. General Harry Raduege Jr., director of the Defense
Information Systems Agency and manager of the National Communications System from
2000 through 2003 noted, “Networks carry information and information is an intrinsic
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element of winning wars. Information, information processing and communication
networks are at the core of every military activity” (Walker 2000b, 1). It was considered
a weapons system because of its ability to operationalize data for leaders and as a
mechanism to control cyberspace.
The Air Force embraced the network as it would a fighter or bomber aircraft,
making the case that its war fighting activities were becoming net-centric. Per the
hypothesis, outsourcing would not be expected for an activity considered core to an
organization’s mission. The budget appears to be an additional factor in retaining the
capability as funding for IT-related missions increased by billions of dollars over the
period between the late 1990s and 2005. Also, the Air Force was structured to allow the
CIO the authority to centralize network assets, increase the IT budget and make
purchases to standardize networks and create an enterprise-wide system.
John Gilligan, CIO of the Air Force, was successful at initiating centralized control
and an enterprise-wide approach to network management through an in-house solution.
By using the chain of command, Gilligan communicated his request for consolidation of
network assets through major command leaders who in turn tasked their organizations to
take action on the request. Organizations were quick to follow the orders of four-star
general officers, military-to-military direction, that minimized the cultural resistance to
changing the locally controlled environment of network management (Gilligan 2008).
Unlike the Navy NMCI system, personnel, funding and resources attached to the
network mission were retained by the Air Force. Maintaining control of the network with
in-house personnel was central to not only integrating Air Force activities across the
globe, but also, for provided a training and proficiency enhancing environment for
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military and government civilian IT personnel. This capability was necessary to develop
and maintain the skills and capability to install, operate and maintain the network
worldwide. The outsourcing of IT related network activities were supported by the Air
Force when it was considered non-core to the war-fighting mission or for technically
complex elements of the network system where in-house resources and capability were
either limited or nonexistent.

Army - Organization factors appear useful in examining the hypothesis that new
activities and those outside the scope of an organization’s normal wartime specific
taskings are likely to be privatized in periods of budgetary decline in the Army’s network
development during the 1990s. Traditionally, the Army had not been as IT-centric as the
other services (French 2003). This was demonstrated in the Army’s late start (post 2000)
in assessing their IT network environment. In the 1990s most Army units remained
organized and equipped to fight Cold War-type battles (Verton 2000a, 1). In the Cold
War era, Army IT was never centrally managed and funded (FCW 2004). To remain
relevant, transformation to a leaner, smarter and quick-to-respond force was required to
address the new post-Cold War threats and conflicts. Lt. General William H. Campbell,
Director of Information Systems, Command, Control, Communications and Computers,
U.S. Army, argued that IT was a fundamental piece of the Army’s transformation plan
(Verton 2000a, 2).
Unlike the Navy, the Army identified the network as a core war fighting capability
and by 2001 moved to centrally manage its global resource by reducing the autonomy of
local units to maintain their own systems. The Army put its CIO in charge of tens of
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millions of information technology dollars with one organization in charge of operating
and maintaining its infrastructure (Seffers 2001). Similar to the Air Force, the Army
network was a global entity based on the nature of its mission and organization. It was
integral to both peacetime and wartime missions. The risk of losing control of the
enterprise network architecture plan and having the private sector manage and operate its
network capability was too great when considering the critical role of information in the
Army’s numerous missions.
In 2004, the Army consolidated its IT resources and desktop support services under
a single organization and put one person in charge of IT operations at each of its bases
and installations in an effort to build an enterprise info-structure (FCW 2004). The
Army’s centralized IT leadership orchestrated outsourcing efforts for network operations
and development where Army capabilities were either limited or nonexistent
(Caterinicchia 2002a). Maintaining in-house control of network operations afforded the
Army flexibility and leverage in how it would spend its increased IT budget and how to
employ its infrastructure. Maintaining control of its infrastructure gave the Army greater
leverage and options in choosing contractors for a variety of requirements to meet Army
and DoD mission needs.

CONCLUSION

This chapter evaluated the approach of each service in addressing the management
of their network technology and infrastructure from the lens of strategic efficiency,
ideology and organization factors. The findings suggest that organization factors offered
the most value in explaining the approach of each service towards outsourcing its
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network management and development. Organization factors offered significant value in
explaining network outsourcing decision making in all three services. A key factor in the
decision of both the Air Force and Army to not outsource control and management of
their networks was defining it as a core organizational capability. Considering the
network a core capability or weapon system prioritized its value and importance and
demonstrated the commitment of the Army and Air Force to retain the asset. Also,
increasing IT budgets over the period appeared to be an incentive to keep networks
within the realm of service organizations, as it provided billions of dollars to
organizations responsible for network operations, security and development.
Organization factors are effective in explaining the Navy’s NMCI outsourcing
effort. Network activities were a fairly new capability and Navy leadership qualified the
NMCI as a non-core function since it was not integral to their war-fighting mission. As
noted earlier, the Navy considered itself an expeditionary force, with its primary wartime
mission centered in the deployed environment. Its fleet and shore based organizations
were separate entities, and integration through network technology was not standard. The
lack of funding and the Navy’s internal organization structure with lower organizations
being centers of power in IT development were additional factors helping to shape the
outsourcing decision.
The Navy CIO during this period noted how the Navy did not have an organization
ability to fund the IT network infrastructure from a central source (Porter 2008). Rather,
each organization was responsible for its own IT and used its budget to build its IT
domains. Budgets were prioritized subjectively at the local levels where IT was not
necessarily the top priority. The Navy leadership team working on its network plan
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realized they could not create their new network from the current infrastructure, with inhouse resources, due to the power of lower organization leaders to align IT priorities and
funding according to their mission requirements as compared to DoN requirements
(Porter 2008). Private sector IT professionals provided the most effective option for the
Navy because they became the only source of networking for all Navy organizations.
Lower echelon organizations had to go through the contractor for network connectivity.
It provided the Navy with an ability to create network homogeneity across its
organizations with increased security.
Though Navy and Marine leaders publicly supported outsourcing NMCI, respective
organizations within each service did not appear to share the same support. In response
to NMCI operations and service, customer satisfaction decreased, network performance
suffered and conversion of legacy systems were delayed or did not occur due to
inadequate integration efforts. Marine Corps leaders eventually voiced their
dissatisfaction publicly, as a seamless exchange of information between units worldwide
was still a problem four years and two contract extensions after the initial outsourcing
decision was completed. The organization discontent appears to suggest that the network
was more than a utility, but an integral part of the organization that affected their ability
to conduct primary mission functions.
While neoliberal beliefs and ideas were popular in the Executive and Congress
during the second Clinton Administration and G.W. Bush Administration, they were not
causal factors in the network management actions of each service. The Navy process for
choosing an enterprise network solution consisted of a working group of 75–150 senior
leaders for whom the priority was not to save money nor reduce manning positions but to
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field an enterprise network. The Navy’s lack of coordination with a neoliberal-friendly
Congress, in combination with a highly innovative and risk-prone funding approach that
appeared to elude congressional review, suggested a measure of organization expediency
and distrust of members of the House and Senate for a favorable review and approval.
While a neoliberal-friendly Congress and Executive appeared helpful in the
passage and follow-on extensions of the NMCI service contract, Congress was ready to
withhold required dollars for the network unless the Navy addressed several irregularities
and incomplete data surrounding the network contract (Porter 2008). The Air Force and
Army network decision making did not appear to be affected by political ideology. Both
services maintained primary control of network management and operations with inhouse personnel.
Strategic efficiency was not useful in explaining the Navy’s NMCI outsourcing as
negligible savings and areas of uncertainty from the incomplete nature of the outsourcing
process created an increased level of risk undermining conditions for a cost-efficient
contract. The potential for increased service costs appeared greater than the cost-saving
benefits being provided by the contractor. Private sector desktop computing management
costs did not offer significant savings when compared to Navy costs. Costs for both the
private sector and Navy systems appeared to have a negligible difference while costs for
customer support and converting legacy systems to the NMCI were not included when
comparing pre-NMCI and NMCI costs. Risks associated with giving ownership and
control of the network to a private sector contractor were significant but not include in its
cost savings process.
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In the Air Force and Army, strategic efficiency had limited usefulness in explaining
the outsourcing decision making for their network management and control, offering
insight into explaining some outsourcing decisions facilitated through organizations and
programs such as the Commodity Council, Netcents, AEIT and ASCP. They allowed
the Air Force and Army to leverage their size and buying power to procure resources and
services at a competitive cost.
The findings from the study highlight why private actors have become an integral
component in establishing and supporting the DoD’s IT capability. The Navy’s NMCI
project, the largest DoD IT desktop outsourcing contract to date, highlights how the
influence of internal organizations and budget constraints remain pertinent in outsourcing
actions. It highlighted the independent and subjective nature of service organizations
when comparing the NMCI project with similar network management decisions in the
Air Force and Army.
The independent nature of each service points to the value of organization factors in
understanding the network phenomenon. It provided the widest span of explanation in
understanding service outsourcing actions. Air Force and Army actions focused on
maintaining control of their network capabilities while using outsourcing in specific areas
where services had limited-to-no capability to provide expertise when lacking personnel
with in-house technical ability. As noted, the Air Force and Army chose different
approaches than the Navy to address similar network development requirements despite
unique differences in mission. These choices were linked in part to service discretion in
defining the core or non-core nature of the network towards the performance of its
mission and to the nature of the organizational structure of each service.
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The findings suggest that outsourcing has become an important instrument, as
discussed in this study, for using private sector expertise in complex and challenging
technical areas in support of the evolving DoD mission. How outsourcing is
implemented within the DoD will likely continue to be subjective and marked by a
service parochialism manifested in service control over what they identify as core
activities in executing the mission. While the services are on the pathway towards the
JCS vision of information superiority across a joint network architecture, reaching the
final destination may prove to be elusive.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
In this study I’ve examined the usefulness of three theoretical frameworks of state
behavior to explain the outsourcing phenomenon of defense services in the DoD. The
case studies of DoD outsourcing activity during periods of high and low activity between
1970 and 2005, along with IT network development in each military service, have served
as a vehicle to test the frameworks against one another for their explanatory power. It’s
also provided the opportunity to examine the extent of political contestation and identify
the likely winners and losers in the nature of defense outsourcing. A comprehensive
view of the theoretical frameworks, predictions and outcomes of outsourcing behavior in
the case studies is provided in the tables - Strategic Efficiency, Political Ideology,
Organization Factors and Overview at the end of this chapter.
The analysis of DoD outsourcing of defense services in each of the case studies has
been useful in establishing a general account of the outsourcing phenomenon between
1970 and 2005, highlighting commonalities in outsourcing behavior and providing a
better understanding of its nature and its political impact. The study finds that strategic
efficiency and political ideology offered limited usefulness and DoD outsourcing was
primarily an instrument for service organizations to further solidify their core mission
requirements and to adapt to new and changing requirements. Also, as will be discussed
in this section, DoD outsourcing of defense services diffused control over defense
activities among non-state (private sector) actors, threatening the states collective
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monopoly over the control of force, limiting public accountability of national defense
actions and challenging the effectiveness of defense organizations.
In my judgment, organization factors offered a more persuasive and comprehensive
explanation than either strategic efficiency or political ideology propositions for most
DoD outsourcing behavior. In the broadest sense, organization factors suggest increased
outsourcing for new capabilities/activities enhancing the overall mission. They are also
more inclined to outsource support activities when budget constraints threaten primary
missions and when required expertise is beyond the capability of the organization. The
six case studies suggest that organization factors are significant, as DoD’s decentralized,
independent approach to outsourcing for support services gives primary control to an
array of military organizations. These organizations have dictated, to a large degree, the
scope and extent of outsourcing activity throughout the period to support their missions
and requirements.
Procurement activity provided organizations with new services to support mission
objectives, as budget reductions, new technology and global conflicts reduced available
in-house resources. While competitive sourcing practices were designed for cost-savings,
organizations did not appear motivated by the A-76 program, as competitions were
inconsistent and not always viewed with favor by organizations. DoD organizations
subjectively used the A-76 program to compete primarily low impact support services
without affecting primary/core missions and without severely affecting their in-house
manning authorizations.
The result of DoD organization autonomy and independence in the outsourcing of
support services was reflective of service autonomy and independence at the highest
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level of leadership in each military service. Each military service procured systems and
services to support its own primary service-centric missions, while deemphasizing the
integrated joint mission. Interservice competition for resources reduced civilian control
in budget matters, limiting the ability to establish joint capabilities and reduce similar
weapon systems unique to each service. Procurement activity centered around the
objectives of each military service and its organizations, as compared to focusing
procurement activity around the national interest and joint combatant war fighting
missions. For example, there are still four tactical air forces and each service has their
own versions of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). It reinforces the unique identity
and survival interests of each service. As Samuel Huntington pointed out nearly 50 years
ago, “the castles of the services will remain in existence, battered but untaken, long after
the decisive battles, both political and military, have shifted to other fields” (Huntington
1961, 52).
Defense and senior government leaders appear to be the winners in acquiring the
private sector services to support their defense mission needs. As suggested by Deborah
Avant, the use of market alternatives for military service through government contracts
generally gives the advantage to executives relative to legislatures, reduces transparency,
and reduces the mobility required to send public forces abroad (Avant 2005, 260). The
market option can further enhance the relative capacity to project military force and
interests abroad, as in the Balkans, Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, and make it
easier to undertake adventurous foreign policies or actions without widespread support in
the polity (Avant 2005, 259).
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While DoD outsourcing offers individual states the ability to enhance the capacity
of their forces, military commanders, civil service personnel and the American public,
represented by democratic principles, stand to lose as a result of DoD outsourcing and its
integration into national defense. The growth of the market for services engaged in
military/security activities diffuses control over violence among a variety of non-state
entities, undermining states’ collective monopoly over the control of force and enhancing
the role for non-state actors in shaping decisions about the use of force (Avant 2005,
228,253). Avant’s argument can account for a range of outsourced tasks and activities
aimed at enhancing and contributing to the defense mission. Organization autonomy in
the defense outsourcing realm within an environment of ineffective oversight,
monitoring and limited transparency reduces the public accountability for national
defense activities, as control of activities becomes diffused across non-state actors.
The expectations of the American public for accountability and transparency in the
execution of national defense must now be tempered by the increased growth and
dependency on the private sector in national defense activities. This partnership, created
through outsourcing, has put increased stress on democratic principles and values, as
exemplified in the notorious abuses at Abu Graib prison in Iraq during the U.S. Iraqi
Freedom campaign. Contractors acting on behalf of the United States military have not
been held to the same standards as military or DoD civilian personnel with regards to
legal infractions and wrongdoing. This jeopardized the integrity and effectiveness of the
military organization as well as our democratic principles.
Commanders have seen their authority and flexibility to accomplish the mission
diminish while the in-house capacity of military organizations has decreased. The
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increased outsourcing of personnel providing support for sophisticated technological
activities, many integrated into operational tasks, has begun to limit the ability and power
of commanders to lead their organizations. They are unable to independently override
contracts and realign contractors for time-sensitive issues where necessary.
Military and civil service personnel have seen many of their positions eliminated or
converted to private sector contracts. The current outsourcing phenomenon calls into
question the ability of the DoD to attract and retain a future in-house workforce with a
broader set of skills providing the necessary services and requirements to satisfy the
national defense objectives of the United States. Outsourcing has diminished the
internal/in-house capacity of DoD organizations to perform core missions without being
dependent on the private sector. While some dependency via the use of technical
representatives has been common throughout the era of major weapon systems
procurements, the integration of the private sector in service and operational support
activities has expanded dependency throughout the portfolio of military missions.
In the remainder of this chapter, I’ll briefly discuss the value and limits of strategic
efficiency, political ideology and organization factors in examining DoD outsourcing
behavior across the case studies. Then, I’ll address the costs and challenges to defense
organizations, the American public and democratic principles posed by the DoD’s
outsourcing behavior.

STRATEGIC EFFICIENCY

The strategic efficiency framework was limited in its usefulness of explaining
outsourcing activity. It was inconsistent in predicting results in higher skilled areas that
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were outsourced, despite many DoD personnel retaining their cost-effectiveness. It was
useful in highlighting differentiated outcomes in the outsourcing process and was
consistent in explaining procurement and competitive sourcing activities for lower skilled
activities where private sector personnel were more cost effective and provided a cost
savings for the DoD. These lower skilled areas accounted for 75 percent of the
competitive sourcing activities and about 30 percent of service procurement. These
findings supported the transactions cost argument as the market provided an effective
structure to support competition and gain efficiency with cost-saving results for these
routine/low-impact services.
However, DoD outsourcing behavior was not always targeted towards cost savings
and suffered from less than full cost accounting, poor oversight and contract surveillance
practices that produced transaction hazards that were not mitigated effectively and
contributed to the diffusion of control to non-state entities. While the goal was costsavings and efficiency, it was questionable whether ex ante and ex post transaction costs
were accounted for in procurement and competitive sourcing actions. These included the
costs of competition, establishing contracts, administration, monitoring, oversight,
dispute settlements and enforcing the contractually promised performance (Alchian and
Woodward 1988, 66–67).
In the Navy’s NMCI outsourcing case, for example, the transactions cost aspect of
the competition suffered as Navy leadership produced incomplete cost comparisons and
risk assessments. The risks accepted by the Navy in the procurement of the NMCI
appeared to outweigh any potential benefits. In addition, Navy leaders did not appear to
include ex post transaction costs, such as those involved with monitoring, oversight and
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quality control of outsourced activities, into their cost calculations. The Navy faced
endemic problems in these areas that resulted in increased costs for service delivery and
the dependency on the private sector for their network capability. The overall findings
from the case studies suggest that procurement activity was not targeted solely at
activities where the private sector could provide cost savings, and introduced a level of
risk and transaction hazard not acceptable in terms of cost savings and efficiency.
Weak administration and management of service contracts also hindered strategic
efficiency. Contract management was designated a high-risk area in the DoD in 1992
due to vulnerabilities involving greater susceptibility to fraud, waste, abuse, and
mismanagement (GAO 2005b, 5–6). Areas of concern included acquisition workforce
shortages, failure to use available pricing information for sole-source contract awards,
improper use of interagency contracting, and insufficient surveillance and ex post
management actions relative to contract management (Schinasi 2006, 7–13). These
concerns and others are highlighted in terms of DoD’s personnel reductions during the
1990s and in DoD’s Inspector General’s (IG) examination of contracting programs.
The effective administration and management of DoD procurement growth to attain
efficiency and the best dollar value, was compromised in part by the significant reduction
in skilled personnel. Between 1989 and 2002, DoD reduced its civilian acquisition
workforce by about 38 percent without ensuring the department had the specific skills
and competencies to accomplish future DoD missions (Schinasi 2006, 8). Yet between
1989 and 2002, the cost for procurement of services increased from $81 billion to $92
billion (Table 1). In 2002, 54 percent of DoD spending for goods and services was spent
on service contracts (DoD IG 2003, 1).
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The DoD IG performed an audit review of 105 contract actions, valued at $6.6
billion, for professional, administrative and management support services between 1997
and 1998, revealing numerous problems in the award and management of contracts (DoD
IG 2003, 1). The IG found contracting officials typically did not use past experiences or
lessons learned from prior acquisitions of the same services to help define requirements
more clearly. Officials continued to award cost reimbursement contracts and accepted the
risks of cost overruns despite 39 years of experience in purchasing the same services
from the same contractor (Cooper 2001, 5–6). DoD officials did not prepare wellsupported independent cost estimates to assess whether the costs that contractors
proposed were reasonable. Oversight of contractor performance was inadequate in a
majority of cases, as some officials could not show that they actually reviewed the
contractors’ work (Cooper 2001, 6).
As a result of an increase in expenditures for services, the DoD IG reexamined the
area in 2003, reviewing 113 contract actions with an estimated value of $17.8 billion
(DoD IG 2003, i). Problems continued to exist in the award and administration of
contracts for professional, administrative, and management support services. Contracting
officials continued to award and administer contracts for services without following
prescribed procedures as noted in 98 of the 113 contracts at 12 DoD locations having one
or more problems (DoD IG 2003, i,4). Problems included a lack of utilization of
historical information for defining requirements, inadequate competition or questionable
sole-source awards, a faulty basis for price-reasonableness determinations and inadequate
contract surveillance or non-compliance with U.S. Truth in Negotiations Act procedures
(DoD IG 2003, i,4).
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In 2000, the GAO reviewed 22 DoD service orders with a value of $553 million and
found concerning trends and challenges in contract management practices. A majority of
the orders were awarded without competing proposals, work descriptions were broadly
defined, and the government was left bearing most of the risk of cost growth (Cooper
2001, 5). GAO also found instances of improper use of interagency contracts and a
failure to follow prescribed procedures designed to ensure fair prices. 80 Competition
requirements were waived to retain the services of incumbent contractors. It was also not
clear who was responsible for describing requirements, negotiating terms and conducting
oversight for these contracts.
A key aspect of ensuring efficiency and cost-savings in contracts is the ex post
management, or surveillance actions, that include the negotiation of contract adaptations,
monitoring, and enforcement. As suggested by Donald Kettl, monitoring may be the most
arduous and expensive part of the process, a consequence of the principal-agent conflict
(Kettl 1993, 29). While outsourcing doesn’t entail the withdrawal of the state from the
provision of certain services, it requires extensive administrative and regulatory structures
to oversee the delivery of services by contractors. For example, financial monitoring is
designed to ensure, through auditing, that contractors are paid only as mandated by the
contract (Prager 1994, 179). Technical monitoring involves comparing the quantity and
quality of product or service delivered against contract specifications, while quality control
requires inspection and review of the delivered service (Prager 1994, 179). DoD’s arduous
monitoring requirement is further complicated by a lack of control over contractors by

80

Interagency contracts provide agencies with easy access to commonly needed goods and services.
Agencies sponsoring these services usually charge a fee to support their operations. These types of
contracts have allowed customer agencies to meet the demands for goods and services at a time when they
face growing workloads and a declining workforce (GAO, 2005a, 25–26).
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organizational leaders, which is more indirect and subject to the parties’ interpretation of
the contractual arrangement.
Monitoring problems were highlight by the DoD IG. IG reports noted that DoD
contracts were subject to insufficient surveillance to include training personnel in
conducting surveillance, assigning personnel at or prior to contract award, holding
personnel accountable for their surveillance duties and performing and documenting
surveillance throughout the period of the contract (Schinasi 2006, 13). The DoD IG
highlighted an insufficient number of trained personnel in place to provide effective
oversight of its logistics support contractors in Kuwait and Afghanistan, and inadequate
surveillance in 26 of 90 DoD service contracts reviewed.
Many of the problems noted above in DoD contracting procedures highlight
significant transaction costs that appear excluded from the cost value in contracts and
outsourcing activities. Their exclusion diminishes the effectiveness of the strategic
efficiency framework in explaining DoD outsourcing. As suggested by Williamson, given
the conditions of bounded rationality and opportunism, people are both less competent in
calculation and less trustworthy and reliable in action where no contractual arrangement
can specify or account for all possible contingencies (Prager 1994, 178). Given this
condition, it’s critical for the DoD to develop effective sourcing, oversight and monitoring
processes in order to provide a more comprehensive measure of efficiency in outsourcing
activities.
While the A-76/competitive sourcing program offered the opportunity for costsavings for all commercial-like activities, organizational leaders were reluctant in many
cases to utilize it due both to the programs complex nature and the negative impact on
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personnel. Managers argued that the program was time consuming, difficult to
implement, disruptive, and threatening to both managers and employees (Stevens 1995,
2). Cost studies were mostly done by managers and employees who developed detailed
work statements and analyses without appropriate training (Stevens 1995, 3).
Additionally, the absence of workload data and adequate cost accounting systems
contributed to an excessive amount of time being spent to complete A-76 studies and
disruption to the workplace (Stevens 1995, 3).
The questionable effectiveness of the A-76/competitive sourcing activities in
reducing organizational expenses by 30 to 40 percent was highlighted in cost accounting
problems. These problems included cost estimations based only on average salary costs
rather than on actual costs, underestimating costs of conducting A-76 studies that were as
high as $9,000 per position studied, projecting savings from reduced military positions
when these positions were not eliminated but transferred elsewhere, the exclusion of
separation pay costs for civilian employees, and added costs for extended studies
(Burman 2001).
As suggested by former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, it is not possible to
manage the DoD exactly like a business, i.e., to meet the bottom line that indicates profit,
or any other single measurable criterion (Brown 1983, 218). The need to be able to fight
a war will always limit the peacetime efficiency of the defense establishment, as will
domestic political factors (Brown 1983, 223). To manage the nation’s defense efficiently
at the lowest possible cost, along the lines of private-sector business management and
organization, is a useful standard, but meeting it exactly entails a price the U.S. cannot
afford to pay to including the abandonment of democratic control (Brown 1983, 224).
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POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

The case studies highlighted the inconsistent nature of political ideology as a factor
in explaining DoD outsourcing behavior. In cases where there were strong ideological
preferences for increased private sector involvement in the business of government, such
as in the Reagan and G.W. Bush administrations, DoD outsourcing activity created
political contestation within Congress, federal unions and those seeking to maintain an
effective civil-service capability. Federal unions had very little effect on contracting
actions, as they had little-to-no power in engaging managers over potential outsourcing
decisions, and there was no mechanism for union or employees to appeal a decision.
Despite President Clinton’s effort to improve labor-management relations in government,
his actions had no legal basis and were not adhered to by many managers.
Congress had a limited ability to affect the growth of the private sector in the DoD
through procurement of support service activities, since most support contracts were
below the congressional review cap. It had a greater ability to affect DoD outsourcing
through intervention in competitive sourcing policies through both legislation and debate
in Congress and with the administration.
The Reagan administration began with powerful public support for change in the
nature of government, and was successful at increasing private sector involvement in
performing public duties. It targeted a review of nearly 380,000 commercial-like federal
employee positions. The amount spent on DoD outsourcing through the procurement of
services rose by nearly 41 percent, from $61.9 to $87.2 billion from 1981 to 1988. In this
period, the percent of DoD O&M funds spent on procured services rose by 11.7 percent,
increasing from 52.1 to 63.8 percent after a 4.3 percent decline in the first case study.
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The growth of military positions in A-76 competitions rose from 5,000 in 1979 to nearly
11,000 in 1983, with a steady annual average between 7,000 and 11,000 through 1988.
The amount of completed cost studies for private sector competitions increased
significantly as compared to periods before and after the Reagan administration. More
than 1,500 cost comparison studies were completed from 1981 to 1988, as compared to
154 studies between 1978 and 1980, and 205 studies between 1989 and 1996.
Democrats in the House and Senate did not attempt to block this change in policy
direction, in part, due to Reagan’s strong public support. As suggested by political
ideology, outsourcing increased with the private-sector friendly administration and weak
resistance in Congress. The implementation of several Executive Orders and A-76 reform
actions highlighted Reagan’s commitment to engaging the private sector in government
and infusing open-market ideas into government. Establishing a structured and ongoing
competitive process between the government and private sector for the fulfillment of
government services through the A-76 process was born, as was increased dependency on
the private sector in the procurement of defense services. The substantial growth in
DoD’s outsourcing activity throughout this period was indicative of Reagan’s
commitment to the promotion of competition and increasing the role of the private sector
in pursuit of public goals.
Yet, as suggested by the third case-study, the Democrat-controlled Congress was
not eager to allow the unfettered growth of the private sector in public service
highlighted by some very public procurement scandals and abuses that associated a
negative reputation with all procurement activity contested by the DoD. Political
ideology was consistent in the containment and decline of DoD outsourcing activities,
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especially in the area of competitive sourcing. A strong Democratic Congress was
successful at supporting legislation that led in part to a significant reduction in
competitive sourcing activity.
Considering the job protection interests of constituents who were DoD federal and
civil service employees, the Nichols amendment gave the Democratic Congress the
ability to put competitive sourcing power at the local organization level. Commanders
were reluctant to diminish their organization strength any further than those already
incurred through congressionally imposed manpower cuts after 1989. Competitive
sourcing was void of any Executive influence or policy actions during the second case
study. Between 1988 and 1995, when Democrats controlled Congress, the Nichols
amendment had a substantial impact in reducing competitive sourcing activity in the
DoD. The total number of positions competed annually declined from 12,000 to 2,128
during this period. Competitive sourcing competitions declined, as well, from 109 to
under 20.
As President G.W. Bush embraced market competition for the government sector, a
polarized Congress pushed back against the president’s management agenda to open to
competition more than 300,000 federal jobs. Attempts by the administration to increase
competitive sourcing led to an anti-competition/outsourcing environment in Congress,
with bipartisan support against the administration’s plan to open up federal jobs to private
sector competition. Announcements for A-76 competitions dropped from nearly 450 in
1999–2000 to under 100 by 2002, and to under 50 by 2004. A-76 competitions declined
by nearly 30 percent, from a high of nearly 220 in 2000 to under 160 by 2003.
Despite congressional efforts and successes at resisting competitive sourcing
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activities, they had little effect on DoD’s procurement of services. There has also been
no interest at extending Congressional powers any further into this area of DoD’s budget
spending behavior. Outsourcing activity as indicated through the procurement of services
has seen an overall increase since the Reagan administration in periods when Democrats
controlled the federal government. It prompts the question as to whether outsourcing
activity is still subject to ideologically driven actions. The nature of DoD outsourcing
behavior during the current Obama administration with the Democratic controlled
Congress will be useful in evaluating whether ideology is a factor in shaping the extent of
activity.
The combination of conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan along with a Republican
administration helped to fuel the growth of procurement activity. Secretary Rumsfeld
advocated a market logic inside the U.S. military as the DoD increased its spending on
private contractors to perform mission related services, as opposed to increasing DoD
manpower as conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan took center stage in security policy.
Between 2000 and 2005, DoD outsourcing expenditures for support services grew by
73.2 percent, from $75 to $130 billion, while the percent of O&M dollars spent on
support services grew by nearly four percent, from 62 to 65.7 percent.
During the same period, military and federal civilian personnel force size did not
benefit from outsourcing activities, as their manning decreased from 2.147 million to
2.143 million despite being engaged in the largest military conflict since Vietnam. It
was the first prolonged modern U.S. conflict where military force structure was not
significantly increased to support operations. Integrating private contractors with DoD
personnel across operational and support missions, such as front line units, had become
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national security strategy. The utilization of private sector actors for DoD and State
Department missions in the deployed environments of Iraq and Afghanistan was arguably
greater than in any previous U.S. military campaign.
While contractors provided needed services and in many cases were effective at
performing their tasks, the increased outsourcing of defense-related activities in combat
zones led to the transfer of power to contractors with lack of accountability and
transparency. In cases throughout the areas of conflict, military commanders lacked
oversight and control of contract personnel who were from a variety of U.S. agencies
performing under different contract standards. Some contractors performing core
missions, such as prisoner interrogation, security, logistics, communications, and base
defense, were capable of using deadly force without effective oversight or monitoring,
and without developed standards of justice. The growing reliance on outsourcing defense
activities as a way for organizations to accomplish their core missions does not always
benefit the American public. It can have detrimental effects on the states national
security objectives and democratic ideals.

ORGANIZATION FACTORS

DOD organizations had relative independence and control regarding their missions.
Common throughout the study was a lack of political oversight and enforcement of
established procurement and competitive sourcing procedures. It gave organizations the
flexibility and tacit approval to conduct outsourcing practices according to their own
local priorities and interests. DOD organizations were able take advantage of weak A-76
implementation, monitoring and enforcement practices to resist opening to competition
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all commercial activities and selectively compete activities not involved in the primary
mission. The large growth in outsourcing during the 1980s benefited service
organizations as core missions were supported while budgets and manpower grew.
Between 1990 and 1995, the DoD budget was reduced from $445 billion to $340
billion, and manpower declined from 3.3 million to 2.4 million personnel respectively.
External pressure by policymakers, put new demands on service chiefs to find savings
within a defense department attempting to redefine its mission. Service chiefs sought the
status quo and resisted congressional pressure to diminish Cold War weapon systems,
arguing for civilian leaders to buy a new generation of weapons. Outsourcing behavior
for the larger, weapons-related procurement issues facing each service was representative
of how service organizations approached both weapon and support system outsourcing
issues.
The budget decline did not reflect an adjustment to a new strategic environment, as
services and defense contractors remained the winners in the procurement process while
service organizations acquired the systems and support services necessary to perform
their missions. Congressional efforts to minimize constituent upheaval in the defense
industry along with service organization interests helped to keep military production
capacity relatively unchanged at Cold War levels (Gholz and Sapolsky 1999/2000,
23,51). The percent of O&M funds spent on procurement activity for support services
increased from 62.5 to 65 percent, as the O&M budget decline was greater than the
decline in procurement spending for support services.
Service organizations utilized legislation such as the Nichols Act to control the
DoD competitive sourcing process and limit further personnel reductions and morale
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problems in their organizations. This was indicated by the rapid decline in competitive
sourcing activity between 1989 and 1995. In this era, DoD completed 202 cost
comparison studies as opposed to the 1,744 completed between 1981 and 1988.
Modernization efforts, including the incorporation of sophisticated technologies in a
climate of budget reductions during the 1990s left service leaders seeking to find savings
in order to support their core missions and weapon systems. Service leaders become
more proactive in reducing manpower costs across existing support activities as DoD A76 competitions increased from under 20 in 1995 to nearly 220 in 2000. The DoD was
spending a majority of its O&M budget for support related activities not considered core
capabilities. Competition was a means of reducing the size of the support structure to
increase dollars allocated for modernization efforts. The assumption was that
competition would ultimately provide savings and allow services organizations to
maintain their war fighting missions with modern weapons systems.
In the treatment of IT networks during this period, organization factors, such as
whether an activity is core to the mission, affected outsourcing behavior. The Army and
Air Force considered the network central to supporting their wartime missions,
considering it a weapon system. Thus outsourcing was limited and did not involve the
management and operations of their IT networks. The Navy did not consider its shore
based network integral to its wartime mission. It was utilized primarily for support and
R&D missions as compared to the fleet’s expeditionary mission with its own internal IT
network.
Also, in addition to the core nature of the IT activity, organization structure was
important in outsourcing decision making for each of the military services. The Navy’s
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organization structure was built for an expeditionary Navy emphasizing decentralization,
autonomy and a wide degree of latitude in unit operations that drove budgeting and
procurement activities. An enterprise-wide IT network using organic resources was
difficult to achieve in a decentralized structure that promoted independent decision making.
The center of power for network management and development was the Navy’s lower
echelon organizations where budget control and execution were within the local
commander’s domain. The Navy CIO did not have funding or budget authority and was
limited in directing local commanders regarding their IT purchases. Attempts to reprogram
funds from organization budgets to pay for the NMCI were met with strong resistance by
Navy admirals.
In the Air Force, by the late 1990s, control of the network was facilitated by an
organization structure where power migrated from the Wing, or unit level, to the Air Force
Headquarter/Air Staff level. The Air Force considered its network a core capability used in
part to support its diverse mission areas. It centralized the role of IT and network
development and directed activities across the Air Force organization/enterprise supported
by senior leaders in Air Force major commands. Unlike the Navy, the Air Force CIO was
able to centrally budget and procure IT resources and make policy that supported strategic
planning and the development of an enterprise network by using the military chain of
command.
As the Air Force and Army retained operational control of their IT networks, the
growth of technology and its integration across all military platforms expanded
exponentially. The DoD did not have sufficient training resources or manpower to
provide for the volume and level of technology being woven into defense missions.
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Outsourcing facilitated the objectives of service organizations to maintain core missions
in order to remain integral components of national defense. It led to an increase by nearly
50 percent in Automated Data Processing and Telecom procurement where the average
percent of O&M budget spent on procured services during the period was 64.8 percent,
an increase of 3.2 percent from the 1989–95 period.
Organizations increased procurement activities during the G.W. Bush
administration, as the percent of O&M budget spent on procured services grew from 61.9
to 65.7 percent through 2005. Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with the growth
of technology, made it difficult for service organizations to perform their missions
without additional manpower. Contractors were augmented into organizations to provide
mostly support services, but in some cases operational tasks. As the DoD budget grew,
service organizations reduced competitive sourcing activities, despite the efforts of the
G.W. Bush administration to increase competition within the federal government. The
decline in competitive sourcing activity was noted in a drop in A-76 competitions, from
nearly 220 in 2000 to 160 by 2003, and announced competitive sourcing initiatives, from
200 in 2000 to fewer than 50 by 2004.

OUTSOURCING COSTS AND CHALLENGES

While defense and government leaders were primarily the winners in DoD
outsourcing activities, outsourcing created new difficulties and challenges for defense
organization commanders, federal unions/civil service personnel, the American public
and democratic principles. When outsourcing did occur, the lack of skill sets at the local
organization level to provide accountability, monitoring and oversight of the contracting
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force created significant problems. The monitoring and oversight of contracts are not
mission essential tasks for most units. As noted by organization factors, tasks that are not
defined as central to the mission are likely to be performed poorly and inadequately
resourced.
Ineffective contract accountability, oversight, and surveillance/monitoring have led
to opportunism, neglect, cost overruns, and the unsatisfactory performance of military
functions. These transactional hazards have undermined the DoD’s war fighting effort,
thrown into doubt whether the DoD can maintain transparency in its operations, and
made it easier for its power and control to be ceded to the private sector.
It is predictable from a basic organization theory perspective that contractor
monitoring and oversight would be endemic problems in the DoD. In general, the theory
suggests that militaries will frequently behave in ways that are inimical to the interests of
the state. While efficiency and cost savings were apparent interests of the state, contracts
were awarded by a wide array of organizations and there was little evidence that DoD
Instruction 3020.41 providing guidance on contractor support issues was being utilized
by DoD components (GAO 2006, 12). Despite the increased role of support contractors
across the DoD, there was limited contract management expertise and limited training for
personnel within units where contracted services were being delivered. Contract
management is not taught as a basic discipline in the services and is a skill limited to
specialty areas, such as acquisitions.
The flurry of identified DoD contract mismanagement and abuses since 2002 has
not been a surprise. As noted by Barry Posen, military organizations are usually closely
watched in times of increasing tension and frequently ignored in times of relative calm
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(Posen 1984, 241). As the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan became the primary national
security concern after 9/11, the U.S. Congress and political leaders highlighted the
breakdown in contractor accounting data between local organizations and department
leadership. This was just a reflection of the larger monitoring and oversight problems
that existed in the DoD throughout the study period.
In 2002, then-Army Secretary Thomas White warned DoD leadership that there was
inadequate control over private military contractors. Army planners and programmers at
the departmental level lacked visibility into the labor issues and costs associated with the
contract work force and the organizations and missions supported by them (White 2002).
This was highlighted by then-Assistant Army Secretary Reginald J. Brown in an April
2002 memo to Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), the ranking Republican on the Senate
Appropriations Committee, putting the figure for the contracted Army workforce at
between 124,000 and 605,000 (Lee 2002). Outside of the Army’s Logistics Civil
Augmentation Program contractor, who routinely provided employee data to the DoD,
which was atypical, other contracts provided estimates of the number of personnel
assigned to support contracts (Peckenpaugh 2004).
While this was an Army issue, all of the services appeared to face a similar problem
of not having credible information on contract labor costs. This was due in part to the
decentralized nature of outsourcing and procurement, and to lack of efficiency in the
implementation and management of the process across the DoD. A 2006 GAO report on
DoD actions regarding the management and oversight of contractors supporting deployed
forces noted that while DoD policy since 1990 recognized the importance of
visibility/transparency over the size of the contractor workforce, DoD continued to lack
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this capability. It could not provide senior leaders and military commanders with
information on the totality of contractor support to deployed forces ( GAO 2006, 3). The
problem continues to exist as the DoD is unable to account for all military contractors
due in part to the decentralized nature of government contracting, different accounting
procedures in each service and the complexity of the procurement process.
Angela Styles, the former chief of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy at the
Office of Management in the G.W. Bush administration, suggested that the number of
contractors working on a project is not relevant, as opposed to cost and quality of work
(Peckenpaugh 2004). Yet commanders in the field suggested that size of the contractor
workforce did matter as it impacted issues such as command and control, logistics and
security (Peckenpaugh 2004). Some senior military leaders in Iraq had no data on the
number of contractors employed at installations when building their base consolidation
plan, contributing to the risk of over-building or under-building the capacity of a base
(Government Account Office 2006, 4). The DoD did not aggregate the information and
lacked the ability to provide the data to commanders at higher levels ( GAO 2006, 15).
Limited visibility of contractor employment affected DoD’s management of its
missions with the unnecessary risk of increasing contracting costs for the government.
For example, a Defense Contract Management Agency official responsible for overseeing
portions of the Army’s LOGCAP contract at 27 installations in Iraq was unable to visit
all locations during a six month tour in Iraq due to limited manpower preventing effective
monitoring at those sites (GAO 2006, 4). Collecting and sharing institutional knowledge
on the use of contractors and lessons learned from previous and ongoing operations was
not developed or shared across the DoD. Also, DoD components provided limited or no
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information on contractor support in pre-deployment training ( GAO 2006, 5). This
contributed to inadequate planning for contractor support and confusion regarding the
roles and responsibilities of commanders in overseeing contractors at deployed locations
(GAO 2006, 5).
DoD outsourcing has challenged organizational effectiveness and unit leadership.
For example, findings from both the IT and 2001–2005 case studies point to how the
DoD outsourcing process and its dependency on private sector personnel may become
disruptive to an organization and detract from its mission. As noted by S.E. Finer, the
military services are marked by the superior quality of their organizations, where even the
most poorly organized or maintained of such armies is far more highly and tightly
structured than any civilian group (Finer 1962, 6). Finer points to a basic imperative of
the military services that still holds true in today’s defense structure — to fight as a unit,
with centralization through a supreme leader, and orders transmitted from highest to
lowest ranks through a fixed hierarchy (Finer 1962, 7). Posen adds that military
organizations that have planned and trained together in peacetime are better able to deal
with the friction of combat, particularly after an extended period of peace (Posen 1984,
243).
The outsourcing of DoD support and operational services transferred control of
military activities to non-state entities and challenged the organizational order imperative
to performing effectively as a unit. Contractors have added friction to the organizational
environment by operating under a different set of rules, are usually paid more money than
DoD personnel, and don’t abide by the same code of military justice. Contractors have
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also compromised the supremacy of local commanders by not being subject to any orders
and actions outside of their prescribed contract requirements.
Contractors don’t integrate seamlessly into military organizations, especially in the
deployed arena — commanders usually don’t have direct control over them and, for
many unit members, the first encounter with contractors comes when they arrive at a
deployed location. Many leaders have inadequate or no training in working with
contractors, and no experience or guidance as to the scope of the local contracts (GAO
2006a, 30). This has created confusion over roles and responsibilities and problems
integrating contract support into operational planning efforts ( GAO 2006, 29).
It has also created the potential for additional costs, and for unit leadership not
being focused on core objectives. Contractors provide services according to the scope of
the contract and request additional fees for expanded support, unlike the flexibility
provided by organic DoD personnel. Organic personnel can be used for a variety of
mission or organizational activities at the direction of the commander or supervisor
without increased cost to the organization. The lack of preparation of the contracting
environment at a deployed location results in commanders spending additional resources
and time away from their primary responsibilities in order to understand the relationships,
service deliverables and their extent of authority.
Adjudicating discipline issues and directing punishment for poor performance or
for rule/law breaking violations becomes much more challenging as well, as contractors
did not fall under the Uniformed Code of Military Justice through the end of the study
period in 2005. These issues become even more difficult when contractors are deployed
outside the United States. Commanders must spend additional time and resources
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becoming familiar with the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), Defense
Contract Management Agency, and Defense Contract Audit Agency to address these type
of issues (Kimball 2007, 4-6). The inclusion by Congress of U.S. military contractors
operating in combat zones into the UCMJ as part of the FY2007 Military Authorization
Act should provide assistance to combat zone commanders in providing good order and
discipline.
In addition, as noted by Finer, the military differs in function from the surrounding
civil society, and its success rests upon a spirit of unity and solidarity, captured in an
esprit de corps — an ensemble of beliefs and sentiments common to all members of the
group (Finer 1962, 9). Contractors in general don’t share this bond with service members
and in many cases are paid better wages, adding to a degree of exclusion within the
organization. While the military is grounded in service to a cause — defined by the
defense of the state and the protection and support of national democratic values.
Contractor participation is primarily grounded in economic interests where participation
is predicated on the salary they will earn, especially in conflict prone areas. Finally, the
tensions between private contractors and DoD personnel may undermine the loyalty,
initiative and fighting power of organizations, and decrease military effectiveness (Avant
2005, 261).
DoD outsourcing also poses challenges to the American public and to democracy
itself, as it threatens democratic principles in the performance of national defense.
Alexander George suggests that U.S. democratic processes have enhanced policy stability
and restraint both domestically and abroad (George 1999, 336–360). Limited
transparency in the accomplishment of military activities can undermine the state’s

316
capacity to govern. The outsourcing of military activities central to a DoD mission, along
with inefficient oversight, monitoring and contract surveillance, creates an environment
for opportunism among contractors where they increase their power and control over
these activities.
As Deborah Avant notes, contracting likely affects changes in political control in
strong states such as the U.S. Though states retain budgetary control and can choose
between contractors, the screening and selection of individuals, and organizational
incentives for individuals, are left in the hands of the firms (Avant 2005, 59). This is a
political change because the control over individuals authorized to use violence is based
on the firm rather than the state (Avant 2005, 59). This phenomenon is also relevant with
the selection of private sector personnel to perform DoD support activities, and those
central to core missions. When force is privatized, the military is challenged to ensure
that the private exercise of power is bounded by public values and controls, as the public
accountability function suffers with gaps in oversight and control (Verkuil 2007, 129).
When civilian contractors assume military roles, especially overseas, it changes the
political process, as fewer government decision makers are involved in sending
contractors, as compared to U.S. troops, abroad (Avant 2005, 132). As suggested earlier,
the redistribution of power reduces transparency and opens the way for private interests
to affect policy implementation and goals (Avant 2005, 60). It also gives political
leadership the ability to use force as an instrument of power with a minimal footprint.
Private actors can act in ways and make decisions that may not be in the best interest of
the U.S., without being accountable to the public. It gives political officials the
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opportunity to make decisions capable of enhancing their own welfare or a segment of
the public, rather than the entire community (Avant 2005, 135).
The use of contractors abroad is often regarded as a lower political commitment that
reduces the need to mobilize public support for foreign engagement activities.
Congressional leaders and the public have not appeared too interested or concerned about
sending contractors, as opposed to U.S. forces, overseas in support of contingency/war
fighting efforts (Avant 2005, 133). It can also void the need to mobilize and deploy the
states military forces for select contingencies and centralizes influence with those in
charge of contractor support (Avant 2005, 60).
While lack of transparency may offer benefits to government leaders, it allows for a
deficit in democratic principles and a lack of public accountability for national defense
activities. The lack of transparency is also furthered by the additional workforce of tens
of thousands of private sector personnel who perform support services in military
organizations but are virtually invisible to the public. They are not accounted for in
manpower statistics and exist only through O&M expenditures and supplemental budgets
that don’t have congressional oversight as with the procurement of high visibility weapon
systems. Dependency on a contractor workforce reduces the role and investment in
federal employees and may lead to a potential long-term decline in the capability of the
federal workforce and civil service.
The need to weigh the possibility of a larger organic force structure to retain
knowledge and skill, and to mitigate transaction hazards created through the outsourcing
of complex activities, needs to be addressed by senior leaders and the public. In many
cases, short-term services have grown into permanent services provided by a private
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sector/ contractor workforce that are relatively hidden and not accountable to the public.
The measure of contractor strength and capability is questionable considering the
problems in monitoring and oversight.
Organization factors suggest that outsourcing will likely remain relatively
decentralized and autonomous across the DoD, presenting a variety of challenges where
short term gains may come at the detriment of long-term DoD capacity and development.
As suggested by Deborah Avant, every time an activity is outsourced, the DoD invests in
a private rather than public capacity. It sends a message to DoD personnel that their
activity is not a core mission and well qualified people within the service will be less
likely to choose it (Avant 2005, 133).
U.S. leadership and the DoD appear content with the role of the private sector in
procurement of services and its integration into defense organizations. Over 57 percent
of DoD procurement dollars are spent on defense services, not equipment, a 66 percent
increase between 1999 and 2003 (Verkuil 2007, 129). Yet, as of 2009, the House Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee members complained that they have been unable to get
detailed accounting on DoD contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan and their activities
(Kreisher 2009). Nor does there appear to be an effective accounting of contractors
supporting DoD activities/missions in the United States.
To accurately assess its ability to provide defense and security missions worldwide
it’s imperative for senior DoD leadership to be able to account for the capabilities that
have been outsourced and those that continue to remain inherent to the organic force
structure across each service. Failure to do so may result in the devaluing of the U.S
defense capability and the loss of capacity in outsourced areas. It may pose similar
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challenges as those recently experienced by nation-states, the global business sector and
financial industry from the 2008 devaluing and collapse of major financial firms. The
climate of financial uncertainty and realignment appeared to result from inadequate levels
of oversight and failure to understand and appreciate the limits and ramifications of a
variety of financial instruments central to the industry.
Given its leveraged position with contractors, it is not clear whether the DoD can
produce and maintain the required military capability it advertises to support national
interests and provide for the well being of U.S. citizens in the future. Without knowing
the extent to which DoD missions have become dependent on private sector support for
their accomplishments and success, it’s difficult to assess the DoD’s future capabilities.
The use of private contractors opens up the possibility that American forces will not be
capable of providing key functional tasks (Avant 2005, 142). In the same way that the
federal government had to keep American Insurance Group afloat in 2008 in order to
prevent a catastrophic effect on the worldwide insurance and finance industry, the DoD
and Congress may likely find themselves in a position where they need to keep private
sector defense companies, especially those providing the DoD with its support and
technology services from failing in order to maintain its capabilities for national defense
and power projection.
To avoid the equivalent of bankruptcy in our defense and security missions, the
DoD needs to specifically account for the private sector role in its labyrinth of activities
and missions, as well as provide an ongoing evaluation of their capabilities and
performance. A bailout of the DoD could prove more difficult, as monetary measures in
addition to skilled personnel and resources would likely be required to keep our superior
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national defense from faltering. The time has passed when the government and DoD can
continue to ignore shortfalls and poor practices in procurement, competitive sourcing,
and contract management and their impact on the force structure and security.
Outsourcing has become a core process across the DoD for a variety of support services
integral to the daily mission of defense organizations. Knowing that organizational
factors play a central role in the outsourcing phenomenon, senior government and DoD
leaders have a professional responsibility to the American public to address outsourcing
behavior and actions pragmatically, in light of the future well being of defense
organizations, democratic values and the national security of the United States of
America.
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Overview of Theoretical Frameworks – Predictions and Performance
Case Study

1970–
1980

1981–
1988

1989–
1995

1996–
2000

2001–
2005

Info
Tech/
Networks

Theory

Outsourcing
Observations

Strategic
Efficiency
Political
Ideology
Org
Factors

- Decrease in
procured
services;
- Brief Increase
in comp
sourcing from
(1978–1980)

Strategic
Efficiency
Political
Ideology
Org
Factors

- Increase in
procured
services;
- Increase in
comp sourcing

Strategic
Efficiency
Political
Ideology
Org
Factors

- Decrease in
procured
services;
- Decrease in
comp sourcing

Strategic
Efficiency
Political
Ideology
Org
Factors

- Increase in
procured
services;
- Increase in
comp sourcing

Strategic
Efficiency
Political
Ideology
Org
Factors

- Increase in
procured
services;
- Decrease in
comp sourcing

Strategic
Efficiency
Political
Ideology
Org
Factors

- Navy
outsourced
network;
- Air Force and
Army did not
outsource
network

Theory
Prediction
for
Outsourcing
Low

Performance
of
Hypothesis

Low

Pass

Overall

Pass
Strategic Efficiency –

Med

Pass

Low

Fail

Med-High

Pass

Low

Fail

Low

Pass

Four cases consistent
with theory prediction;
Two cases inconsistent;
problems with contract
management, oversight
and monitoring
processes limited the
usefulness of the
framework; also
inconsistent procurement
behavior for activities
not offering expected
DoD cost-savings

Med- Low

Pass

Political Ideology –

Low

Pass

Med-High

Pass

Med-High

Fail

Med-High

Pass

Med

Pass

Two case consistent with
theory prediction; three
case inconsistent;
inability of Congress to
intervene in military
procurement activities
for support services and
minimal unilateral
influence of Executive
limited usefulness of
framework

Med-High

Fail

Low-Med

Pass

Med-High

Fail

Med

Fail

Low-Med

Pass

Organization Factors –
Five cases consistent
with theory prediction;
one case inconsistent;
framework offers most
consistent explanation
for DoD outsourcing
activities
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Strategic Efficiency – Theory Prediction
Note: Cost comparisons refers to the A-76 process
1970–1980

1981–1988

1989–1995

Theory Prediction:
Low Outsourcing

Theory Prediction:
Low Outsourcing

Theory Prediction:
Low Outsourcing

Justification
Pay
– DoD pay for enlisted,
officer and federal civilian is
more cost effective than
comparable private sector
personnel;
+Private sector personnel at
low-skilled/manual labor
positions offer comparable
cost value with federal or
military personnel;

Justification
Pay
-Military and Fed civilian
pay less than private sector
for enlisted and mid-senior
officer;
+Junior officer pay
competitive with private
sector equivalent between
1980–1985;

Justification
Pay
- Military and Fed civilian
pay less than private sector
in most enlisted and officer
positions;

Relative Pay Growth
-Private sector pay growing
faster than military and
federal civilians;
Medical
No significant impact;
Other
- 65-75% of outsourcing
through procurement of
services initiatives were
primarily in areas where DoD
personnel were better cost
savings;
+75% of outsourcing through
competitive sourcing
initiatives was in the
relatively low-skilled/manual
labor type commercial
activities of utilities and
housekeeping;

Relative Pay Growth
+Parity in military pay with
private sector in 1982;
- Private sector pay grows
faster than officer and senior
enlisted pay between 1983
and 1988; junior enlisted pay
growing faster than private
sector equivalents;
+Relative pay for DoD craft,
production, operator, laborer
activities grew faster than
private sector;
Medical
+Military expenses
beginning to grow at a faster
rate than private sector;
Other
+Private sector personnel at
low-skilled positions offer
comparable cost value to
federal or military personnel;

Relative Pay Growth
- Officer pay-growth slower
than private sector
equivalents; senior enlisted
pay-growth slower thru 1992
and faster than private sector
equivalents in 1993–94;
some junior enlisted pay
parity with private sector
equivalent in 1989 and pay
grew faster in 1990–95;
+Relative pay for craft,
production, operator, laborer
activities grew faster than
private sector;
Medical
+Military expenses growing
faster than private sector;
Other
+Private sector personnel at
low-skilled positions offer
comparable cost value than
federal or military personnel;
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Strategic Efficiency – Theory Prediction
1996–2000

2001–2005

Theory Prediction:
Medium Outsourcing

Theory Prediction:
Medium Outsourcing

Justification
Pay
+ Military and Fed civilian pay
becoming more competitive with
private sector;
- Middle to senior level enlisted and
officer positions remain cost savings to
DoD;
+ Junior enlisted and officer
compensation competitive with private
sector equivalents;

Justification
Pay
+Military and Fed civilian pay approaching
parity with private sector in junior civilian,
enlisted and officer;
-Private sector more costly
in middle to senior level enlisted and officer
positions;

Relative Pay-Growth
- Officer and senior enlisted pay grew
slower than private sector equivalents;
+Junior enlisted pay-growth faster than
private sector equivalents;
Medical
+Military expenses growing faster than
private sector; nearly four times the
cost for private sector;
Other
+Private sector actors becoming
increasingly cost-effective for some
military positions when including
medical compensation variables;
- Mixed findings on cost savings value
of federal employees;
+Private sector personnel at lowskilled positions offer comparable cost
value than federal or military
personnel;
+DoD Budget at its lowest levels since
1976;

Relative Pay-Growth
+Congress adjusts military
pay to create parity in pay-growth in military
and private sector through 2006;
Medical
+Military expenses growing faster than
private sector;
Other
+Increase in military compensation;
+Military less cost-effective
for low-to-mid-level positions;
+Private sector personnel at
low-skilled positions offer greater cost
savings than
federal or military
personnel;
-Military and federal
civilian more cost-effective for higher skilled
and upper middle to senior positions;
-Weak contracting
oversight and monitoring processes;
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Strategic Efficiency – Outcome of Outsourcing Behavior
1970–1980

1981–1988

1989–1995

Outcome: Medium
correlation with
theory prediction

Outcome: Low
correlation with theory
prediction

Outcome: Medium
correlation with theory
prediction

Average percent of
O&M spent on
procured services was
57.8 percent;
percent of O&M
dollars spent on
procured services
declined by 3.5
percent during case;
25-35 percent of
procured services
were for low skilled
jobs; Competitive
sourcing activity had
significant increase
between 1978 and
1980; DoD completed
cost comparisons
increased from 1-205
by the end of 1980; 75
percent of
competitions were for
low skilled positions;

Average percent of
O&M spent on procured
services was 64.2
percent; percent of
O&M dollars spent on
procured services
increased by 9.3 percent
during case; 25-35
percent of procured
services were for low
skilled jobs; Competitive
Sourcing activity was
significant; the DoD
completed 1,631 cost
comparisons between
1981 and 1988 with an
annual dollar value
average of $279
million; 75 percent of
competitions were for
low skilled positions;

Average percent of O&M
spent on procured services
was 61.6 percent; percent of
O&M dollars spent on
procured services increased
by 1.2 percent during case;
O&M Budget decreased and
amount spent on
procurement of services
decreased;
Competitive Sourcing
activity declined
considerable as compared to
the 1981-88 period;
completed cost comparison
studies were reduced to 183
between 1989 and 1994;
Total positions studied
declined from 12,000 in
1988 to 2,128 in 1995 and
was preceded by annual
totals of 496, 441, 1623,
between 1992 and 1994;

325

Strategic Efficiency – Outcome of Outsourcing Behavior
1996–2000

2001–2005

Outcome:
Medium-to-High correlation
with theory prediction

Outcome:
Medium correlation with theory
prediction

Increased procurement and
competitive sourcing activity;
Average percent of O&M spent
on procured services was 64.8
percent; percent of O&M spent on
procured services decreased by 3
percent during case; O&M budget
increased and amount spent on
procurement remained consistent;
Competitive Sourcing measured
through A-76 activities;
competitive sourcing initiatives
increased; A-76 competitions
increased from 20 in 1996 to 210
in 2000; positions competed
increased form under 100 in 1996
to 8000 in 2000; DoD competitive
sourcing initiatives increased from
50 in 1995 to nearly 450 in 1999;

Average percent of O&M spent on
procured services was 63.3 percent;
percent of O&M spent on procured
services increased by 3.7 percent during
case; O&M budget increased and
amount spent on procurement of
services increased; Competitive
Sourcing activity as measured by the
average # of positions competed, A-76
competitions and announced
competitive sourcing initiatives
decreased; the average # of positions
annually competed declined under
14,000 in 2003; A-76 competitions
decreased from over 200 in 2000 to 160
in 2003; announced competitive
sourcing initiatives declined from 450
in 1999 to under 50 in 2004;
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Political Ideology – Theory Prediction
1970–1980

1981–1988

1989–1995

Theory Prediction:
Low Outsourcing

Theory Prediction:
Medium-to-High
Outsourcing

Theory Prediction:
Medium-to-Low
Outsourcing

Justification
+Neoliberal/marketcentric ideas grow
throughout period;
+ Republican
presidency offered
support for increased
market-centric
economic
policymaking; strong
support for private
sector firms performing
government functions;
+ Congress split
through first Reagan
admin;
+ Weak House during
first term;
- Democratic Congress
during last half of 2nd
Reagan admin offered
increased resistance to
market-centric designs;

Justification
+ Expect Reagan’s
neoliberal economic
principles to carry
forward with Republican
admin of G.H.W. Bush;
- Clinton admin
represents conservative
element of the
Democratic party;
- Democrat controlled
Congress increases
resistance for further
market activity;
- Congress initiated
legislation having direct
affect on DoD;
competitive sourcing
activities and results
through 1995;

Justification
- State intervention
prevailed as
foundation for
economy;
- Market-centric ideas
have minority position
but increase toward
end of decade with
deregulation efforts;
- Using private sector
for DoD activities not
in mainstream political
discourse
or strategies;
- Nixon admin chose
state interventionist
approach to economic
management;
+Ford admin action to
incorporate market
ideas correlated with
deregulation efforts
and increased use of
private sector;
- Carter admin actions
to reduce private
sector in DoD
activities were
unsuccessful;
+Deregulation efforts
support neoliberal
aims;
+Commercial sourcing
activity increased;
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Political Ideology – Theory Prediction
1996–2000

2001–2005

Theory Prediction: Medium-toLow Outsourcing

Theory Prediction: Medium-toHigh Outsourcing

Justification
+ Clinton administration moving to
the right, increasing market
tendencies in policymaking;
+ Congress (R) outsourcing friendly;
- FAIR Act actions by Clinton
administration provide limited
opportunities for private sector;
- Clinton administration alignment
with federal unions to limit
competitive sourcing activities;

Justification
+ Pres. Bush support for
neoliberalism;
+ SecDef strong market-centric
economic policy advocate;
- Senate relatively split;
+ Small Republican majority in
House;
+ President announces PMA
supporting federal activities
competition as top five priority;
+ Iraq infrastructure development
plan following neo-liberal
architecture;
- Bilateral Congressional pushback
on competitive sourcing objectives
and A-76 program;
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Political Ideology – Outcome of Outsourcing Behavior
19

1970–1980
Outcome:
Medium
correlation with
theory prediction
Average percent of
O&M spent on
procured services
was 57.8 percent;
percent of O&M
spent on procured
services declined
by 3.5 percent
during case;
25-35 percent of
procured services
were for low
skilled jobs;
Competitive
sourcing activity
had significant
increase between
1978 and 1980;
DoD completed
cost comparisons
increased from 1205 by the end of
1980; 75 percent
of competitions
were for low
skilled positions;

197 1981–1988

1989–1995

Outcome:
High correlation with
theory prediction

Outcome:
Medium correlation with
theory prediction

Average percent of
O&M spent on
procured services was
64.2 percent; percent of
O&M spent on
procured services
increased by 9.3 percent
during case; 25-35
percent of procured
services were for low
skilled jobs;
Competitive Sourcing
activity was significant;
annual average of cost
comparison studies was
203 between 1981 and
1988; 1,631 cost
comparisons completed
between 1981-1988; 75
percent of competitions
were for low skilled
positions;

Average percent of O&M
spent on procured services
was 61.6 percent; percent of
O&M spent on procured
services increased by 1.2
percent during case; O&M
Budget decreased and
amount spent on
procurement of services
decreased;
Competitive Sourcing
activity declined
considerable from the 198188 period as indicated by
cost comparison studies and
annual positions studied;
completed cost comparison
studies were reduced to 183
between 1989 and 1994;
total positions studied
declined from 12,000 in
1988 to 2,128 in 1995 and
was preceded by annual
totals of 496, 441, 1623,
between 1992 and 1994;
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Political Ideology – Outcome of Outsourcing Behavior
1996–2000

2001–2005

Outcome:
Medium-to-Low correlation
with theory prediction

Outcome:
Med-to-Low correlation with theory
prediction

Increased procurement and
competitive sourcing activity;
Average percent of O&M spent
on procured services was 64.8
percent; percent of O&M spent on
procured services decreased by 3
percent during case; O&M budget
increased and amount spent on
procurement remained consistent;
Competitive Sourcing measured
through A-76 activities;
competitive sourcing initiatives
increased; A-76 competitions
increased from 20 in 1996 to 210
in 2000; positions competed
increased form under 100 in 1996
to 8000 in 2000; DoD competitive
sourcing initiatives increased from
50 in 1995 to nearly 450 in 1999;

Average percent of O&M spent on
procured services was 63.3 percent;
percent of O&M spent on procured
services increased by 3.7 percent during
case; O&M budget increased and
amount spent on procurement of
services increased; Competitive
Sourcing activity as measured by the
average # of positions competed, A-76
competitions and announced
competitive sourcing initiatives
decreased; the average # of positions
annually competed declined under
14,000 in 2003; A-76 competitions
decreased from over 200 in 2000 to 160
in 2003; announced competitive
sourcing initiatives declined from 450
in 1999 to under 50 in 2004;
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Organization Factors – Theory Predictions
1970–1980

1981–1988

1989–1995

Theory Prediction:
Low Outsourcing

Theory Prediction:
Low Outsourcing

Theory Prediction:
Low Outsourcing

Justification
-Outsourcing activities
decentralized;
-Org autonomy;
-Local organizations
controlled process for
choosing activity and
extent of outsourcing;
-Organizations
selectively followed
OMB guidance for
competitive sourcing;
-minimal oversight;
+Vietnam war;
+Budget reduced;

Justification
-Outsourcing activities
decentralized;
-Org autonomy;
-Local organizations
controlled process for
choosing activity and extent
of outsourcing;
- Organizations selectively
followed OMB guidance
for competitive sourcing;
-Minimal oversight;
- No major conflicts;
- Budget increased;

Justification
- Service leaders reluctant to
change practices and
missions in early post-Cold
War period;
- Org autonomy;
- Organizations face
reduction, seek to maintain
force size;
+ Budget reductions;
+Weapons modernization
requires increased funding;
+ Increased dependency on
commercial technology;
+ Increased operations
tempo due to Iraq (Desert
Storm) and Balkans conflict;
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Organization Factors – Theory Predictions
1996–2000

2001–2005

Theory Prediction:
Medium-to-High Outsourcing

Theory Prediction:
Low-to-Medium Outsourcing

Justification
+Service leaders more inclined to
support outsourcing due to budget
reductions and need to modernize
force;
+limited organization autonomy;
+Decreased DoD budget, lowest level
since 1976;
+ Weapons modernization requires
increased funding;
+ Increased dependency on
commercial tech;
+ Increased operations tempo due to
conflict in Balkans and post-Iraq
(Desert Storm) missions;

Justification
+ Service leaders need to procure support
for requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq;
+ Limited org autonomy;
+ Increased operations tempo with largest
force deployment over extended period of
time since Vietnam conflict;
+ Increased technological maturity and
integration in missions; minimal internal
expertise and support infrastructure;
+Weapons modernization;
-Budget increasing;
- Organizations have limited control over
contractors;
- Local organization leaders have interest
in protecting employees (military/civilian);
- Deployments limit competitive sourcing
activities;
- Reduced force size in midst of two major
conflicts, minimal desire to replace existing
force structure;
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Organization Factors – Outcome of Outsourcing Behavior
1970–1980

1981–1988

1989–1995

Outcome: Medium
correlation with
theory prediction

Outcome: Low
correlation with theory
prediction

Outcome: Medium-toHigh correlation with
theory prediction

Average percent of
O&M spent on
procured services was
57.8 percent; percent
of O&M spent on
procured services
declined by 3.5 percent
during case;
25-35 percent of
procured services were
for low skilled jobs;
competitive sourcing
activity had increased
between 1978 and
1980; DoD completed
cost comparisons
increased from 1-205
by 1980;

Average percent of O&M
spent on procured services
was 64.2 percent; percent
of O&M spent on procured
services increased by 9.3
percent during case; 25-35
percent of procured
services were for low
skilled jobs; Competitive
Sourcing activity was
significant; annual average
for cost comparison studies
was 203 between 1981 and
1988; 1,631 cost
comparisons completed
between 1981–1988; 75
percent of competitions
were for low skilled
positions;

Average percent of O&M
spent on procured services
was 61.6 percent; O&M
spent on procured services
increased by 1.2 percent;
O&M budget decreased;
amount spent on
procurement of services
decreased;
Competitive Sourcing
activity declined as
indicated by cost
comparison studies and
annual positions studied;
completed cost comparison
studies were reduced to 183
between 1989 and 1994;
total positions studied
declined from 12,000 in
1988 to 2,128 in 1995 and
was preceded by annual
totals of 496, 441, 1,623,
between 1992 and 1994;
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Organization Factors – Outcome of Outsourcing Behavior
1996–2000

2001–2005

Outcome: Medium-to-High
correlation with theory prediction

Outcome: High correlation with theory
prediction

Average percent of O&M spent on
procured services was 64.8 percent;
percent of O&M spent on procured
services decreased by three percent;
O&M budget increased and funds
spent on procurement remained
consistent; Competitive Sourcing
measured through A-76 activities;
DoD competitive sourcing initiatives
increased; A-76 competitions
increased from 20 in 1996 to 210 in
2000; positions competed increased
form under 100 in 1996 to 8,000 in
2000; DoD competitive sourcing
initiatives increased from 50 in 1995 to
450 in 1999;

Average percent of O&M spent on
procured services was 63.3 percent; percent
of O&M spent on procured services
increased by 3.7 percent during case; O&M
budget increased and amount spent on
procurement of services increased;
Competitive Sourcing activity as measured
by the average # of positions competed; A76 competitions and announced
competitive sourcing initiatives decreased;
the average # of positions annually
competed declined under 14,000 in 2003;
A-76 competitions decreased from over
200 in 2000 to 160 in 2003; announced
competitive sourcing initiatives declined
from 450 in 1999 to under 50 in 2004;
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TABLES

TABLE 1
Comparison of DoD’s Use of Contract Obligations for select Services
between Fiscal Years 1996 to 2005 (dollars in billions)

Service Category

Professional, administrative,
and management support
Information Technology
Medical Services
Housekeeping Services
(GAO 2006c, 5)

Service obligations
Fiscal year

1996
$10.8

2005
$28.3

Percentage of
service
obligations
fiscal year
2005
20.0

4.9
1.6
2.4

10.3
8.0
4.8

7.3
5.6
3.4

Percentage
change, fiscal
years 1996 to
2005

110
412
98

161
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TABLE 3
Real Growth/Decline in National Defense Spending
FY 1970 to FY1988

BUDGET AUTHORITY
Fiscal Current Constant
Year
Dollars
FY2005
Dollars
1970
75.3
401.0
71
72.7
365.7
72
76.4
351.6
73
79.1
335.6
74
81.5
318.2
75
86.2
307.6
76
97.3
321.6
77
110.2
334.5
78
117.2
329.8
79
126.5
328.1
80
143.9
333.6
1981
180.0
370.8
82
216.5
410.0
83
245.0
442.7
84
265.2
462.5
85
294.7
493.9
86
289.1
474.9
87
287.4
460.2
88
292.0
451.3

Real Growth
/Decline

Current
Dollars

-9.0%
-8.8%
-3.9%
-4.6%
-5.2%
-3.3%

81.7
78.9
79.2
76.7
79.3
86.5
89.6
97.2
104.5
116.3
134.0
157.5
185.3
209.9
227.4
252.7
273.4
282.0
290.4

4.6%
4.0%
-1.4%
-0.5%
1.7%
11.1%
10.6%
8.0%
4.5%
6.8%
-3.8%
-3.1%
-1.9%

OUTLAYS
Constant Real Growth
FY2005
/Decline
Dollars
436.2
-7.1%
398.1
-8.7%
369.6
-7.2%
336.9
-8.8%
322.4
-4.3%
315.0
-2.3%
305.1
-3.1%
307.4
0.8%
307.5
0.0%
316.9
3.1%
324.9
2.5%
339.5
4.5%
362.6
6.8%
391.0
7.8%
406.7
4.0%
433.2
6.5%
455.1
5.0%
456.5
0.3%
454.9
-0.4%
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TABLE 3
Real Growth/Decline in National Defense Spending
FY 1989 to FY 2005

BUDGET AUTHORITY
Fiscal Current Constant
Year
Dollars
FY2005
Dollars
89
299.6
445.5
90
301.2
435.2
1991
296.2
411.5
92
287.7
390.8
93
281.1
374.2
94
263.3
343.2
95
266.4
340.0
96
266.2
332.5
97
270.4
330.3
98
271.3
323.1
99
292.3
339.5
2000
304.1
344.2
01
335.3
368.9
02
362.1
387.6
03
456.2
476
04
460.5
469.7
05
448.1
448.1
(Carter and Coipuram, 2005, 24)

Real Growth
/Decline

Current
Dollars

-1.3%
-2.3%
-5.4%
-5.0%
-4.2%
-8.3%
-0.9%
-2.2%
-0.7%
-2.2%

303.6
297.9
296.7
286.1
283.9
278.9
271.0
265.2
270.5
268.5
274.9
294.5
305.5
348.6
404.9
453.7
469.4

5.1%
1.4%
7.2%
5.1%
22.8%
-1.3%
-4.6%

OUTLAYS
Constant Real Growth
FY2005 /Decline
Dollars
456.0
0.3%
435.3
-4.5%
417.1
-4.2%
389.0
-6.7%
376.1
-3.3%
360.8
-4.1%
345.0
-4.4%
331.0
-4.1%
328.9
-0.6%
318.9
-3.0%
320.3
0.4%
333.5
4.1%
335.6
0.6%
372.3
10.9%
422.5
13.5%
461.1
9.4%
469.4
1.6%
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TABLE 4
DoD A-76 Cost Studies by Functional Area
from October 1978 through December 1986

Function

Number
of
Studies

Estimated
dollar savings

Facilities/grounds/utilities maintenance
Custodial
Commissary/clothing store
Motor pool/vehicle maintenance
Multifunction/base maintenance
Supply/warehousing/distribution
Administrative telephone and communications
Equipment maintenance
Management/administrative support
Automated data processing
Audiovisual
Other
Fire protection/guard
Laundry/dry cleaning
Food service
Transport
Library
Mail and file
Printing
Education and training
Data entry
Health services
Architecture/engineering
Manufacturing
Social/community services

251
201
145
124
120
109
96
82
81
66
65
59
54
50
35
29
24
18
16
14
12
7
2
1
0

$89,073
26,196
20,170
56,283
155.515
31,783
20,924
49,475
8,968
3,677
18,645
42,383
7,870
12,554
27,196
25,993
277
462
781
11,402
2,234
431
56
209
0

All Functions

1,661

$612,557

(GAO 1988, 15)
Note: A description of the types of functions included in each of the 25 categories studied is provided in the
Appendix.
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TABLE 5
DoD Completed Cost Comparisons by Fiscal Year
of Initial Decision
Fiscal Year

Total
1
114
205
186
292
370
171
192
184
127
109
70
29
66
9
2
7

Annualized Dollars
(000s)
1,536
152,934
557,934
369,334
428,160
390,584
161,025
263,502
203,770
239,844
177,548
156,242
35,502
67.945
11,369
7,712
9,063

Average Annualized Dollars
(000s)
1,536
1,342
2,719
1,986
1,466
1,056
942
1,372
1,107
1,889
1,629
2,232
1,224
1,029
1,263
3,856
1,295

1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Total

2134

3,233,565

1,515

(Keating 1997, 3, 52)
Note: FY78 through 94 data was derived from the FY 94 Commercial Activity Management Information
System (CAMIS) database. A CAMIS record is set up every time a function is nominated for A-76 cost
comparison.
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TABLE 7
Positions Studied in the DoD and Civilian Agencies
between the G.H.W. Bush and Clinton Administrations

Fiscal Year

Total FTEs

DoD FTEs

1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

17,249
8,469
9,547
2,026
564
509
1,691
2,386
5,267
25,255

12,000
6,100
6,989
1,243
496
441
1,623
2,128
5,241
25,255

Civilian
Agencies FTEs
5,249
2,369
2,558
783
68
68
68
258
26
0

(Grasso 2003, 10).
Note: An FTE is the calculation of staffing levels using staff work time as a factor. As a result of an OMB
Circular A-76 competition, the function currently performed by federal agency workers could be
transferred to a source outside of the agency, including another federal agency or the private sector.
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TABLE 8
MILITARY PAY PERCENTILES
Basic Military Pay as Percentile of Private Sector Pay for Male Enlisted and Officer
Personnel
Fiscal
Year

E-4, 4 Years
of Service
(YOS) vs. 2226 Year Old,
High School

E-4, 4
YOS vs.
22-26 Year
Old, Some
College

E-5, 10
YOS vs.,
27-31 Year
Old, Some
College

82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

49
54
54
57
59
57
55
56
61
60
63
68
68
66
68
65
67
71

49
42
52
48
51
51
48
50
54
55
60
63
63
62
63
61
63
65

49
50
45
49
48
50
50
47
51
50
58
60
61
61
62
58
61
61

O-3, 8 YOS
vs. 27-31
Year Old,
4+ Years
College,
Professional/
Technical
76
73
69
70
65
64
61
62
63
64
67
71
67
69
68
64
69
64

O-4, 10 YOS
vs. 32-36
Year Old, 4+
Years
College,
Professional/
Technical
66
64
63
61
61
58
54
53
55
54
55
55
54
54
57
56
59
58

(Hosek 2001, 75)
Note: Military Pay is measured as basic military compensation (BMC) from 1982–1997 and regular
military compensation (RMC) from 1998–1999. BMC includes basic pay, basic allowance for subsistence,
basic allowance for quarters, and the tax advantage arising from the no taxability of the allowances. RMC
is the same except the basic allowance for housing replaces the basic allowance for quarters. Private sector
pay is from the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey. The sample is limited to the
previous-year pay for workers who reported at least 35 hours per week and at least 35 weeks in that year.
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TABLE 9
Changes in Military Compensation for Average Active Duty Military Personnel,
1999–2005 (Excluding VA benefits) (in FY 2005 Dollars)

(Kosiak 2005, 27)
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TABLE 10
1998 Comparison of the Annual Value of Federal and Private-Sector Benefits for
Five Hypothetical Employees (in dollars)

(Musell and Holen 1998, viii)
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TABLE 11 Composition of Congress
(Majority Party highlighted: Blue-Democrat, Red-Republican)
Senate
Congressional
Session

Dem

Rep

Other

91st

1969–71

57

43

—

92nd

1971–73

54

44

2

93rd

1973–75

56

42

2

94th

1975–77

60

38

1

95th

1977–79

61

38

1

96th

1979–81

58

41

1

97th

1981–83

46

53

1

98th

1983–85

46

54

—

99th

1985–87

47

53

—

100th

1987–89

55

45

—

101st

1989–91

55

45

—

102nd

1991–93

56

44

—

103rd

1993–95

57

43

—

104th

1995–97

48

52

—

105th

1997–99

45

55

—

106th

1999–01

45

55

—

107th Jan-

2001–01

50

50

—

2001–02

50

49

1

2002–03

48

50

2

2003–05

48

51

1

Party
Control

D
D
D
D
D
D
R
R
R
D
D
D
D
R
R
R
R

House

Dem

Rep

243

192

255

180

242

192

291

144

292

143

277

158

242

192

269

166

253

182

258

177

260

175

267

167

258

176

204

230

206

228

211

223

212

221

212

221

212

221

204

229

Party
Control

D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
R
R
R
R

Jun
107th Jun-

D

R

Nov
107th

R

R

Nov-Jan
108th

R

R
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TABLE 12
1993 Variations Among the Services in Using Enlisted Personnel
to Fill Civilian Equivalent Positions
Air Force enlisted
and civilian
personnel

Army enlisted and
civilian personnel

Navy enlisted and
civilian personnel

Occupational
specialty

Number

Percent
Civilian

Number

Percent
civilian

Number

Percent
Civilian

Administration,
general
Auditing and
accounting
Computer
operators/
analysts
Construction
equipment
Electricians
Electronic
instruments
Fire fighting and
damage control
Food service,
general
Information and
education, general
Law enforcement,
general

39,154

59.6

55,518

76.9

34,445

67.7

4,370

42.7

5,332

88.5

4,396

100.0

11,279

16.7

4,663

67.5

5,639

53.4

1,919

57.5

11,247

78.9

2,277

44.3

3,615
20,027

41.9
44.2

1,906
8,059

86.5
82.7

7,111
8,223

81.9
77.4

8,164

34.5

2,934

92.1

2,880

100.0

6,322

14.1

14,986

18.4

14,198

6.6

5,038

52.9

5,309

88.7

2,553

76.2

10,229

4.6

17,191

6.4

3,509

72.6
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TABLE 12
1993 Variations Among the Services in Using Enlisted Personnel
to Fill Civilian Equivalent Positions
Air Force enlisted
and civilian
personnel

Army enlisted and
civilian personnel

Navy enlisted and
civilian personnel

Occupational
specialty

Number

Percent
Civilian

Number

Percent
civilian

Number

Percent
Civilian

Mechanical and
electrical
equipment
Medical
administration and
logistics
Motor vehicle
operators
Personnel, general
Recruiting and
counseling
Security guards
Supply
administration
Transportation
Utilities
Warehousing and
equipment
handling
Total enlisted and
civilian functions

4,590

100.0

5,043

75.0

12,033

85.9

6,108

19.8

6,626

50.6

1,468

100.0

5,491

43.3

14,280

23.4

1,929

100.0

12,082
1,328

27.1
9.0

21,770
3,934

40.0
5.3

8,842
1,592

44.8
27.5

16,782
25,109

2.2
40.7

1,896
42,206

100.0
32.3

1,496
24,390

57.8
45.7

9,255
10,428
9,026

16.0
42.9
49.5

3,656
8604
9,645

59.1
88.8
86.6

1,894
13,052
7.904

82.4
73.4
100.0

491,419

27.1

674,843

28.2

603,177

27.3

Source: Occupational specialty data provided by Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC)
(GAO 1994, 21)
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FIGURES

FIGURE 1

(DoD Comptroller 2006, 64–67; DoD SIAD 2006)
Note 1: Total Obligation Authority (TOA): TOA is a DoD financial term that expresses the value of the
DIRECT Defense program for a fiscal year. It includes regular O&M appropriations, any supplemental
O&M appropriations, and any funding from other appropriation accounts transferred or reprogrammed into
the O&M account during budget execution (DoD Comptroller 2006, 1; GAO 2007, 8).
Note 2: The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is a measure of the average change over time in the prices paid by
urban consumers for a fixed market basket of consumer goods and services (DoD Comptroller 2006, 39).
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FIGURE 1 Data
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FIGURE 1 Data
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FIGURE 1B
Average Percent of O&M for Procured Services
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FIGURE 2
Comparison of Military and Civilian DoD Pay
with Service Procurement Cost
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FIGURE 4
Total Annual Pay for Military and DoD Civilians

(DoD Comptroller 2006, 64–67; 70–73)
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FIGURE 4 Data 1970–2005
Military vs. DoD Civilian Pay
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FIGURE 5
FTE Positions in A-76 Competitions between 1979 and 1996
with Projected Activity between 1997 and 2003

(Cohen 1997a, 30)
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FIGURE 6
Trends in the Average Number of Total FTEs Competed for each Year
from 1996 through 2003

(Gansler and Lucyshyn 2004, 26)
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FIGURE 7
DoD A-76 Competitions 1995–2003

(Gansler and Lucyshyn 2004, 22)
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FIGURE 8
Announced DoD Competitive Sourcing Initiatives
1995–2004: Number of Competitive Sourcing Initiatives Announced by DoD (Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Defense Agencies and Field Activities)
from FY 1995 to FY 2004

(Kleinknecht et al 2005, 9)
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FIGURE 9
Enlisted Pay as a Percent of Private Sector Pay, Males

(Hosek 2001, 72)
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FIGURE 10
Officer Pay as Percent of Private Sector Pay, Males

(Hosek 2001, 74)
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FIGURE 11
Relative Pay Growth/Decline in Military

(Hosek et al 1994, 7)
Note 1: ECI (Employment Cost Index) is used for measuring wage growth in the civilian sector. It has
been used in setting military pay increases in the military. Negative bar indicates that pay in the military
has grown more slowly than in the civilian sector

Note 2: Pay gaps are comparisons of relative pay-growth as measured from a base point rather than
comparisons of absolute pay levels. Fiscal 1982 is the base point for the pay gap computation reported here
for the ECI. In 1982 Congress provided the military with a large pay raise to create parity with the private
sector. Pay is tracked by a Basic Pay Index (BPI), and the gap is computed as the percentage difference in
the BPI and the ECI (Hosek, Peterson, and Heilbrunn1994; Williams 1995).
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FIGURE 12
Differences Between Military and
Private Sector Pay Raises since 1982
(Percent)

(Gilmore 2007, 12)
Notes: RMC = regular military compensation (basic pay, allowances for housing and subsistence, and the
federal tax advantage that occurs because those allowances are not taxed); ECI = employment cost index.
These comparisons exclude the military’s special pays, bonuses, and noncash benefits.
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FIGURE 14
ECI BASED MILITARY PAY GAP

(Asch and Hosek 1999, 5)
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FIGURE 15
DECI Based Military Pay Gap for Officers
and Enlisted Personnel

(Asch and Hosek 1999, 8)
Note: The DECI (Defense Employment Cost Index) is an alternative index that RAND developed to
measure pay comparability for military personnel. The DECI tracks wage growth for civilians who are
demographically similar (based on age, education, and occupation) to personnel on active duty. A positive
bar indicates that pay in the military has grown more rapidly than in the civilian sector.
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FIGURE 16
Civilian vs. Junior and Senior Enlisted
Pay Growth 1980s–1990s

(Asch and Hosek 1999, 11)
Note: Boom refers to the economic growth during the mid–1990’s
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FIGURE 17
Relative Pay Growth/Decline in DoD Functional Areas

(Hosek et al 1994, 15)
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FIGURE 18
Estimated Distribution of Federal/Private Salary Differences for Selected
Professional and Administrative Occupations in FY 2000
(Thousands of federal employees)

(Percentage Difference in Salaries)
(Musell 2002, 6,8)
Note: Administrative and Professional occupations include computer specialists, accountants and lawyers.
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FIGURE 19
Estimated Distribution of Federal/Private Salary Differences for Selected Technical
and Clerical Occupations in FY 2000
(Thousands of federal employees)

(Percentage Difference in Salaries)
(Musell 2002, 6,8)
Note: Technical and Clerical occupations include computer operators, clerk, and secretary.
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FIGURE 20
Comparison of Changes in Federal
and Private Sector Pay
(Index of Change)

Source: Congressional Budget Office using data provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Office
of Personnel Management.
Note: The gap shown is calculated by CBO on the basis of changes in federal pay compared with changes
in the ECI. The calculated gap compares with an official estimate of 23 percent.
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FIGURE 21
Percent of Military Personnel who Serve for a 20–Year Career

(Walker 2005b, 7)
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FIGURE 22
Military Compensation (excluding Veterans’ Benefits) for the Average Active Duty
Service Member in 1988, 1999 and 2005

(Kosiak 2005)
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FIGURE 25
The DoD’s Historical Medical Spending
and the Size of the Active Duty Force

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on information from the Department of Defense's 2003 Future
Years Defense Program (for medical spending); Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal Years
2004/2005: Military Personnel Programs (for the 2003 accrual payment included in medical spending);
and the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System and Managed Care Forecasting and Analysis
System (for the size of the active-duty force).
a. Excludes mobilized and full-time members of the Reserves and National Guard.
Note: The Department of Defense's medical spending increased from $6,600 per active-duty service
member in 1988 to $19,600 in 2003, or by a total of $13,000.
a. Owing to the greater use of technology, changes in the utilization of health care services, and higher
medical prices.
b. Consisting of a decrease in the number of active-duty military personnel and their dependents and an
increase in the number of retirees and their dependents and survivors
(Percy, Clay-Mendez, and Gilmore 2003, 2).
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FIGURE 26
Medical Spending per Dollar of Cash Compensation for Service Members and for
Federal and Private Sector Employees–1988 to 2020

Source: Congressional Budget Office using information from the Department of Defense (for military
service members); Office of Personnel Management (for federal civilian employees' salaries and Federal
Employees Health Benefits program premiums); and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (for comparable data on
private-sector employees).
Note: Error bars represent high and low estimates.
a. Based on 1991 data because earlier data are not available.
(Percy, Clay-Mendez, and Gilmore 2003, xi)
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FIGURE 28

Usage of the Terms Outsourcing and Privatization
in Newspapers and Academic Journals
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FIGURE 28 Data 1970–1997
Usage of the Terms Outsourcing and Privatization
in Newspapers and Academic Journals

374
FIGURE 28 Data 1998–2005
Usage of the Terms Outsourcing and Privatization
in Newspapers and Academic Journals

375
FIGURE 29
Types of Commercial Activities Outsourced

(DoD SIAD and Division 2006)
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FIGURE 29 Data 1970–1993
Types of Commercial Activities Outsourced

Note: In 2005 dollars (thousands)
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FIGURE 29 Data 1994–2005
Types of Commercial Activities Outsourced

Note: In 2005 dollars (thousands)
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APPENDIX
Primary DoD Functions Included in
25 Categories of Functions in A-76 Studies
Administrative telephone and communications - Administrative telephone services,
telecommunication centers, communication systems installation, and intermediate repair
of communications equipment.
Architecture and Engineering – Architecture, engineering, and technical services.
Audiovisual – Visual information support, audiovisual production, technical
documentation, electronic media, and audiovisual design services.
Automated Data Processing (ADP) – Data processing, operations and maintenance of
ADP equipment, ADP production control and customer service, data transmission,
system design, development and programming, and applications systems development
and maintenance.
Commissary/clothing store – Commissary and clothing store operation activities.
Custodial – Janitor, pest management, and refuse collection.
Data entry – Data transcription/data entry and punch card processing.
Education and Training – Operation of training devices and simulators, recruit training,
officer training, specialized skills training, flight training, professional development,
civilian education and training, dependent education, and other training.
Equipment Maintenance – Intermediate and depot level maintenance of various
equipment including aircraft, missiles, vessels, combat vehicles, and armaments, as well
as railway, industrial, dining facility, medical, dental, and other equipment.
Facilities/Grounds/Utilities maintenance – Maintenance and repair of buildings.
Structures, grounds, railway, waterway, and waterfront facilities. Operation and
maintenance of electrical, plants and systems, heating plants and systems, water plants
and systems, sewage and waste plants, air conditioning and refrigeration plants, and other
utilities.
Fire Protection and Guard – Fire prevention, protection, and guard services
(GAO 1988)
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